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Despite a preoccupation with the concepts of land and rent during initial historical 
cycles of colonization and capital expansion, today’s Western philosophers neglect the 
importance of land, preferring the generic ontologies offered by the ostensibly analogous 
affordances of space, place, earth, and world.  At the same time, Native philosophers 
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redress the failure of Western philosophers to engage in meaningful dialogue with Native 
philosophers by taking anticolonial criticism to the heart of settler environmental 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Like any complex concept, land cannot be boiled down to any single property or 
fundamental element.  Furthermore, no one discipline of research can generate an 
exhaustive account of its significance.  It is possible to think of land in a straightforward 
definitional manner: those portions of the earth’s surface that are not concealed by water; 
the soil; solid parts of the earth, etc.  Lakes, rivers, and other waterbodies have also been 
considered part of the land as is assumed by many treaties; so have lower parts of the 
troposphere and even plants, animals, humans, and other forms of life or energy (Leopold 
1950).  There are limits to the expansiveness of the concept, however.  Most people 
probably would not consider the open ocean or upper atmospheric layers to be land.  But 
these sorts of demarcations, though sometimes significant, do not seem to offer much in 
the way of a philosophy of land.  The philosophical meanings of land arise only from 
specific social-historical relationships. 
In the prestigious and voluminous 764-page Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, 
land does not appear in the index.  There is an entry for “World” but the word land does 
not appear in the text of the article.  Land also goes unmentioned in the entry for 
“Ecology.”  The author concludes: “The present ecological crisis is a crisis in the 
relationship between human culture and nonhuman nature.  What used to be only patches 
of human culture in a vast surrounding milieu of wild nature has become a kind of 
planetary crust of material and immaterial human artifacts and activities with wilderness 
areas within it” (Drummond 1997, 150).  Indeed, this has been the summary way to 
thematize ecological problems in Western phenomenology: as the human domination of 




specifically in letting wild nature be, to put things in Heideggerian terms (Drummond 
1997, 137).  Seldom to be found in this literature is the idea that ecological crises are 
equally based on the domination of humans by other humans.  As one group of authors 
has written, “The ecological rift is, at bottom, a product of a social rift: the domination of 
human being by human being” (Foster, Clark, York, 2010).  To see this relation requires 
a philosophical conception not of world, not of place, not of nature, but of land and lands 
and the relationships specific humans have to them. 
Though out of vogue today, the West does in fact have a long tradition of thinking 
about land in philosophical terms.  There are two main camps.  John Locke defined land 
primarily as “the chief matter of property,” being that to which labor is applied in 
production (Locke 1967, para 32).  For Locke, land “that is left wholly to Nature, that 
hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting, is called, as indeed it is, wast;” 
(Locke 1967, para 42).  The moral mandates of Adam Smith to invest the maximum 
amount of wealth towards the “creation” of additional wealth follow directly from 
Locke’s ideas on property.  But property not yet being capital; it is dubious whether the 
concept “property” or even private property truly captures the prevailing relation to land 
today.  In practice, land is absorbed as a form of capital, which can initially be 
understood as wealth privately marshaled for the accumulation of more wealth. 
Karl Marx on the other hand balks at Locke’s bourgeois categorization of land as 
private property, writing, “The view of nature attained under the dominion of private 
property and money is a real contempt for and practical debasement of nature...” (Marx 
1975, 172).  For Marx, the rightful human relation to land is one of direct associated 




is undisturbed by the intervention of capital accumulation (Marx 1992, 637).  The general 
appropriation of nature for human needs is not the same as the formation of private 
property where the earth is possessed by individuals to the exclusion of others (Foster and 
Clark 2018, 3).  Marx emphasizes the communal, direct relation of production as the 
basis of right to land.  However, Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang express nervousness about 
this approach: 
Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for 
autonomous, self determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work 
it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, 
‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land (Tuck and 
Yang 2012, 30). 
  
In stark contrast, many Native philosophers describe their own view in terms of relations 
to land that are not characterized primarily by production but by personal kinship.  Robert 
Bunge, a Lakota philosopher, writes, “To the native American, it [land] is the mother of 
all that lives, the Ur-source of life itself, a living, breathing entity – a person” (Bunge 
1979, 2).  Bunge’s view is anticolonial because it indicates that the primary human 
relationship to land is not universalizable: specific people are integrally related to specific 
lands.  Land should not simply belong to anyone who “works it.”  As a generalized 
relation to capital, class often falls short as a critical tool in anticolonial contexts.  George 
Tinker emphasizes that “American Indian peoples resist categorization in terms of class 
structure” because the frameworks of nations and peoples are more helpful for thinking 
about relationships to specific lands, leaving open the question “whether indigenous 
peoples desire production in the modern economic sense in the first place” (Tinker 2004, 
103).  On this view, ownership is not a right of humans over land, but rather, as Winona 




land ownership.  They translate as ‘the land of the people’ which doesn’t infer that we 
own our land but that we belong on it” (LaDuke 1997, 33).  Oneida author Laura Kellogg 
laments the assimilation of Native Peoples into the general workforce, writing, “the 
dismemberment of the Indian domain puts the Indian out into the labor world of the white 
man, landless” (Kellogg 1920, 51).  And yet, many Native American authors still resist 
seeing themselves simply as part of a global proletariat, rejecting European notions of 
production and labor as constituting the basic human relationship to the land, including 
the Marxist idea of associated production under common ownership. 
The general map of worldviews above provides a context for the specific 
intervention sought by this dissertation.  To some, land might at first seem to be a petty 
subject for philosophy, with place, space, world, earth and other lofty terms appearing 
more suited to the luminosity of its stature.  But land is in a sense more immanently 
significant because it entails a direct conceptual bridge to issues of nationhood, 
displacement, colonialism, and labor.  In addition to its depth as a concept in political 
ontology and epistemology, raising questions about where we are and where we know, 
land also holds ethical significance for questions about responsibility and accountability.  
Specific ethical responsibilities tend to remain hidden when land-like substitutes 
dominate discourse with their tendency to play the role of universal ontological 
categories.  The ubiquity of this generalizing approach is perhaps not so surprising in a 
culture that is captivated by a sense of land as a species of fungible property, both 
interchangeable and for sale, caught up in a perspective that only sees the difference 
between “parcels” of land in terms of monetary units.  Though necessarily dispersed and 




power and control than is achieved by the institutional hegemony of prisons, factories, 
hospitals, courts, schools, and so on (Veblen 1997; Foucault 1995).  Western schemes of 
land have been crafted over time to justify and incite violence, genocide, displacement, 
rape, murder, and white supremacy aimed at domination and accumulation on a world 
scale (Churchill 1993; Smith 2015; Stannard 1993; Tuck and Yang 2012).  How, then, 
could it be denied that there is an obligation to address a matter of such metaphysical and 
moral gravity? 
 Very little has changed in the prevailing Western concept of land since John 
Locke.  Its only evolution has been permutations of the original colonizing idea.  Locke 
established the moral foundation of private property as a natural right for the explicit 
purpose of colonizing the Americas (Arneil 1996a, 1996b; Macpherson 2011).  By and 
large, subsequent political economists (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, etc.) extended this view 
to encompass new elements in economic and geographic expansion.  The alternatives 
achieved by Karl Marx, who proposes control of land by the associated producers, are 
sounder according to democratic and ecological principles, but still need much additional 
discussion and critical examination from an anticolonial perspective (Foster 2000; 
Coulthard 2014). 
 Because of the bloodstained history of Western expansionism, my dissertation 
begins from the premise that there is no good philosophical account of land within the 
West.  A good conception would provide parameters for the material transformation (or 
dissolution) of Western nations from societies founded on the violence of colonialism and 
imperialism to societies that establish peace, justice, and equality along lines of race, 




theory or aspect of a theory of land is the following:  Does this achieve justice for the 
oppressed?  If the answer is unclear or negative, then more critical work needs to be done 
and the theory revised. 
 In particular, the concept of nationhood needs to be re-examined critically.  
Popular discourse typically understands discrimination based on nationality to be directed 
at immigrant populations.  However, a proper understanding of colonialism recognizes 
that modern nation-states such as the U.S. are in fact filled with thousands of Native 
nations that are actively denied the possibility of self-determination under conditions of 
totalitarian rule.  Thus, the worst aspects of international injustice, including perpetual 
genocide and separation from homelands, are issues that stand to be addressed by 
concepts of land and nationhood.  The extensive literature addressing Indigenous 
sovereignty must be engaged with earnest by Western philosophers who should 
especially focus on the challenges of self-critique and allyship in this context, both of 
which are necessary parts of the process to fight colonialism at every possible juncture 
and to take anticolonial criticism to every corner of research.  In that process, Westerners 
cannot simply adopt Native attitudes to land.  Changes must be made from within and 
through dialogue with those who are in position to make the most meaningful criticism.   
 This dissertation argues that prevailing Western attitudes towards land are 
crystalized in the content of a range of foundational philosophical methodologies.  In 
particular the content of phenomenology and political economy are significant because 
they propose experiential and material approaches to radical philosophy and should 
engage in rich intercultural dialogue in order to root out where they have failed to 




themselves should be thrown out.  To the contrary, they are indispensable opportunities 
for intercultural dialogue, self-reflection, and transformation; the incorporation of 
decolonizing methodology should shift the basic concepts in focus to better alternatives.  
Specifically, this means addressing land in so far as it stabilizes violence in lived 
meanings and material realities. 
 Via the phenomenological tradition, Western philosophers have challenged the 
metaphysical position that presumes nature to be strictly “natural” entity or object of the 
natural sciences (Foltz 1995; Abram 1996; James 2009; Toadvine 2009).  This has been a 
fruitful discussion in many ways, illuminating human experience both in its kinships and 
its discontinuities with the rest of nature.  Concepts like dwelling and intercorporeality 
complicate the absolute gap in meaning between human and non-human worlds.  The 
concept of place has turned focus to the ways human identity is formed by a proximal 
nexus of meanings.  However, until very recently the concept of land has received 
minimal attention from the phenomenologists of the West. 
 Todd Mei’s 2017 book, Land and the Given Economy, acknowledges the 
phenomenological uniqueness of land in comparison with other concepts that have been 
more commonly studied (2017, 9).  He argues that land accesses ontologically primary 
structures of being-in-the-world because it connects our possibilities of experience 
directly to economic realities.  He writes, 
The studies of Casey and Malpas make significant progress in rethinking our 
relation to land, yet they do so without seeing the deeply ontological and 
economic implications of what this relation means (2017, 110). 
 
Mei’s work contributes a way to conceptually link phenomenological descriptions of 




bridging concept.  He identifies his work as additive to other endeavors in 
phenomenology, writing “it is precisely an understanding of land as we experience it that 
is lacking” (2017, 11).  Edward Casey, Edward Relph, Yi-Fu Tuan, Jeff Malpas, and 
other phenomenologists have taken up the concept of place with earnest but neglect a 
serious philosophical engagement with political economy and mislay the material 
ontology afforded by the concept of land.   
 However, Mei’s re-opening of the question of land suffers from a lack of 
engagement with Native authors and thus overlooks many fundamental philosophical 
problems.  He fails to ask who the “we” of experience is, missing the colonial context of 
land entirely, omitting what are perhaps the most important critiques and needs for 
radical transformation.  As a result, he falls back on an economic account developed in 
the early 1800s by David Ricardo and a phenomenological account offered by Martin 
Heidegger, boiling the ontology of land down to a general sort of hupokeimenon or a 
“ground upon which we dwell.”  It is not clear that Mei makes any positive contributions 
to a phenomenology of land at all.  Rather his book re-presents old thinking that is 
anchored by colonial experiences. 
 The main issue here is not with phenomenology’s core method, but rather with 
descriptions that normalize settler experience without interrogating it as such.  Hence, 
what needs to be added to phenomenological method is a decolonizing methodology that 
centers the rich descriptions of experience expressed by colonized peoples.  A main 





 This dissertation develops a critical analysis of Western philosophies of land by 
way of two distinct methodologies which will also form the outline of the second and 
third chapters.  These will be phenomenology and political economy.  As is outlined in 
the chapter descriptions at the end of this introduction, the dissertation will focus on 
certain key authors who have wide-ranging influence for thinking about land or its 
affiliated concepts within each tradition. 
 
Decolonizing Methodology 
In order to critically examine the normalization of settler experience and material 
relations, this dissertation adopts philosophical dialogue between Western and Native 
people as a core methodological principal with the intention of transforming Western 
conceptions of land in ways that offer some useful tools for exiting the settler colonial 
landscape.  In such a dialogue, it is important to center Native critiques that talk back to 
colonialism as well as Native worldviews that both predate and stand independently of 
colonialism.  Reasons for this are at least fourfold:  1) to destabilize the univocal aspects 
of settler philosophy and open space for self-criticism, 2) to combat the process of 
erasure by a confirmation of Native contributions to philosophical thinking, 3) to 
acknowledge the intellectual sovereignty and significance of Native thinkers, and 4) to be 
philosophically rigorous by considering radically different points of view.  In many cases, 
questions that have only just appeared at the so-called “forefront” of settler colonial 
research have a rich history of discussion in Native cultures.  Philosophical questions 




 Western environmental thinking has often interpreted itself as a groundbreaking 
enterprise.  Aldo Leopold wrote in the 1940s, “There is as yet no ethic dealing with 
man’s relation to the land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it” (Leopold 
1950, 203).  To put the absurdity of this claim into perspective, Charles Alexander 
Eastman, who graduated from medical school at Boston University, just a two-hour drive 
from Yale where Leopold studied forestry, published an interpretation of his Dakota 
culture in 1911.  He wrote, “We believed that…every creature possesses a soul in some 
degree, though not necessarily a soul conscious of itself.  The tree, the waterfall, the 
grizzly bear, each is an embodied Force, and as such an object of reverence” (Eastman 
1911, 14-15).  This written history references a living history extending from time 
immemorial.  Leopold’s self-aggrandizement and discounting of Native American 
thinking is not merely incidental or explainable by a lack of exposure.  Leopold was fully 
aware of the environmental views of Native groups but did not regard them as a mature 
ethical stage in his so-called “ethical sequence.”  In an essay ironically titled “Aldo 
Leopold listens to the Southwest,” Dan Schilling writes, “It is no exaggeration to suggest 
that the compelling culmination of Leopold’s intellectual wanderings, the celebrated 
‘Land Ethic,’ had its genesis in the Southwest” (Schilling 2009, 326).  Schilling pulls a 
few sentences from a letter written by a 17-year-old Leopold who had just listened to a 
tribal elder’s speech.  This letter originally appears in the scholarship of Curt Meine: “He 
said after speaking of the Indian’s knowledge of nature, ‘Nature is the gate to the Great 
Mystery.’ The words are simple enough but the meaning unfathomable” (Meine 1988, 




tribes and colonial governments.  He was also directly exposed to the thinking of Native 
people on the subject of land and nature. 
Government officials who followed in Leopold’s footsteps and generated federal 
policy also trivialized Native cultures.  In an examination of national parks and their 
relation to Native Americans, Philip Burnham commented on those drafting the so-called 
Leopold Report of 1963, “Leopold et al., more progressive in spirit, still dismissed native 
people as passive onlookers, with no more claim of an active presence than the 
mummified Esther in the Mesa Verde museum” (Burnham 2000, 149). 
Kyle Whyte’s essay appearing in a 2013 APA newsletter evaluates Callicott’s 
book, Earth’s Insights.  Callicott claims that Leopold’s achievement should be 
considered “a universal environmental ethic, with globally acceptable credentials, 
underwriting and reinforcing each of the others.  Further, it is also intended to serve as a 
standard for evaluating others” (Callicott 1994, 188).  Whyte responds, “For Callicott, 
only the land ethic can interpret and validate all Indigenous ethics…Leopold’s land ethic 
ought to colonize the other ethics” (Whyte 2013, 2).  Touting the universality of Western 
ethics strikes an eerie harmonization with the history of religious, linguistic, and cultural 
assimilation in boarding schools.  Whyte warns, “Those who see Leopold as a powerful 
connector between tribal and non-tribal people must realize that we live in a colonial 
world, not a post-colonial one. Our histories are not shared and they do conflict; 
similarities are only on the surface” (Whyte 2013, 4). 
 The content as well as the methods of Western philosophy are at stake in this 
dialogue.  A philosophical method opposed to Cartesian skepticism about the spatial 




am here in Eugene, Oregon, a city carrying the name of a prominent colonist.  The proper 
name of the area, Chifin, reminds me that my city continues to live a linguistic lie, 
pretending as though we are not in fact occupying the homeland of the Kalapuya.  I am 
quite certain that the laptop on which I write is powered by hydroelectric dams 
constructed on the rivers with which several local nations have ancient and dynamic 
relationships.  I am quite certain that the house in which I dwell is built from the old 
growth trees that at one point lived in abundance, but now only stand in special reserved 
areas.   
 These thoughts are philosophically significant because they imply that authorship 
on this land caries specific moral responsibilities.  There is a direct connection between 
my living here and my duties as a scholar.  There is an obligation not just to utter certain 
words or to acknowledge certain truths, but to take pauses and develop a constant 
vigilance and awareness of my research in terms of its possibilities for usefulness as well 
as its potential for harm in my colonial context (thoughts inspired by Ilarion and 
Roderick, 2013).  Linda Tuhiwai Smith presses the researcher to consider their work 
from the perspective of people to whom they have a moral responsibility.  “Are they 
useful to us…Can they actually do anything?” (2012, 10).  Most academic research is 
considered to be worth-while simply as part of a pool of ever-growing knowledge.  
Whether this could represent an ever-growing pool of ignorance is typically not 
considered.  Researchers are tasked with identifying gaps in the literature and filling 
them.  Rarely are they asked to stop and consider how the body of research they engage 
might reinscribe forms of social violence.  Smith writes, “…belief in the idea that 




reflection of ideology as it is of academic training” (2012, 2).  Decolonizing research 
must remain vigilant about the ways in which it at risk of becoming just another fragment 
of settler colonial power. 
 Such a cross-cultural dialogue is complex and fraught with internal tensions, risk, 
and unequal power dynamics.  The fact that mainstream philosophical research in the 
university setting is risky for Native People should come as no surprise.  Universities are 
settler institutions that generate the knowledge and conceptual tools necessary for the 
reproduction and deepening of settler power.  As Smith writes, “Western disciplines are 
as much implicated in each other as they are in imperialism” (Smith 2012, 11).  With its 
conceptual and logical equipment, Western philosophy has legitimized the production of 
settler nations.  Research conducted in the academy should be scrutinized in terms of how 
it achieves the settler project of, as Eve Tuck suspects, “securing private property” (Patel 
xiii, 2016).  New research may challenge or criticize old views in certain ways, but often 
recapitulates or re-inscribes violent forms of social power in both content and 
methodology. 
 Who am I, then, a nonNative white settler, to write my version of an anticolonial 
philosophy of land?  As an author on this soil, it is a responsibility implied by my social 
context to resist colonial projects by any means possible.  The dangers of engagement 
with an ethical problem, which are many, are far outweighed by the dangers of living in 
denial.  To implement alternative strategies to normalized research, this dissertation will 
seek to challenge white entitlement to land, identify colonial structures in the 
subterranean philosophical literature, and do the work it takes to relay Native arguments 




disciplines.  It is part of my task to navigate, as Patel writes, “the complexities of 
communicating Native epistemologies to nonNatives,” but it is not my task to speak for 
Native Peoples (Patel 2016, 7).  I find a profound methodological sense of direction in 
Leigh Patel’s work when she so eloquently writes, 
Coloniality, because of its pervasiveness, implicates everyone through its ongoing 
structure of people, land, and well-being.  These implications do not mean that 
anyone’s structural location relative to colonization is fixed by virtue of birthplace 
or social identity, but rather at every juncture there is constant opportunity and 
responsibility to identify and counter the genealogies of coloniality that continue 
to demand oppression (Patel 2016, 6). 
 
There are two important methods available for Western philosophical research: 1) 
What Smith calls “systems or methods of self-critique” that constitute internal 
criticisms and visions of emancipation within the Western tradition and 2) Dialogue 
with Native authors about the shortcomings of these modes of self-critique and 
engagement in cross-cultural communication and the centering of Native voices 
(Smith 2012, 166). 
 As authorship attempting to do work at the border of two worlds, it is 
necessary for this dissertation to challenge the long history of Native Peoples being 
left out, erased, or treated as an object of study (Tuck and Yang 2012, 22).  Rather, 
Native voices should appear on the scene of research as what they really are: agents 
in the conversation.  They should appear as critics, teachers, philosophers, friends, 
contributors, and so on.  In a culture so obsessed with white liberal versions of 
cultural blending, it is easy to forget that in many conversations, some people have 
privileged knowledge of certain aspects of life, and their voices must be taken to heart 
ahead of others.  “Stop talking,” the title of one Indigenous methods book reads 




text as active achievements equal to the words themselves.  As a dialogue, the ways 
in which this dissertation proposes to change the world are necessarily insufficient: It 
will not return lands to Native People or make an end of colonizing worldviews.  
However, it can do work to move closer to these outcomes and to make a small 
intervention in the forceful repetition of colonial logics within some pockets of 
intellectual life. 
 The methodological importance of dialogical philosophical inquiry is matched by 
the significance of the historical contexts of Western philosophies of land that constitute 
protracted cycles of imperialist conquest.  A decolonizing historical analysis should be 
equally dialogical and framed by an attitude of listening, considering radically different 
descriptions of events as keystones for self-criticism.  If settler colonialism is at bottom a 
“logic of owning land” then Western history and philosophy should be reinterpreted from 
that vantage point (Patel 2016, 30).  Hence, an in-depth genealogy of the philosophy of 
land is of vital importance in service of Smith’s call to investigate “conceptual tools, the 
ones which makes us feel uncomfortable, which we avoid, for which we have no easy 
response” (Patel 2016, 30; Smith 2012, 41). 
 Western concepts of land have acted as the equivalent of the atomic bomb, 
erasing entire populations of human beings (and other beings) from view and from the 
realm of value, rendering them eliminable according to “scientifically” produced 
concepts.  In fighting back against to this “logic of elimination” (Wolfe 2006), it should 
not be forgotten that the creation of literal atomic bombs has left heavy scars on Native 
nations.  As I experienced firsthand while living in the Diné Nation some years ago, the 




uranium mining is a cause of disease and pestilence for the Diné people and their land.  
Only some 300 miles northeast of my current location, the Hanford nuclear site looms 
over the Columbia River near its confluence with the Yakima and Snake.  To be used in 
warfare, uranium must first be enriched, and the fulfillment of this military project 
created a toxic nuclear impingement on Yakima lands.  This prevents cultural and 
spiritual practices and violates treaty rights to the harvest of roots, berries, medicines, 
fish, and game.  As the Yakima Nation implored in comments directed at an 
insufficiently restorative environmental assessment, “Then, also, allow Yakimas to be 
Yakimas” (Yakima Indian Nation, 1985, 6-15).  Kyle Whyte writes,  
“…injustice also occurs when the social institutions of one society systemically 
erase certain socioecological contexts, or horizons, that are vital for members of 
another society to experience themselves in the world as having responsibilities to 
other humans, nonhumans and the environment.  Injustice, here, involves one 
society robbing another society of its capacities to experience the world as a place 
of collective life that its members feel responsible for maintaining” (2016, 158). 
 
Conceptual erasure, or colonial ideology, synchronizes with such material and spiritual 
violence throughout repeating cycles of time.  As many Native authors have emphasized, 
settler colonialism is a recurring social relation, not an historical event in the past.  
Hence, the conceptual genealogy of the concept of land in the West that appears in the 
next section provides a critical backdrop for tracing cycles of ideological mutation as 
they have changed or adapted the colonial enterprise of owning land.  Key approaches 
that have served this end are dominant social relations to land as private property, capital, 
and a source of rent, all of which play specific roles in Western political economic 
ideology.  Uncovering this history of philosophical description and justification 





An Ideological History of Land in the West 
Western history is so deeply invested in the solidity of private property and the 
expansiveness of capital that it is in fact difficult if not impossible to develop an 
understanding of “the West” that is not fundamentally undermined by a radical shift away 
from these social relations.  Whether originating in Locke, Smith, Malthus, Darwin, or 
others, Western theories of the human relation to land have tended be characterized as 
universal laws, naturalizing colonization as an inevitable process that occurs according to 
fundamental principles of population and economics rather than social conditions of 
oppression.  Cycles of colonization have been treated as unique chances to study these 
laws in action as if observing billiard balls clap against one another.  Darwin wrote, 
No country can be named in which all the native inhabitants are now so perfectly 
adapted to each other and to the physical conditions under which they live, that 
none of them could anyhow be improved; for in all countries, the natives have 
been so far conquered by naturalised productions, that they have allowed 
foreigners to take firm possession of the land. And as foreigners have thus 
everywhere beaten some of the natives, we may safely conclude that the natives 
might have been modified with advantage, so as to have better resisted such 
intruders (2006, 53). 
 
This characterizes the displacement of Native Peoples as case studies in the struggle for 
existence.  The work of untangling these “laws” that have structured the West begins 
with identifying the attitudes and social conditions that unify recurring cycles of 
ideological development.  Penned in 1896 by celebrated American historian Frederick 
Jackson Turner, the passage below captures something essential about the Western 
relation to land: 
The West, at bottom, is a form of society, rather than an area.  It is the 
term applied to the region whose social conditions result from the 
application of older institutions and ideas to the transforming influences of 





An unabashed colonial enthusiast, Turner nostalgically eulogized the impulse to spatial 
expansion as the basal spirit of Western liberty and freedom.  But as he came to realize, 
colonial expansion is at the same time an act of political consolidation.  Turner wrote at a 
time when, in fact, unincorporated lands had all but disappeared and the bulk of what had 
once been considered terra nullius was the public and private property of U.S. citizens.  
His essay, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, famously proclaimed the 
end of the era of geographic expansion and therefore the end of the frontier.  This historic 
turning point presented an interesting problem:  Did the disappearance of the frontier 
spell the end of the social conditions defining the West?  Turner’s answer to the question 
was “no.”  He suggested that expansion need not end with the disappearance of “free 
land.”  It could in fact persist as the organizing social principle if Americans, with their 
characteristic Yankee gusto, tackle new “frontiers” in technology, science, and capital 
increase.  Of course, what he failed to think was that the slow-down in spatial expansion 
did not spell the end of colonialism; rather it was merely indicative of colonialism’s 
solidification as a basis for other frontiers of accumulation. 
Assuming Turner was right about the possibility for Western social forms to 
reinvigorate themselves in alternate modes of accumulation and expansion, a true 
revolution in the concept of land within the Western world would entail the absolute 
destruction of the form of society that can rightfully be called “the West.”  Such a 
conception would put in to question the legitimacy of the existence of many modern 
nations like the United States.  Wherever “the West” exists as a form of society and 




  Carolyn Merchant famously argues in The Death of Nature that dominating 
relationships to nature did not simply inhere in Europe’s trajectory, but rather had to be 
created philosophically, politically, and culturally by violent force (1989).  Even in works 
of late Christian origin, the spiritual unity of humans and the communal distribution of 
resources appear as core values.  Acts 4:32-35 reads, 
32All believers were one in heart and mind.  No one claimed that any of their 
possessions was their own, but they shared everything they had… 33And God’s 
grace was so powerfully at work in them all 34 that there were no needy persons 
among them.  For from time to time those who owned land or houses sold them, 
brought the money from the sales 35 and put it at the apostles’ feet, and it was 
distributed to anyone who had need (NIV). 
 
 That passage is typically dated to around 80 AD.  The first Christians were mostly 
Jewish, and a glance deeper into the Jewish prophetic tradition reveals an even more 
sweeping edict coming from Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem suggesting the communal 
ownership of land.  Psalm 115:15-16 reads, “15Blessed be ye of the LORD, who made 
heaven and earth.  16The heavens are the heavens of the LORD; But the earth hath He 
given to the children of men” (JPS).  The godhead of the Hebraic tradition gives the 
surface of the earth to human kind in common. 
 Working to overcome the prima facie implications of biblical scriptures, John 
Locke opened Chapter V of the Second Treatise, “Of Property,” with the passage from 
Psalms above.  This set for Locke an interesting task: to reconcile private property in land 
with biblical descriptions of land as common human inheritance.  He wrote, “But this 
being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come 
to have a Property in any thing…” (Locke 2003, 111.). 
 Locke raised this concern with good reason.  Anticolonial sentiment in England 




notes, “The opponents of colonialism either argued that settlements would ruin England 
or that England had no right to claim land already occupied by another people” (Arneil, 
“The Wild Indian’s Venison,” 62).  Locke’s biblical reference established a shared 
starting point with those who were doubtful about the English right to colonize America. 
 The Second Treatise is a landmark because it transformed political ideas of 
property in land to justify the British colonization of the Americas.  Locke’s position as 
secretary and financial dependent to Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury,1 
shaped the focus of his writings profoundly.  In his classic biography on Locke, Maurice 
Cranston writes, “Locke was easily infected with Ashley’s zeal for commercial 
imperialism, seeing as clearly as his patron saw the possibilities it offered for personal 
and national enrichment” (1957, 119).  In 1663 the Earl was given title as one of eight 
Lords Proprietors (landlords) to a then-new British expansion known as Carolina.  A few 
years later Locke drafted the organizing documents for the settlement; these are known as 
the Grand Model.  Arneil writes, “John Locke saw America as the second Garden of 
Eden; a new beginning for England should it manage to defend its claims in the 
American continent against those of the Indians and other European powers” (Arneil, 
John Locke and America, 1).  Hence, Locke had two primary targets in Chapter V:  1) to 
argue against Native claims to the land based on continued occupation, and 2) “to 
distinguish the English, Protestant approach to colonization, as one based on trade and 
industry, from that of the Catholic Spaniards, which he perceived as one of violence and 
conquest” (ibid., 9).  For these reasons, Locke’s treatise is one of the only early modern 
volumes to dwell at length on the origin of title and the individual right to exclusive 
                                               




ownership, offering moral justifications and procedural rules for acquisitions of private 
property in land.  Most subsequent political economists took this point of view for 
granted and did not address these fundamental philosophical issues. 
 Famously, Locke’s starting point is a “state of nature” in which men have little or 
no property except that which they have in their own person (Locke 2003, 101, 111-12).  
He contrasts the original property in one’s person with the original status of “Nature” or 
the “Earth” as common to all.   Scholars have often written off the state of nature as a 
completely invented “conjectural history” based on little but Locke’s own imagination.  
Although this might be true in some sense, it is essential to realize that, as Arneil argues, 
Locke himself felt there was an empirical basis for the state of nature in the accounts he 
read of European contact with Native Americans.  She found that in Locke’s personal 
library there were no fewer than “195 titles under the category of voyages and travels.  
Most of these describe trips to the Americas by European explorers” (Arneil, John Locke 
and America, 24).  Locke’s logical starting point was therefore intended to be the state of 
affairs in the Americas and other colonies as perceived by Europeans. 
 The truth of his treatise is in its description of the European sense of entitlement, 
which involves the conversion of nature into private property.  He wrote, the 
“spontaneous hand of Nature” supplies men with provisions to which “nobody has 
originally a private Dominion” (2003, 111).  However, through “The Labour of his Body 
and the Work of his Hands,” individuals may claim private dominion over the fruits of the 
earth (ibid.).   “The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they 
were in, hath fixed my Property in them” (2003, 112).  According to Locke, this clearly 




killed them (ibid.).  However, given his connection to the Earl, Locke was hunting bigger 
game, so to speak: 
But the chief matter of Property being now not the Fruits of the Earth, and the 
Beasts that subsist on it, but the Earth it self; as that which takes in and carries 
with it all the rest: I think it is plain, that Property in that too is acquired as the 
former. As much Land as a man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use 
the product of, so much is his Property (2003, 113). 
 
This provided the justification of property accumulation needed by settlers practicing 
European agriculture.  The continuous occupation of land was not enough to grant title.  
Private ownership in land required that it be developed in a certain way, with an intense 
focus on the human wants produced by industry and agriculture.  The management 
techniques practiced by Native nations resulted in landscapes that appeared undeveloped 
to European eyes looking for excuses to claim land.  Locke argued that land not 
developed in the European manner was “wast” because it was human labor, not “nature,” 
that provided the preponderance of what is useful in any landscape: 
I think it will be but a very modest Computation to say, that of the Products of the 
Earth useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour: nay, if we will 
rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several Expences 
about them, what in them is purely owning to Nature, and what to labour, we 
shall find, that in most of them 99/100 are wholly to be put on the account of 
labour (2003, 117). 
 
Land that is left wholly to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, 
or Planting, is called, as indeed it is, wast (2003, 118). 
 
 The morally charged category of “wast” justified settler claims to as much and as 
good of land as one could possibly cultivate or otherwise improve.  To validate the Earl’s 
title in Carolina, however, Locke needed to establish the right not merely to property, 
which he justified by cultivation for human needs, but to justify land used as capital for 




and capital is not always well understood in this context.  For example, Patrick Wolfe 
writes of the terra nullius policies in Australia that the “key concept is that of private 
property…the doctrine held that private property in land resulted from the mixing of 
one’s labor with it…” (2001, 869).  However, in Australia as in the United States, the 
initial motivations of the British empire were not to provide small farmers with land for 
growing subsistence crops but rather for the establishment of plantations and extractive 
export economies.  Locke’s patron would not and could not cultivate all of Carolina 
personally.  Hence, Locke’s account reaches its climax when he argues for what C. B. 
Macpherson calls “a natural right of unlimited appropriation” including the capitalization 
of land (1962, 231).  For Locke, this excess of land beyond what one needs may be 
rightfully possessed “by receiving in exchange for the overplus [of land], Gold and 
Silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one” (2003, 121).  In a strange 
twist of logic, the Landlords must atone for failing to apply their own labor to the land by 
collecting rent from those who do.  Whether or not Locke’s argument makes any sense at 
all, the conclusion is clear: land should be treated as capital in the quest to hoard wealth.  
Macpherson offers textual evidence that the views expressed by Locke at this juncture are 
more than self-interested and utilitarian; they represent a genuine philosophical belief 
about the essence of rationality itself as accumulative (1962, 236).  He writes, for Locke, 
“rational conduct…is private appropriation of the land and the materials it yields…” 
(1962, 233). 
 Locke’s arguments imply the following significant results for control of land:  1) 
Native claims to land based on continued occupation are illegitimate, 2) Labor’s right to 




in the form of currency (though in-kind rent is possible, especially in the form of 
commodity crops as in many metayer systems).  Locke’s primary achievement was not to 
turn property right into natural law, but to turn property right into the right to expropriate 
land for the creation of capital.  Subsequent capitalist economists each made significant 
contributions to the historical meanings of capital, labor, and value, all of which affect 
the status of land. 
 The innovations in capitalist philosophy achieved by Adam Smith’s The Wealth 
of Nations were clearly influenced by Locke’s writings.  Smith penned, 
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original 
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable (1937, 
121). 
 
But this original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole produce 
of his own labour, could not last beyond the first introduction of the appropriation 
of land and the accumulation of stock (1937, 65). 
 
Smith saw capital as a sort of ordinary, natural occurrence.  It arose when someone had 
more stock than was needed for their own immediate consumption, the surplus portion 
being set forth with the expectation that it “yield a revenue or profit to its employer” 
(1937, 262).  According to Smith, capital was accumulated not by the exploitation of 
labor and land but rather by exercising the virtue of parsimony.  He wrote, “Parsimony, 
and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital.  Industry, indeed, 
provides the subject which parsimony accumulates” (1937, 321). 
 Smith argued that markets should be deregulated to enhance the capitalization of 
both manufacture and agriculture.  He focused moral derision at limitations to the 
expansion of capital: “The absurdity of these regulations [to international commerce] will 




must necessarily be advantageous to both” (1896, 204).  Smith wrote this knowing full 
well that the export of capital from wealthy nations, especially under relations of 
imperialism, consistently resulted in greater return on investment (see Hilferding, 1981, 
311-337).  Further pressing for deregulation, Smith wrote of the Corn Laws in Britain, 
which, among other things, placed a “bounty” on any wheat imports, “It obstructed not 
only that division in the employment of stock which is so advantageous to every society, 
but it obstructed likewise the improvement and cultivation of the land” (1937, 497).  He 
accused governments of using a feeble protectionist “political arithmetic” that could 
never match the robust adaptability of free markets (1937, 501).  To Smith, such thinking 
needlessly limited countries to operating within the boundaries of their regional 
capacities: 
To prohibit by a perpetual law the importation of foreign corn and cattle, is in 
reality to enact, that the population and industry of the country shall at no time 
exceed what the rude produce of its own soil can maintain (1937, 429) 
 
 To enhance the wealth of nations it was necessary to maximize the amount of 
stock employed as capital.  Smith argued that real wealth cannot be measured in the static 
amount of money or metals lying about, but only in the “the annual produce of the land 
and labour of society” (1937, 652).  Hence, capital should be applied to land and labor in 
order to increase productivity and achieve “that universal opulence which extends itself 
to the lowest ranks of the people” (1937, 11).  To illustrate the inefficiency of the old 
agricultural regime, Smith caricatured the “country weaver, who cultivates a small farm” 
(1937, 8).  Where capital had not accomplished the division of labor, Smith saw a sort of 
wastefulness: 
The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or 




his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different 
ways almost every day of his life; renders him almost always slothful and lazy, 
and incapable of any vigorous application… (1937, 8). 
 
 The “wast” criticized by Locke is taken to its logical conclusion by Smith:  Waste 
is land or labor that is not subjected to the strict standards demanded by the intense 
application of capital to produce profits.  The triumph of colonialism is to turn Native 
lands into a form of capital.  In Locke as in Smith, there was a moral edict to appropriate 
land in this way, capitalizing land for maximal productivity.  Land was considered 
“fertile” to the extent to which it produced profits.  Smith equates profitability with 
fertility in many instances, as in the following: 
They [tenant farmers] are thus both encouraged and enabled to increase this 
surplus produce by a further improvement and better cultivation of the land; and 
as the fertility of the land had given birth to the manufacture, so the progress of 
the manufacture reacts upon the land, and increases still further its fertility (1937, 
383). 
 
For Smith, the “surplus produce” of well-cultivated lands constituted the origin of rent, 
and hence made the social position of the landlord possible: 
As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share of almost 
all the produce which the labourer can either raise, or collect from it.  His rent 
makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon 
land (1937, 65). 
 
Tenant farmers pressed to produce a surplus beyond their immediate needs are forced to 
enhance their cash productivity (which Smith confuses with fertility).2  Rent in this 
instance, Smith argued, came from the ability of the land to produce more than was 
necessary for the subsistence of the farmer, continued production, and normal profits of 
labor (1937, 146).  Any “surplus” above this amount Smith called the “natural rent of 
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land,” or, put another way, anything more than “the smallest share with which the tenant 
can content himself without being a loser” (1937, 144).  Hence, it is a basic capitalist 
tenet that rents are extracted directly from the fertility produced by the relation of land 
and labor. 
Smith applied the categories of waste and capital to human activity also, writing 
extensively on “unproductive” versus “productive” labor.  His version of the “labor 
theory of value” (the origination of which is so often misattributed to Marx) held that the 
“toil and trouble” of acquiring some object establishes the baseline for the most important 
sort of value to free markets: price.3  “Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the 
exchangeable value of all commodities” (1937, 30).  Unproductive labor was labor that 
did not generate any enduring exchangeable value, i.e. labor that was “unproductive of 
any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject, or vendible 
commodity” (1937, 315).  Teachers, lawyers, servants, public employees, and soldiers all 
fell into this category.  Mothering and reproductive labor were not discussed by Smith, 
but it is obvious that he excludes them from productive labor.  According to Smith, 
expending stocks on such services is sometimes necessary but often indulgent, foregoing 
the chance to produce more wealth (an “opportunity cost”).  “A man grows rich by 
employing a multitude of manufacturers: he grows poor by employing a multitude of 
menial servants” (1937, 314).  It follows from this theory that the tyrannical strategies of 
                                               
3 Variants of the labor theory of value date back at least a hundred years before Smith.  Sir William Petty 
wrote in a manuscript published in 1662, “But that which I would say upon this matter is, that all things 
ought to be valued by two natural denominations, which is land and labour; that is, we ought to say, a ship 
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and garments were the creatures of lands and mens labours thereupon: this being true, we should be glad to 
find out a natural par between land and labour, so as we might express the value by either of them alone, as 
well or better by both, and reduce one into the other, as easily and certainly, as we reduce pence into 




mercantilism and expenditures on warfare are at odds with capital accumulation.  Smith 
criticized “expensive and unnecessary wars” for inhibiting free trade and funneling 
resources away from economic expansion (1937, 327).4  He is perhaps the foremost 
representative of the liberal capitalism that prevails today despite constant threats from 
countervailing cycles of fascism. 
 David Ricardo published new capitalist views on land and rent in 1817, titling his 
seminal work On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.  He expanded upon 
Smith’s theory of the division of labor to account for schemes of globalized economic 
production, arguing that land and labor should be mobilized by capital according to the 
relative advantages inherent to each region to maximize global production, 
…our enjoyments should be increased by the better distribution of labour, by each 
country producing those commodities for which by its situation, its climate, and 
its other natural or artificial advantages, it is adapted, and by their exchanging 
them for the commodities of other countries, as they should be augmented by a 
rise in the rate of profits (1821, 136). 
 
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its 
capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each…It is this 
principle which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal, that 
corn shall be grown in America and Poland, and that hardware and other goods 
shall be manufactured in England. (1821, 139). 
 
 Like Smith, Ricardo understood capital to be both ordinary and natural.  He wrote 
that a corollary to the stock marshaled by modern capitalists could be found in the 
hunter’s weapon: it is “the hunter’s capital…in that early state to which Adam Smith 
refers” (1821, 16).  He also adopted a version of the labor theory of value: “the quantity 
of labour realized in commodities…regulate their exchange value…” (1821, 4).  The 
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natural riches of the earth, he wrote, have no value “for value depends not on abundance, 
but on the difficulty or facility of production” (1821, 320). 
 Ricardo developed a position on rent that opposed itself to Smith’s in significant 
ways.  Rent for Ricardo arises only when land becomes scarce and landlords hold a 
monopoly.  This enables them to charge a fee for “the gifts of nature which exist in 
boundless quantity [air, water] ... the original indestructible powers of the soil” (1821, 53-
56).  Ricardo wrote that in a different world, 
If air, water, the elasticity of steam, and the pressure of the atmosphere, were of 
various qualities, if they could be appropriated, and each quality existed only in 
moderate abundance they as well as land would afford rent… (1821, 64) 
 
 However, for Ricardo, rent could not be summed up in simple Smithian terms as the 
absolute ability of the soil to produce a “surplus” beyond the farmer’s needs.  Rather, he 
saw it as a layered spatial-temporal phenomenon that depended on differential advantages 
or what Ricardo called “relative fertility” (1821, 393).  He developed the idea that rents 
depend on the “difference between the produce obtained by the employment of two equal 
quantities of capital and labour” on different plots of land (1821, 59).  Smith argued that 
rent varied according to 
…the supposed extent of those powers [of nature], or in other words, according to 
the supposed natural or improved fertility of the land.  It is the work of nature 
which remains, after deducting or compensating every thing which can be 
regarded as the work of man” (Smith 1937, 345). 
 
Smith’s theory could not explain why in many cases rents go up when overall soil 
fertility goes down, as is often the case when population increases.  He also could not 
very well explain how rents are placed upon enterprises of manufacture, in which, Smith 
claimed, “nature does nothing, man does all” (ibid.).  To Ricardo, rents on land occupied 




manufacture which can be mentioned, in which nature does not give her assistance to 
man, and give it too, generously and gratuitously” (1821, 66).  On the other hand, 
according to the rule of relative fertility, manufacture enterprises could be more 
productive than agriculture on the same plot of land.  Hence, it made sense for the highest 
rents to arise in land areas of concentrated human activity.  Ricardo’s theory of relative 
fertility was important as a precursor to the empirical theories of value developed by Karl 
Marx and Henry George that were based on social conditions rather than absolute laws. 
 Ricardo also applied his theory of relative advantage to the idea of machinery.  If 
owned as a monopoly, it offered a sort of additional rent to the owner.  He wrote,  
He, indeed, who made the discovery of the machine, or who first usefully applied 
it, would enjoy an additional advantage, by making great profits for a time; but in 
proportion as the machine came into general use, the price of the commodity 
produced, would, from the effects of competition, sink to its cost of production, 
when the capitalist would get the same money profits as before…(1821, 447) 
 
In contrast with many capitalists who argued that machinery generally benefited the poor 
working classes by enhancing the availability of commodities, Ricardo argued that the 
popular hatred of machinery was in accord with the principles of political economy.  
Machinery, he argued, was very good at boosting the net profits of capital but did not 
necessarily increase the pool of money from which the wages of labor were drawn.  
Hence, he saw a tension between the interests of labor on the one hand, and capital and 
landlords on the other, writing, 
I now, however, see reason to be satisfied that the one fund, from which landlords 
and capitalists derive their revenue, may increase, while the other, that upon 
which the laboring classes mainly depend, may diminish, and therefore it follows, 
if I am right, that the same cause which may increase the net revenue of the 
country, may at the same time render the population redundant, and deteriorate 





 It was Ricardo’s stance on land as a common form of wealth that served to 
migrate his ideas into the mainstream left in the United states via the incredibly popular 
work of Henry George.  Unlike some capitalist economists who absorbed land entirely 
into the category of fungible capital, Ricardo proposed a sharp distinction.   He argued 
that land was distinct from capital because it was not originally created by labor.  
Therefore, the rent or surplus of land should not rightfully belong to anyone because it 
was not created by anyone.  Landlords contribute nothing to society because they do not 
in fact produce anything.  They only accrued money due to monopoly.  As an unproduced 
yet universal ingredient in production, Ricardo recommended a universal tax on all land 
that was equal to its rent.  He and Henry George believed this would essentially 
nationalize rents for the public benefit.  Ricardo wrote, “A land-tax, levied in proportion 
to the rent of land…will fall wholly on the landlords” (1821, 300).  This move would 
shift more of the wealth produced by land into the realm of social production, in other 
words, create more capital. 
Despite giving some credence to the views of the poor and arguing for a common 
wealth in land, Ricardo was far from generally sympathetic to the working class.  This 
meant that in practice the value captured by common ownership in land would be accrued 
to the owners of capital and not to laborers.  He famously insisted upon the law of wages 
developed in its general form by Smith, writing “The natural price of labour is that price 
which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and to perpetuate 
their race, without ever increase or diminution” (1821, 86).  For Ricardo, it was natural 
for wages to tend towards a bare subsistence level.  This is related to the law of rent:  




where no rent would be charged.  As population increases and land becomes scarce, the 
relative advantage of working the remaining land of low fertility becomes non-existent; 
hence, wages naturally tend toward a bare subsistence level, or the level of working lands 
which bore no rent.  Ricardo’s theory was central to debates surrounding the infamous 
Poor Laws Amendment Bill of 1834 which dramatically reduced social welfare in 
England because it was found to decrease the subsistence level wage by allowing a 
portion of the workforce to accept wages that were lower than what they actually needed 
to survive. 
It was Thomas Malthus who argued that propping up the lowest earners in society 
would drive down the general level of subsistence by increasing population and pushing 
farmers on to less and less desirable lands.  His view was that “misery, since it was a vital 
check on an overcharged population, was both necessary and inevitable” (Foster 2000, 
97).  For Malthus, misery was not produced by social conditions of inequality, but rather 
by the “law” that the natural growth rate of population tended to outstrip the natural 
growth rate of subsistence (Foster 2000, 93).  It was just three years after the appearance 
of Ricardo’s seminal book that Malthus expressed these views in his own magnum opus: 
Principles of Political Economy: Considered with a View to Their Practical Application 
(published 1820).  Although more often remembered for his 1798 Essay on Population 
which he revised several times up through the mid-1820s, Malthus’ Principles situates 
his infamous views on population and subsistence within a broader context.  He, like 
Ricardo, was a Smithian through and through, accepting most of Smith’s core principles 
regarding private property and value, and emphatically reiterating the centrality of capital 




…material capital is the specific source of that great department of the national 
revenue, peculiarly called profits, and is further absolutely necessary to that 
division of labour, and extended use of machinery, which so wonderfully 
increases the productive powers of human industry, its vast influence on the 
progress of national wealth must be considered as incontrovertibly established 
(1936, 36). 
 
He noted the significant ability of peasant agriculture to feed the poor, however 
discounted it as productive labor because “revenues” directly consumed do not create 
profit: 
By this definition of wealth [as exchanged goods], a very large and most 
important portion of material commodities is excluded from the denomination. In 
the business of agriculture, a considerable share of produce is always destined to 
be consumed on the spot without being exchanged (1936, 26). 
 
On the subject of rent, Malthus sided more with Smith, arguing that Ricardo’s theory 
“under-rates” the contribution of absolute fertility to the rate of rent.  He warned that 
Ricardo’s theory aligned with the likes of Mr. David Buchanan of Edinburgh who wrote, 
“it [rent] can form no general addition to the stock of the community, as the neat surplus 
in question is nothing more than a revenue transferred from one class to another…” 
(1936, 139).  To Malthus, the ability of the soil to produce beyond the cost of production 
was a “gift of nature to man” (1936, 140).  In other places, he referred to this capacity as 
a gift of Providence or of God, as in the following,  
Must we not, on the contrary, allow that rent is the natural result of a most 
inestimable quality in the soil, which God has bestowed on man – the quality of 
being able to maintain more persons than are necessary to work it?  Is it not a part, 
and we shall see farther on that it is an absolutely necessary part, of that general 
surplus produce from the land, which has been justly stated to be the source of all 
power and enjoyment; and without which, in fact, there would be no cities, no 
military or naval force, no arts, no learning, none of the finer manufactures, none 
of the conveniences and luxuries of foreign countries, and none of that cultivated 
and polished society, which not only elevates and dignifies individuals, but which 






To Malthus, the rent paid to landlords represented a portion of the God-given earthly 
“excess” that constituted the ability to accumulate capital rapidly, “The fertility of the 
land, either natural or acquired, may be said to be the only source of permanently high 
national returns for capital” (1936, 213). 
 Malthus’ focus on absolute rather than relative fertility was no accident; the issue 
was intimately related to his work on population.  Malthus characterized this relationship 
in the following manner,  
It is therefore strictly true, that land produces the necessaries of life – produces 
the means by which, and by which alone, an increase of people may be brought 
into being and supported. In this respect it is fundamentally different from every 
other kind of machine known to man; and it is natural to suppose that the use of 
it should be attended with some peculiar effects (1936, 142). 
 
Whatever machinery might be developed to work the land more efficiently, you cannot 
squeeze blood from a turnip, so to speak.  Malthus theorized that rising populations 
increase the demand for more food products, thus putting more strain on the fertility of 
agricultural lands.  This in turn reduces the fertility of marginal lands in use, driving 
down the accepted level of subsistence, resulting in destitution, vice, misery, and poverty, 
all of which are natural and necessary checks on population.  Malthus argued that if such 
hard limits did not exist, the number of humans descended since the Christian era, 
…would have been sufficient, not only to fill the earth quite full of people, so that 
four should stand in every square yard, but to fill all the planets of our solar 
system in the same way, and not only them, but all the planets revolving round the 
stars which are visible to the naked eye… (1936, 208). 
 
The basic theory is that population tends to push upon the limits of subsistence and force 
farmers onto more marginal lands, resulting in natural cycles of poverty according to a 
natural law.  Malthus wrote off the obvious counterexample of the many Native nations 




banana and other subtropical plants were extraordinarily productive with little work, 
however, 
It appears then, that the extreme fertility of these countries, instead of affording an 
adequate stimulus to a rapid increase of wealth and population, has produced, 
under the actual circumstances in which they have been placed, a degree of 
indolence which has kept them poor and thinly peopled after the lapse of ages 
(1936, 337). 
 
Ricardo concurred with the Malthusian view on population, writing “With population 
pressing against the means of subsistence, the only remedies are either a reduction of 
people, or a more rapid accumulation of capital” (1821, 94).  Neither thinker paused to 
consider whether it was the accumulation of capital by the wealthy that was pressing on 
the means of subsistence and creating poverty rather than the populations of poor people. 
 In accordance with this philosophy about the relation of human population to 
land, significant changes were made to the Poor Laws of England in 1834.  At the core of 
these changes were the theories of Malthus, Ricardo, and Bentham in particular.  The 
Bishop of Chichester wrote in his memoir of Malthus, “The Essay on Population and the 
Poor Laws Amendment Bill, will stand or fall together” (Malthus 1936, xiv).  As a result, 
relief to the poor was only offered within workhouses which intentionally implemented 
conditions of squalor to act as a deterrent.  Malthus’ theory suggested that providing 
relief to the poor removed the natural checks against population increase and artificially 
resulted in an increased population and more pressure on land fertility, thus creating a 
positive feedback loop with poverty while also threatening to degrade the lives of the 
wealthy.  Ricardo wrote that the workhouses could function as a way of reforming the 
poor, who he blamed for their poverty.  Harkening back to Smith’s claim that capital and 




…by impressing on the poor the value of independence, by teaching them that 
they must look not to systemic or casual charity, but to their own exertions for 
support, that prudence and forethought are neither unnecessary nor unprofitable 
virtues, we shall by degrees approach a sound and more healthful state (1821, 
104). 
 
It is difficult to overestimate the influence of the Malthusian doctrine as a pseudo-
scientific account of population and land fertility.  Despite a lack of empirical evidence 
supporting its main theoretical positions, it impacted the core ideological components of 
European science, technology, and capitalism.  Sixty-one years after the publication of 
the Essay on Population, Darwin wrote of his central principle in On the Origin of 
Species, 
It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and 
vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, 
and no prudential restraint from marriage. Although some species may be now 
increasing, more or less rapidly, in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would 
not hold them (2006, 41). 
 
Darwin theorized that the limits on subsistence resulted in a struggle for existence; this in 
turn drove natural selection.  It can be argued that Darwin intended the struggle for 
existence to be understood in a “large and metaphorical sense,” including the benefit of 
co-adaptations as well as the dependence of organisms on the environment in ways that 
were not limited by the existence of other organisms (Darwin, 2006, 40).  However, his 
theory of population largely aligns with that of Malthus and paved the way for scientific 
racism.  A full-blown expression can be found in the writing American conservationist 
and wildlife scientist Madison Grant.  The themes of his 1916 book, The Passing of the 
Great Race; or, the Racial basis of European history, eerily coincide with Darwin’s 




of colonization.  For Malthus, as in Locke, colonization offered a sort of fresh start for 
the scientific observation of such economic developments, 
So much of violence, and unjust monopoly has attended the appropriation of land 
in the early times of all long settled states, that in order to see the natural 
foundation and natural progress of rents, it is necessary to direct our attention to 
the establishment and progressive cultivation of new colonies (Malthus 1821, 
148). 
 
Unlike the critical view developed by Karl Marx, Malthus viewed expropriation, 
violence, and poverty as external to the natural laws of capital.  In his system they 
presented challenges that only more liberal capitalism could alleviate. 
 Tracing the intense, rapid, and zealous development of Western concepts of land 
leaves us with a glaring question: Why have such dialogues ceased?  Where is land in 
modern Western philosophical debates?  The degree of neglect by Western philosophers 
has been inversely matched by the insistence of Native authors on land’s importance.  
Whatever philosophical motivations undergird this disproportion are suspicious given 
that the robbery of land is the source of settler privilege and Native oppression.  The rules 
of a decolonizing philosophical methodology demand an immediate engagement on the 
topic of land and its role in Western philosophy. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
The first chapter presents some Native American conceptions of land, arguing that 
they constitute self-determined and philosophically sound worldviews.  This approach 
resists the limiting tendency of Westerners to hear Native voices only against or within 
the context of colonialism, which makes the listening process all about white people.  It is 




pan-Amerindian context.  This is not to suggest that elements of Native philosophy must 
be widespread to be legitimate, but rather that certain shared philosophies contribute to 
the remarkable capacity of thousands of diverse nations to live sustainably alongside each 
other.   Specifically, the chapter argues that views of land as a relative, maternal and 
material provider, person, and origin of identity, ethics, and spiritual practice stand as 
significant Native contributions to experience and material relations.  If land is not a 
“natural object” and is rather a real person or agent with whom humans should have an 
intimate familial relationship, then it follows that peoples and lands are not incidentally 
but integrally related.  This contrasts with Western view that universalizes the human-
land relationship into generic categories for the benefit of colonizing power which does 
not want to recognize the full richness and specificity of human cultures based on the 
occupation of lands since time immemorial.  The next two chapters seek to unravel the 
universalizing tendencies of Western conceptions of land in contexts where radicalization 
has been attempted but without sufficiently listening to colonized peoples. 
The second chapter begins by uncovering the deep colonial character of 
phenomenology as it was developed in Europe in the 20th century.  As a primary mode of 
engagement for settler environmental thinkers, it is important to investigate how the 
critical developments within this tradition remain problematic on the subject of land.  Just 
as the articulation of land as capital and property can be traced to Locke and other 
European thinkers, I will argue that the phenomenology developed in 19th and 20th 
century Europe has similar tendencies towards worldviews that conceive of land as a sort 
of fungible ground for the development of settler cultures with a special attention to 




descriptions of mortals clearing and cultivating space for dwelling are proto-colonial 
experiences of land, implementing many of the fundamental concepts developed by 
Locke, including the idea that uncultivated areas are a “wasteland” and that (Semitic) 
“nomads” have no homeland or claim to the soil (Heidegger 2013a, 55-56; 2013b; Faye 
2009, 143).  Furthermore, Heidegger’s thinking is tied to the fascist movement in 
Germany which makes his philosophical deployments of concepts like Earth and 
rootedness, which have been so popular in environmental philosophy, imminently 
suspect.  Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s insistence on historical rootedness and sacred 
elements, emphasizing instead the individual efforts of labor required for humans to draw 
life from an amorphous background of elements to form a domicile (Levinas 1990, 
2000).  I argue that Levinas’s phenomenology is also problematic because it thinks of the 
land as lacking any specific character of its own. 
It follows from these critiques that decolonizing phenomenologies of land must 
take precedence in any radical reformation of phenomenological praxis.  If 
phenomenology is to consider itself more than just specific philosophical claims made by 
certain philosophers (mostly white men) of European descent, and to embrace its better 
nature as a method for the critical examination of experience, it must start this process by 
listening to descriptions of experience that have been marginalized or not considered 
phenomenology at all.  It is here that Native narratives of land suggest more peaceful 
phenomenological approaches.  Robert Bunge emphasizes in his essay, “Land is a 
Feeling (Two Views),” that for Native people land does not belong to humans as some 
neutral space or ground for development to be cleared or assimilated, but rather that 




surroundings as the mother of all that lives (Bunge 1979).  His detailed contrast of 
experiences of land for American Indians and whites not only offers a brilliant 
phenomenology of land but also a broader demonstration of how the experience of land 
relates to economic structures and race.  Understanding the colonization and racialization 
of land is important for seeing the limitations of more recent phenomenological accounts 
of place, as made popular by the work of Edward Casey (1993, 1998), and others, which 
stand in need of supplementary material analyses and decolonizing elements.  These 
elements have been highlighted by many authors.  Tiffany King, for example, writes 
about the enslaved black female body that it served the “production of Settler space, the 
clearing of Native land and the accumulation of property” (King 2013, 22-23).  Here we 
see what Tuck and Yang call the “settler-native-slave triad” which outlines three 
perspectival axes regarding land that all demand attention and recognition (Tuck and 
Yang 2012). 
A phenomenology of land, then, should incorporate not just the non-
mechanistic experiential meaning that is born out of phenomenology’s resistance to 
naturalism, but, considering the violence of colonization and slavery, must also 
recognize the meaning of land as more than a ground for the privileged experience of 
certain white humans.  Land must be interpreted as full of personality and a life of its 
own and already in relationship to specific peoples; these meanings standing over and 
against colonial aspirations for the complete appropriation of resources and the 
elimination of Native Peoples.  It follows that land must be interpreted as a non-
universalizable general relation, in other words as a relation that all humans have but 




contain this and that character defined by particular geography, plants, animals, and 
humans.  This does not foreclose the possibility of philosophies of land that are of 
intercultural significance containing shared principles, but it does imply that any 
“philosophy of land” is necessarily incomplete, non-universal, and fallible.  The 
Heideggerian insistence that land must be “cleared” implies that these specific 
relations are experientially “plowed under” in favor of the blank slate of ontological 
structures recognized by settler phenomenology.  As Herbert Dreyfus notes, the 
verbal sense of “clearing” is a central movement of Dasein’s existentiality (Dreyfus 
1991, 164-165).  Heidegger writes in Being and Time, “Ecstatic temporality clears 
the there primordially” (Heidegger 2010, 334, italics in original).  The experiential 
activity of clearing is adjacent to colonial acts of clearing away the history of Native 
people according to the fantasy of discovery and the clearing (clear cutting) of 
physical areas for development.  A decolonizing phenomenology of land will 
recognize ontologies of particular lands as unique and indispensable, not requiring 
“clearing” to become meaningful. 
A de-universalized ontological understanding of the relationships between 
peoples and lands suggests the need for a third chapter analyzing the history of land 
in its function within political economies, the material requirements of life, and the 
specific meanings those carry.  In particular Marx’s critique of capital contains the 
switch from thinking of land as private property to thinking of land as a metabolic 
partner with human life.  On Mei’s reading of Marx and Marxists (especially John 
Bellamy Foster), he claims that “Marx neglects the concept of land” and reduces the 




the exploitation of labor in the first half of Capital 1 should not be read as 
reductionist.  Other parts of his corpus provide crucial focus on the expropriation and 
exploitation of land, theorizing a reciprocal and direct relationship between humans 
and soil.  There is much potential here for thinking of land as something other than 
the object of imperialist expansion and domination, namely as the spiritual and 
material link between humans to the earth. 
 In his groundbreaking book, Red Skins, White Masks, Glen Coulthard argues that 
Marxist theory has many useful applications but needs critical examination by a robust 
discourse that does not focus on relations of domination from the perspective of the 
“waged male proletariat” but rather from the perspective of the colonized (Coulthard 
2014, 11).  In an effort to unite the immiserated masses of the underclass, foundational 
aspects of Marxist theory convey a lack of differentiation between the proletariat and 
colonized, missing the central principle of white supremacy that unites all strata of white 
imperialist nations and underpins colonizing social structures.  The third chapter expands 
upon Coulthard’s view, arguing that capitalist imperialism functions not as a general 
metabolic interruption into a universal labor-relation with the earth, but rather as a 
national collaboration by specific people into the relationships formed between the 
colonized and their land.  This suggests that material justice and emancipatory futures 
require not just the cessation of capital exploitation and the return of the means of 
production to workers, but also the return of land to specific people.  Tuck and Yang 
write: 
The pursuit of worker rights (and rights to work) and minoritized people’s rights 
in a settler colonial context can appear to be anti-capitalist, but this pursuit is 
nonetheless largely pro-colonial. That is, the ideal of “redistribution of wealth” 





What is missing from the political economy of Karl Marx, Henry George, and other 
critics of private land ownership is a decolonizing feature to the “equal right” to 
communal control that highlights the justice of repatriating land to specific nations.  This 
condemns any blindness towards the participation of the white settler proletariat in 
imperialist projects of national domination.  Marxist thinking must examine its basic 
visions of the future, putting the idea of ownership by the associated producers in critical 




II.  NATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF LAND 
“…fully developed, if unwritten, philosophy – or, rather, philosophies – 
flourished on American soil long ages before the European came here, and 
continues to exert influence even today over the minds and hearts of thousands of 
American aborigines” (Bunge 1984, 1). 
 
 This chapter argues that sustainable5 and robust Native philosophies of land 
predate colonial impact and are characterized by active regard for land as a relative, as a 
material or maternal provider, as a person, and as an origin of identity, ethics, and 
spiritual practice.  Conceptual and experiential linkages in Native philosophies convey 
strong intercultural values characterized by dovetailing yet self-determined eco-social 
nexuses, explaining the ability of Native nations to live prosperously alongside each other 
and unite against the common threat of colonialism.  This chapter comes first because 
recognizing the independence and legitimacy of Native worlds is the initial step to 
meaningful listening within a philosophical context (Norton Smith 2010, 14).  Coming to 
an understanding about the sophisticated nature of Native philosophies and the centrality 
of land in them is the only path to an anticolonial critique of Western philosophical 
research that is penetrating enough to make serious changes and engage in tangible self-
criticism with a concomitant understanding of moral responsibilities. 
 In contrast with the foregoing discussion of Western ideology, Massasoit, a 
Wampanoag chief, said the following, “What is this you call property?  It cannot be the 
earth.  For the land is our mother, nourishing all her children, beasts, birds, fish and all 
men” (Grinde and Johansen 1995, 30).  He expresses a fundamental antagonism between 
                                               





Native spiritual practice and the concept of property.  But if the concept of property is off 
the table, what other ideas can express an idea of ownership sufficient for self-
determination and sovereignty of Native nations on Native lands? 
 Deloria offers some terminology that might more fittingly describe the sort of 
ownership Native nations take in a relationship to their lands.  He writes, 
Before any final solution to American history can occur, a reconciliation must be 
effected between the spiritual owner of the land – the American Indian – and the 
political owner of the land – the American white man.  Guilt and accusations 
cannot continue to revolve in a vacuum without some effort at solution (1973, 
89). 
 The idea of spiritual ownership is interesting because it does not connote a 
relationship of simple use, productivity, or profit.  Rather it is more like “taking 
ownership of something” in the sense of taking responsibility out of a feeling of 
reverence.  For example, water protectors have taken ethical and spiritual ownership of 
the land in pipeline disputes like Dakota Access at Standing Rock (Worland 2016).  
Spiritual ownership is not something that can result from a transaction or a purchase.  It 
cannot be bought.  Rather it is the result of cultural history built upon a sense of mutual 
obligation.  For example, “In the Cherokee language, the word that means ‘land’ (eloheh) 
also denotes culture, history, and religion” (Grinde and Johansen 1995, 43).  The spiritual 
owners of the land are the ones who have developed a relationship with it as a relative 
and have established systems of respect and reciprocity.  This does not preclude use.  
Grinde and Johansen write, “although Native Americans did not have land deeds or trade 
in real estate, they did use the land” (1995, 37).  Such a recognition is important in the 
face of the Lockean misconception that Natives “wast” the land.  However, use in this 




associated with or compared to the concept of property to be understood and recognized 
as legitimate.  The Iroquois issued the following statement at a UN Convention, “Our 
culture is among the most ancient continuously existing cultures in the world.  We are the 
spiritual guardians of this place” (Akwesasne Notes 1978).  They are talking about the 
idea of spiritual ownership. 
 Careful conceptual analysis would discourage the grouping of Native land tenure 
systems among forms of collective property ownership.  Grinde and Johansen make what 
I believe is a bit of a categorical leap and speak of “Native American property systems” 
(1995, 37), citing Cronon’s Changes in the Land.  They suggest that Native notions of 
individual property extended primarily to things such as clothing and tools, while 
“Land…was usually held collectively” (ibid.).  However, reordering what counts as 
individual and collective property probably is not enough to capture the distinction here.  
European ideas of property, even collective property, entail unilateral human control and 
little or no ethical obligation to the intrinsic qualities of the property itself beyond its 
productive capacities for humans.  In other words, it is not a kinship relation.  Hence, 
speaking of Native American property systems is probably a poor analogy or 
malapropism.  To make things more tangible, Massasoit’s language points us to an 
illuminating ethical question: How is collective property ownership of one’s Mother any 
more ethically intelligible than individual property ownership of one’s Mother?  The 
categories are at odds.  Hence, though arguably more complex and geographically 
nuanced than European property schemes, Native American land-use and tenure systems 




 It is on account of this difference in how land shapes and forms Native identity 
that Westerners have most dramatically misunderstood the meaning of being Native in 
colonial America.  While race and the concept of white supremacy are foundational for 
accounting for the oppression of Native people, Patrick Wolfe writes that treating race as 
a “master category” is insufficient for explaining “various regimes of difference that have 
served to distinguish dominant groups from groups whom they initially encountered in 
colonial contexts” (2001, 867).  Specifically, in accounting for Native identities, race 
does not capture the importance of national identities based on geographically delimited 
boundaries and sacred places.  Thus, Wolfe asks after another sort of way for naming the 
oppression of Native Peoples that is “centered on land” (867).  It is only within the 
context of colonial aspirations for land that racial formations of “the Indian” make any 
sense at all, where policies of assimilation and elimination are strategies for reducing 
Native populations and therefore Native land claims. 
 One such policy is the ascription of tribal membership based on blood quantum; 
this practice undermines Native sovereignty by attacking the basic social ability for self-
definition.  Kyle Whyte argues, 
Indeed, many of the indigenous peoples in North America have rich systems of 
membership based on family, clan, or other kinship identities; culturally specific 
processes for being recognized as a community member; and processes 
appropriate for the ongoing reality that there has been constant intermingling 
across different peoples and communities.  Thus blood seems like so much US 
colonial baggage (2017, 91). 
 
The reduction of tribal identity to demonstrable ancestry based on colonial documents or 
strands of DNA reduces Native identity to a static and gradually dissipating racial 
category rather than a much richer category based on a broad spectrum of dynamic 




evaluating Native identities “within the same conceptual framework” that is used to 
evaluate Western identities (1998, 205).  Hence, spending time to consider how Native 
identities contrast with Western ones on the subject of land casts light on the violence 
done in the creation of colonial “regimes of difference” based on how both identities are 
formed in and through land in very specific ways. 
 In beginning such a discussion, the basic fact prevails that there is no single 
philosophy of land for all Native Americans.  As Deloria makes explicit, tribal practices 
and religions, though containing certain general accords, are never a universalizable 
relation, but always “the relationship of a particular people with a particular land” 
(Deloria 1973, 269).  However, as Deloria also expressed, there are many shared 
principles where aspects of existence converge in significant ways.  Black Elk famously 
envisioned the spiritual lives of Native people coming together in a sacred circle.  The 
significance of this cannot be overstated as it was not simply a minor vision, but rather 
the culmination of his greatest revelation.  He said,  
And I saw that the sacred hoop of my people was one of many hoops that made 
one circle, wide as daylight and as starlight, and in the center grew one mighty 
flowering tree to shelter all the children of one mother and one father.  And I saw 
that it was holy (2007, 33). 
 
Black Elk’s vision appears to recognize that bordering nations are mutually dependent 
both socially and ecologically.  Shared experiences exist not only in solidarity over and 
against colonialism, but also in the independent lives of Native nations.  As Viola 
Cordova writes, “We see our ideas and concepts as rational, viable, and alternative means 
of interpreting the world.  This fact is one of the reasons that Native Americans have 





 Robust conceptions of land are either explicitly formulated or at play in almost 
every book, documentary film, artwork, and ceremony of Native authorship.  This 
prevalence is explained by a two-fold significance land has for Native lives: 
the theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism, including Indigenous 
anticapitalism, is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented 
around the question of land – a struggle not only for land in the material sense but 
also deeply informed by what the land as a system of reciprocal relations and 
obligations can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the 
natural world … (Coulthard 2014, 13). 
 
Hence, philosophies of land are important both as an act of resistance to land theft and as 
a locus of ethical and spiritual life.  These are interrelated but distinct modes of 
perception and action.  On the one hand, there is a time and place to focus on, “the 
resurgence of cultural practices that are attentive to the subjective and structural 
composition of settler-colonial power” (Coulthard 2014, 24).  These discourses fight back 
and defend against colonization.  On the other hand, there is a time and place to focus on 
“the free and independent existence of indigenous nations…as the baseline for all further 
discussions about American Indian existence” (Newcomb 2008, 110).  These two 
possible approaches to land have their critical difference in that one is always a response 
to colonialism while the other carves out a real space apart from it, establishing what 
Shawnee philosopher Thomas Norton-Smith calls “an actual American Indian world” 
(2010, 14).  It is imperative to maintain a distinction between the ways in which Native 
peoples respond to colonialism (often in English, in situations of coercion, under threat of 
death, etc.) and the worldviews that make such responses possible.  Dale Turner writes, 
“The discourses of rights, sovereignty, and nationhood have been and continue to be used 




identity” (Turner 2007, 198).  Hence, straightforward interpretations of resistant 
discourses can fall short of understanding Native worldviews about land. 
 Critical modes directed at Europeans are nothing new in Native life.  Baron 
Lahontan, a French military man of the late 1600s, complained of his experiences with 
Huron and Algonquin peoples in eastern Canada, 
They brand us for Slaves, and call us miserable Souls, whose Life is not worth 
having…They pretend that their contented Way of Living far surpasses our 
Riches: That all our Sciences are not so valuable as the Art of leading a peaceful 
calm Life….I wish I had Time to recount the innumerable Absurdities they are 
guilty of relating to our Customs; but to be particular upon that Head, would be a 
Work of Ten or Twelve Days (1735, 10-11). 
 
This chapter is going to specifically deemphasize the “ten or twelve days” of critique and 
instead focuses on the Native North American philosophies of land existing both 
independently of and alongside colonizing forces.  There is nothing pure or perfect about 
such a project.  It is just a matter of attention, somewhat akin to Lakota philosopher 
Robert Bunge in his attempt to outline what he called “an American Urphilosophie” 
before pragmatism (Bunge 1984).  Another benefit of this approach is that it actively 
combats the view identified by Grinde and Johansen supposing  
Native Americans possessed little or no environmental philosophy, and that any 
attempt to assemble evidence to sustain a Native American ecological paradigm is 
doomed to failure because the entire argument is an exercise in wishful thinking 
by environmental activists seeking support for their own views (Grinde and 
Johansen 1995, 30). 
 
Centering Native philosophies in the discussion combats the tendency for them to be 
treated as a supplement to Euro-environmentalism, simply appropriating critical Native 
views to European ends.  Subsequent chapters will make ample space for critical Native 
voices to undermine the colonial logics at play in the experiential and material schemes 





Land as a Relative and Mother 
 Black Elk’s vision above speaks to the diversity of Native cultures while also 
establishing a sacred continuity or circle that is spiritual, philosophical, ecological, and 
terrestrial in nature.6  The hoop of the world represents the many lives of Natives peoples 
participating dynamically with a fluid landscape that is characterized as deeply by the 
divisions of rivers, mountains, and territories as it is by the confluence of skies, valleys, 
and migrations.  Each particular people relates to a particular land, and there are private 
aspects of that, but there is nothing especially isolating about tribal nationhood or 
religious practices.  In the common parlance resulting from problematic anthropology, 
the word “tribalism” has come to refer to a distinct set of meanings associated with a 
group that is antagonistic to other worldviews.   But in the practice of actual tribal 
religions, nothing could be farther from the truth.  As Deloria explains, although 
ceremony and ritual are often carried out in isolated sanctuaries, the intention is to 
establish a deeper harmony with, as he says, “the whole web of cosmic life” (1998, 203).  
This interaction defines a scope of awareness and responsibility that is, as Norton-Smith 
                                               
6 There is some controversy about how Black Elk’s Catholicism should affect the interpretation of his 
vision.  Some “traditionalists” have wanted to maintain that he was “fully native” and that his Catholicism 
was merely an act while staunch Catholics have championed him as a “conversion success story” (Thomas 
2017, 449).  The question arises, should his vision be interpreted as a Lakota vision or a Catholic vision?  I 
would maintain that such concerns are misguided because they are rest on an essentialization of Lakota 
culture.  This is a mistake because 1) it suggests that Lakota culture is somehow pure, non-dynamic, and 
“contaminated” by any admixture of other religious practice, and 2) it precludes the possibility of 
successful and genuine intercultural accessibility and participation between Native and nonNative people.  
Clyde Holler describes Black Elk as a practitioner of “dual participation” (1995, xix).  In addition, 
participation in Christian religion does not preclude an anticolonial interpretation of it.  Damian Costello 
writes, “Western Christianity had domesticated the Messiah to accommodate colonialism.  Through his 
vision Black Elk called Western Christianity back to central claims of the gospel – nonviolence, the 




says, expansive rather than restrictive (2010, 77-94).  The innermost circle of awareness, 
however, tends to be directed towards relatives. 
 It is natural to start by talking about land as a relative first because in one sense it 
is the narrowest concept to be discussed in this chapter.  All relatives are people but not 
all people are relatives.  While this might seem obvious, it is an important distinction in a 
philosophical context rife with misunderstanding.  Norton-Smith writes, “We are not 
making a silly claim that what Westerners understand is the natural world is viewed by 
Indians as ‘one big family.’  Kinship groups are fairly small, and relationships within 
them are close, concrete and directly experienced” (2010, 91).  Although a small category 
from a quantitative perspective, kinship groups are of the utmost significant in forming 
what Eastman calls the “active principles” of life, or the deepest parts of identity, daily 
perception, and revelation (1978, 193).  Deloria likewise cautions that the idea of land as 
a relative does not imply that, in Native experience, all parts of land are equally 
associated.  Rather, the relationships are specific and proximal.  He writes in For This 
Land, “They do not embrace all trees or love all rivers and mountains.  What is important 
is the relationship you have with a particular tree or a particular mountain” (Deloria 1998, 
223).  Imbedded in the specific characters and histories of land are also a multitude of 
other relatives and personalities.  To relate well to land means respecting the significance 
of these specific relationships and how they impact life in a direct way, just like honoring 
the relationship one has with human relatives. 
  It is worthwhile to note that there are some philosophical reasons to begin with 
the term “relatives” rather than the more general term “relations.”  In Native philosophies 




fact, it typically carries the meaning of a “relative,” as in a relation (in the sense that my 
uncle Ken is a relation).  When LaDuke titles her book All Our Relations, she intends it 
in the latter sense, implying concentric rings of family kinship extending out from a 
center or homeland.  In English the term “relation” can be voided of its ethical content in 
general ontologies.  A “relational world-view” can be quickly co-opted by or conflated 
with the Euro-centric schemes of, for example, Leibniz, Whitehead, Heidegger, etc.  But, 
as will be fleshed out in the next chapter, there is no good reason to see an obvious 
analogy.  There is a unique sort of relationality that is central to Native worldviews.  In 
her posthumously published volume, How It Is, Viola Cordova writes, “Philosophical 
method … should be … a search for concepts that serve as foundational notions for other 
ideas and practices observed within a specific cultural group.  We have, for example, the 
Native American concept of the relatedness of all beings, and also, the concept of Earth 
as a Mother” (2007, 67).  These two fundamental concepts are intertwined, but the 
concept of relative provides a less ambiguous starting point than relation in the context of 
land.  To offer a brief contrast, in English the category of relative typically suggests 
direct ethical obligations.  But if we think of the real dualism generated by the categories 
of property and wilderness, it is apparent that one can stand “in relation” to land as its 
owner or as its conqueror.  It is ethically problematic, however, to own or conquer one’s 
relative in a straightforward sense, especially if that relative is one’s own mother.7  
Likewise, there is a moral injunction against separating families against their will, 
                                               
7 The ideology of American slavery challenges this.  As Du Bois notes, the fact of enslaving one’s own 
children was “written on the foreheads of two millions of mulattoes, and written in ineffaceable blood” (Du 





making the pan-Amerindian view of earth as mother an injunction against conquering or 
otherwise disrupting the familial life of your neighbor as well. 
 The Western tendency to mystify and idealize Native culture belies the somewhat 
straightforward sense in which land is considered to be a relative in a dynamic 
relationship of material and ethical reciprocity.  In Bunge’s essay, “Land is a Feeling,” he 
describes a Native view of land as a relative, or more specifically as a mother.  This 
kinship relation between specific peoples and specific lands is born in an interlocking and 
dynamic affiliation that also extends to the earth as a whole.  Bunge explains, 
What does one call a living breathing person who is the source of one's own life 
but mother?  In the white view this extends only to a mother of the flesh.  The 
Indian view extends the concept to the mother of earth – the source of all flesh.  
Nor is it merely fanciful, poetic, mystical or mythical in the sense of false or 
untrue. The Indian view can be established as factual by criteria acceptable to the 
most scientifically minded white man.  Any soil engineer knows the earth 
breathes. And any scientist will acknowledge that the earth is the condition and 
source of life as we know it (1979, 2). 
 
Eastman provides a similar view, 
The Sun and the Earth, by an obvious parable, holding scarcely more of poetic 
metaphor than of scientific truth, were in his [the Native’s] view the parents of all 
organic life.  From the Sun, as the universal father, proceeds the quickening 
principle in nature, and in the patient and fruitful womb of our mother, the Earth, 
are hidden embryos of plants and men.  Therefore our reverence and love for 
them was really an imaginative extension of our love for our immediate parents, 
and with this sentiment of filial piety was joined a willingness to appeal to them, 
as to a father, for such good gifts as we may desire. This is the material or 
physical prayer (1911, 13-14, emphasis mine). 
 
These authors do a good job of demystifying what is meant by experiencing land as a 
relative in the sense of a maternal provider of life.  What Bunge calls the “imaginative 
comprehensive view” of Native life reveals land as rich in both literal and ethical 




expression “Mother Earth” contains meaning that is both symbolic and literal (2007, 
113). 
 Associations between land and motherhood have a problematic history in 
European traditions.  As Merchant writes, the pastoral tradition was founded on “a 
masculine perception of nature as a mother and bride whose primary function was to 
comfort, nurture, and provide for the well-being of the male…nature and women are 
subordinate and essentially passive” (1989, 9).  Catherine Roach warns that heavy-
handed gendering of the earth has a problematic effect on popular perception of 
environmental problems and women, arguing that “we should uncouple nature imagery 
from any too-exclusive female gendering” (2003, 172).  Indeed, Native feminists have 
documented many ways the earth has been gendered to justify colonial violence.  Native 
feminist Chris Finley adds to this gender analysis the significance of colonialism 
assigning sexual identities to land, arguing that the biopolitical strategy of settler 
colonialism is to heterosexualize land.  Finley writes, “The conflation of Native women’s 
bodies with racialized and sexualized narratives of the land constructs it as penetrable and 
open to ownership through heteropatriarchal domination” (Driskill et al. 2011, 35).  It is 
specifically heteropatriarchal settler family structures based on property rights that 
construe land as rape-able for its resources (Driskill et al. 2011, 35; Smith 2005). 
 To combat these colonial norms enforcing violent sex and gender relations, Finley 
suggests a recovery of the Native bull-dyke.  Re-queering Native bodies allows for the 
mothering figure in Native worldviews to be something other than the passive, 
submissive, heterosexual, married (to a white man), cisgendered mother of white settler 




not have been consensual… Colonialism naturalizes the heterosexual Native woman’s 
desire for a white man to make conquest a universal love story” (Driskill et al. 2011, 36).  
Overall the kinship relations to mothers in Native societies resist such a heteropatriarchal 
story.  Queer Indigenous scholars have clarified that the category of mother is neither 
sexualized nor tied to female genitals.  Mothering is the social role of creation that forms, 
grows, and sustains life.  It is a process of becoming, not a fixed biological state.  
Cordova writes, “the Earth becomes ‘parent’ not only because of her act of creation but 
because of her continued sustenance of her creations.  In this latter sense the Earth exists 
as a literal mother” (2007, 114).  This fluidity of human and non-human genders is a fact 
of existence and based on the concrete relations different beings take to one another.  
Qwo-Li Driskill cites a Cherokee traditionalist saying, “There is historical 
documentation… that found two men married, one living as a woman, the other a man, 
and it was considered normal.  Gender roles seemed to be more important than sexual 
identity” (Driskill et al. 2011, 105).  Furthermore, most Native societies do not contain 
the sort of dominant male subjectivity identified by feminists (for example, see Adams 
2010, 58).  Luther Standing Bear saw a supportive and fluid gender role for men in 
relation to their partners.  For example, he wrote, "The first thing a dutiful husband did in 
the morning, after breakfasting, was to arrange his wife's hair and to paint her face” 
(Standing Bear 2006, 94).  Seen in the right light, such customs imply more than a simple 
lack of mirrors.  They imply flexible gender roles enacted in social norms based on 
reciprocity and mutual support.  Finley writes, “Native gender norms and family 
structures, which vary from tribe to tribe, do not conform to Native men having control of 




2011, 37).  The Mother of Native land-based philosophies is not subjected to the rule of 
any man or human.  They are an independent force fulfilling but not limited to the 
specific social role of forming and sustaining life. 
 Native American experiences of land as a maternal provider offer a literal and 
ethical orientation to particular lands as a relative or part of a family group and extend to 
the broader intercultural idea of the earth as the mother of all life involving All Our 
Relations (LaDuke 1999).  Because of its grounding in proximal familial kinship, this 
extension comes without the perils associated with white views of mother earth and 
humanity that are too abstract or universal and fail to recognize culturally specific 
differences and responsibilities.  The fluidity between experiences of a particular land as 
the mother of a nation or people and the earth in general as the mother of all is anchored 
by common rudiments of experience such as the stars, the moon, the sun, and the 
continuity of the earth’s surface and elements, waters, winds, and so on.  Although not all 
of these are part of the earth proper, they all provide for life on earth as contributing 
forces that create a shared experience of, as Eastman writes, “the love of the Great 
Mystery and a sense of brotherhood with all creation” (1911, 28).  The Great Mystery is 
the mystery of life itself and the reverence for and communion with all things in that 
mystery.  While the Great Mystery and the relation to the earth as a whole includes land, 
it is not reducible to land and is a broader concept.  Likewise, land is not reducible to the 
broader concept of earth because it contains more specific meanings.  The broader 
spiritual orientation that provides the “motive power” of existence is carried over and 
exercised as a concrete moral principle in the realm of the homeland and family (1911, 




broader principles only conceivable through the cyclical connections with relatives that 
likewise contain all aspects of the relation to earth and provide specific openings to the 
greater mystery (May 2014).  Such principles are not only spiritual but also legal and 
expressed in Native law.  LaDuke documents the Mohawk Nation’s “Kaienarakowa (the 
Great Law of Peace and the Good Mind),” which “upholds principles of kinship, 
women’s leadership, and the value of the widest possible community consensus” 
(LaDuke 1999, 13). 
Attempts have been made to stir up doubts about the authenticity of Native views 
of mother earth.  Sam Gill’s Mother Earth: An American Myth argues that there are only 
two references to the earth as a mother in available historical literature, supporting the 
possibility that such sentiments were the invention of white scholars and not the real 
content of tribal religion.  To this, Deloria responds with his characteristic wit, “I would 
like to point out that Gill's contention that these quotations are the only references to 
Mother Earth by Indians supports the possibility that he is not the best scholar of this 
generation” (Deloria 1992, 406).  Deloria goes on to offer evidence he found in 
commonplace recordings of council minutes and treaty negotiations.  Grinde and 
Johansen concur, writing “To the contrary, anyone who believes that American Indians 
only recently began using the metaphor of earth as mother knows precious little history” 
(1995, 30).  Despite white attempts to obscure or downplay the importance of Native 
environmental philosophy, there is nothing odd or particularly mysterious or 
unimaginable about experiencing land as a mother, especially when contrasted with the 
dubious origins of the God-given and inalienable right to property prevalent in colonial 




The origins remain mysterious despite the efforts of Locke and others to clarify them.  
But perhaps this enigmatic character is only due to a purposive denial of the obvious 
emotional content, that of domination (Grinde and Johansen 1995, 17). 
   
Land as a Person 
 Native theorists further elaborate their views of land based on broader ideas: 
notions of the person, personhood, and personality.8  In contrast to the concept of a 
wilderness, which conveys a void of meaning and personality, land according to most 
Native authors is itself a person or congregation of personalities.  As Deloria notes in his 
essay, “American Indian Metaphysics,” this rather simple idea causes most whites to balk 
and assume that Native peoples are “combining aspects of things that, at first glance, 
could not and should not be together” (Deloria and Wildcat 2001, 2).  Specifically, this is 
the incorporation of the “natural” world with the world of “persons.”  A commonsense 
Western point of view typically conflates the category of person with the category of 
human (or depending on the who, when, and where in Western history, white male 
humans only).  Norton-Smith developed an experiment to reveal this restrictive view.  He 
has his audience write down two lists, one containing types of animals and another 
containing types of people.  Invariably the list of people is populated by humans and the 
list of animals does not contain the human animal (Norton-Smith 2010, 10).  But why 
should the category of person be so limited?  There are good reasons to consider this 
preconception of Western experience to be based in the desire to dominate entire 
categories of beings (whether human or non-human). 
                                               




 In his book The Dance of Person and Place Norton-Smith does an excellent job 
of untangling the categories of human and person to make his Shawnee worldview 
intelligible to white readers.  He starts by showing that even in the Western cannon, 
philosophers have not argued for categorical equivalency.  Rather than humanness being 
what makes a person, European philosophers have accounted for personhood with criteria 
such as rationality, language, and self-reflection.  In this way, personhood is abstracted 
from human existence (Norton-Smith 2010, 81).  Norton-Smith demonstrates that even 
this Western view can and has been construed to be consistent with the notion of non-
human persons (2010, 82). 
 Although inclusive of non-human persons, Norton-Smith’s Shawnee perspective 
contains stricter requirements for personhood than Western schemes.  On his view, 
personhood is not implied by a singular capacity like rationality that is merely possessed 
or not possessed.  His criteria are socially embedded and dynamic.  One becomes a 
person by participation in an organic social and moral nexus.  For him, such beings 
achieve an “animate” status, that is the actual power (manitou) something has as a 
significant component of social reality.  This does not require that a person be alive in a 
biological sense.  Rather, 
In American Indian traditions an animate being is a person by virtue of its 
membership and participation in an actual network of social and moral 
relationships and practices with other persons, so moral agency is at the core of a 
Native conception of persons, just as…. the Western conception of personhood 
(2010, 90). 
 
This is very close to Deloria’s account of personhood, 
Power and place produce personality.  This equation simply means that the 
universe is alive, but it also contains within it the very important suggestion that 
the universe is personal and, therefore, must be approached in a personal manner.  




of necessity must be personal and incapable of expansion and projection to hold 
true universally (Deloria and Wildcat 2001, 23). 
 
By these descriptions, Native views of personhood tend to be expansive in the sense that 
they are open to the recognition of personal relationships with beings of all kinds.  In his 
essay published in the APA newsletter following Vine Deloria’s death, Scott Pratt 
defends Deloria’s agent ontology against common Western misconceptions.  He writes, 
It is more difficult to see how one might treat a mountain or a stone or a river as 
an agent in moral relation with human beings or other persons, but from the 
perspective of Deloria’s agent ontology, they also count as real agents.  If this is 
so, then human interactions with ecosystems and other large systems as well as 
so-called inorganic things would also be fundamentally moral relationships and 
actions can be evaluated in terms of the ways in which they foster or undermine 
aspects of personhood on the part of these other agents (2006, 7). 
 
Deloria’s simple formula, power plus place equal personality, offers a concise way to 
conceive of animism in a straightforward sense that does away with the mysticism 
attributed by Western readers.  The idea of power here is a translation of terms that have 
shared meaning in different Native traditions.  Some examples are manitou from 
Algonquin, orenda from the Iroquoian, and wakán from the Siouan language groups.   
 The idea that these concepts entail a fundamentally flawed combination of realms 
misunderstands what they mean by imposing Western categories on to Native 
worldviews.  Typically, Western minds will assume these concepts ascribe a supernatural 
power to natural objects.  On a common Western understanding, “supernatural” implies a 
metaphysical realm that is completely separate or dualistic relation to the “natural” or 
“physical” realms.  The idea of the supernatural is not alien to Native religious practices, 
but it often takes on a different meaning.  For example, Eastman writes, “In every 
religion there is an element of the supernatural…” (1911, 16).  However, on his view this 




miracle of life in seed and egg, the miracle of death in lightning flash and the swelling 
deep…We have still to face the ultimate miracle, - the origin and principle of life!” 
(1911, 16-18).  Some Native authors have rejected the concept of the supernatural 
altogether.  Citing Hallowell, Norton-Smith writes “… if the concept of the natural is 
absent, so must be the concept of the supernatural” (Norton-Smith 2010, 84; Hallowell 
1960, 28).  However, it is unlikely that Norton-Smith and Eastman are in radical 
disagreement here.  The difference is probably semantic.  They both reject the idea that 
the realm of spirit or the supernatural are in absolute opposition to the material world.  
The manitou of a tree is not an alien force from another realm rousing its activity.  The 
idea is that the tree is itself this force in the world (which can be seen as miraculous);  it 
has a specific kind of influence and agency of its own.  Bunge writes of the Lakota 
concept wakán that it represents the word power in the sense of a power so great that it 
could be considered “supernatural.”  But as Bunge is well aware, his use of this word 
does not imply its usual meaning.  He gives the example of a gun, mazáwakán, which just 
means “holy iron.”  This object is labeled with the term wakán, indicating “in Lakota 
language that a gun has extraordinary powers; once used, once fired, something important 
and irrevocable happens. The universe is forever changed and cannot be the same again. 
All this is contained in the concept of wakán” (1984, 74).  In the wake of school 
shootings, who can deny that guns are a thing of unique moral importance in this sense, 
having a kind of power within the moral realm?  In contrast, one is reminded of the 
classic Western film, Shane, when the male lead “mansplains” guns to his female 
counterpart after teaching her son how to use one without her permission, “A gun is a 




gun is as good or as bad as the man using it.  Remember that” (Stevens 1953).  Thinking 
of guns as a neutral technology that can be used for good or evil ignores the powerful 
influence they have on human life.  Such conceptions of agency explain Deloria’s affinity 
for Marshall McLuhan who insists that technologies themselves shape our culture much 
more profoundly than the basic ways in which they are “used” (Deloria 1979).  Norton-
Smith describes the concept of manitou as the power an entity has to be animate or 
morally significant in a social reality.  There is no suggestion that some otherworldly 
entity informs the actions of stones, animals, or trees like some sort of spirit-homunculus.   
 The second variable of Deloria’s formula, the idea of place, points towards 
geographical specificity as constitutive of personality.  Coulthard gives some insight into 
how Native conceptions of personhood relate specifically to land: 
In the Weledeh dialect of Dogrib (which is my community’s language), for 
example, “land” (or dé) is translated in relational terms as that which 
encompasses not only the land (understood here as material), but also people and 
animals, rocks and trees, lakes and rivers, and so on.  Seen in this light, we are as 
much a part of the land as any other element.  Furthermore, within this system of 
relations human beings are not the only constituent believed to embody spirit or 
agency ... Ethically this meant that humans held certain obligations to the land, 
animals, plants and lakes as much the same way that we hold obligations to other 
people (2014, 61). 
 
Coulthard’s formulation meshes well with Norton-Smith’s when he says, “The Native 
conception of persons is expansive, for all sorts of nonhuman spirit beings – ancestors 
and animals, plants and places, physical forces and cardinal directions, the Sun, Earth, 
and other powerful spirit beings” (2010, 93).  On this view land is a very special kind of 
person (a Mother) because it gives birth and life (literally and symbolically) to people in 
a specific place.  All lands are unique and have special characteristics and powers that 




specific personalities and relationships between those personalities.  In that sense land is 
an ontological origin of personhood, existing both in unique forms that constitute the 
origin of specific peoples as well the intercultural sense of the earth as the Mother of all.  
Pratt offers of summary of this central role of place: 
“Place” is also an important term in that it implies the importance of land among 
the others who form the context of a person.  From one angle, land and sustaining 
environments are simply a necessary condition for the existence of any particular 
beings on earth.  From another angle, land, rivers, ecosystems, even farm fields, 
hills, and mountain ranges are also persons in their own right in interaction with 
other persons, human and otherwise.  In a universe of interaction, a particular land 
is understood to be another characteristic expression of power, different from the 
expressions of animals or plants, so an agent in its own right (2006, 7). 
 
Acknowledging that land is a person in its own right opens the profound possibility for 
human identities to be understood in terms of a personal kinship with it.  This is not just a 
closeness or intimacy with land but rather a reciprocal moral relationship that makes up 
the core of human individuals and nations. 
 
Land as a source of identity, ethics, and spirituality 
 An expansive conception of persons implies seeing land as part of expansive 
forms of identity, ethics, and spirituality that include more-than-human concerns.  Tribal 
spiritual practices tend to seek a continuity of experience between humans and land rather 
than creating disparate categories of owner and the owned.  In this way distinct cultural 
forms can develop that are fitting to geographically defined origins and boundaries.  
Georges Sioui writes, 
Put simply, the Amerindian genius, acknowledging as it does the universal 
interdependence of all beings, physical and spiritual, tries by every available 
means to establish intellectual and emotional contact between them, so as to 
guarantee them – for they are all “relatives” – abundance, quality, and therefore, 





In Black Elk’s vision, a cardinal direction, the South, speaks to him: “Behold a good 
nation walking in a sacred manner in a good land” (2007, 28).  Kyle Whyte describes this 
process as the mutual inscription of cultural content both on land and in the emotional 
responsivity of human bodies (Whyte 2017, 96).  He writes, “bodies express moral 
terrains through affective responses” (Whyte 2016, 161; Figueroa and Waitt 2008, 328).  
In this way, continuity and contact with land also establishes the differentiation of 
cultures.  Black Elk’s vision expresses the possible unification of identity, ethics, and 
spirituality through the emotional and practical connection of a particular group of people 
to a particular land.  There is nothing guaranteed about the quality of this connection.  
Rather it is a vision of possible life, something that must be achieved and cyclically 
renewed.  There is no fixed state of harmony between people and land.  The fact that this 
sacred connection does not merely “exist” but is “walked” expresses an ethical or 
practical relationship.  It expresses an awareness that must be tended to carefully and 
never taken for granted.  Walking means always looking where one is going. 
 Native conceptions of identity incorporate land as an integral aspect rather than an 
incidental aspect.  In their book Indian from the Inside, McPherson and Rabb write, “In 
the previous chapter on the phenomenology of the vision quest we noted that one of the 
things discovered during the vision quest is that we are not really apart from the earth and 
other people.  We are rather a part of the earth and other people” (2011, 100).  The 
expansive view of personhood is matched by an expansive view of personal identity.  
Native views of identity are grounded by an orientation to one’s land as a center of 
meaning, containing the relationships that make one’s person unique and significant.  For 




on their lands as the mutual revival of buffalo people and buffalo nations.  She writes, 
“grass will once again call the names of the buffalo, and the buffalo people will 
remember their relations and rejoice” (1999, 162). 
 In the Pacific Northwest where I live, similar efforts are being made by tribal 
organizations to restore the lives of the salmon people.  The Columbia River Inter-Tribal 
Fish Commission, a multinational organization formed by the Yakama, Umatilla, Warm 
Springs, and Nez Perce nations, seeks the revival of salmon culture through a restorative 
relationship with salmon in the Columbia Basin (“Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission,” n.d.)  It would be a misunderstanding to reduce the sense of identity 
Columbia Basin tribes feel with salmon as a simple closeness or intimacy.  A biologist or 
sport fisherman can become well-acquainted with salmon.  However, for Columbia River 
Basin tribes, salmon are part of their creation story.  In preparation for the first humans, 
Creator asked the plants and animals who among them would give themselves for the 
nourishment of these new people.  Salmon offered his body for food and Water offered 
herself as a home for the salmon.  The sacred name for salmon is Wy-Kan-Ush, making 
the Columbia River Basin tribes Wy-Kan-Ush-Pum, or Salmon People (ibid.).  This 
creation story conveys the beginnings Wy-Kan-Ush-Pum as nations.  The Land of what is 
called the Columbia River Basin cooperates with Water to make a home for the Salmon, 
and together with the human nations they all actively contribute to making the Wy-Kan-
Ush the place that it is.  This is the literal and ontological framing of what it means to be 
Indigenous in the Columbia River Basin.  The spirit of the salmon expressed by Wy-Kan-




miraculous aspect of the sacred relationship and mutual responsibility between humans, 
Land, Water, and Salmon. 
It follows that Indigeneity is more complex than the idea of living in the land where you 
were born.  Indigeneity does not simply ensue after building a society grounded in a 
specific geographical area.  All humans and societies are from somewhere and build their 
life in some place.  Indigeneity is defined by the founding of a people or a nation in 
relation to land as a person.  The Columbia Basin tribes are Indigenous because of their 
creation as nations in relation to Wy-Kan-Ush,Water, and their Lands as people.  This 
precludes expansion or imperial conquest because the national identity cannot be 
exported to other lands.  Indigeneity is and always has been anticolonial (or perhaps 
noncolonial) even before it came to be formed in and through its contrast with 
colonialism. 
 Philosophically speaking, the emphasis of identities built around the particular 
non-human elders and relatives of a particular land mean a view of identity that is 
“polycentric” according to McPherson and Rabb (2011, 20).  This is a different idea from 
pluralism or multiculturalism because it implies a relation to land.  It is the idea of 
diversity based on bounded geographical relationships.  Deloria speaks of Native cultures 
as holding “non-homogenous pockets of identity” that represent “different arrangements 
of emotional energy” (1973, 78).  By “pockets” Deloria literally means different pockets 
of land.  Coulthard remarks on Deloria’s assertions that he 
does not simply intend to reiterate the rather obvious observation that most 
Indigenous societies hold a strong attachment to their homelands, but is instead 
attempting to explicate the position that land occupies as an ontological 





From a polycentric view of the world, the earth is populated by different centers of 
meaning.  To each Native group, these centers are not simply the location of lifestyles 
and memories, but the place that creates a people as a people.  Cordova writes, “The 
viewer…is…positioned at the ‘center of the universe.’  This is not, however, an 
egocentric interpretation: the viewer is only a small aspect of the entire directional 
system” (2007, 186).  Spatiality, or a personal relationship to a bounded area of land, to 
be more specific, is at the center of identity.  In his essay on Blackhawk’s conception of 
place, Pratt writes, “Here, land is not merely something valued, but rather the ground that 
organizes the meaning of things and events” (Pratt 2001, 110). 
 It follows from this sense of identity that from Native viewpoints, ethical 
principles are not mere beliefs or cultural values, but are active principles of meaning in 
daily perception and action based around a direct personal relationship with land as a 
relative.  LaDuke writes, 
Understanding the complexity of these belief systems is central to understanding 
the societies built on those spiritual foundations – the relationship of peoples to 
their sacred lands, to relatives with fins or hooves, to the plant and animal foods 
that anchor a way of life (2005, 12). 
 
These principles are revealed in the obligations that form a diversity of personal 
relationships according to the specific relatives that make up material and spiritual life.  
Black Elk recites Fox Belly’s song in which “walking,” or what could perhaps be 
interpreted as daily ethical action, is connected to deeper sacred relationships, 
Revealing this, they walk.  
A sacred herb – revealing it, they walk. 
Revealing this, they walk. 
The sacred life of bison – revealing it, they walk. 
Revealing this, they walk 
A sacred eagle feather – revealing it, they walk. 




The eagle and the bison – like relatives they walk (159). 
 
 Fox Belly’s song magnifies a Lakota worldview in specific ways.  The 
performance of daily ethical obligations to particular relatives reveals the sacred or 
spiritual relationships that underpin this continuous relation in the mutual creation of life.  
Fox Belly expresses a direct and sacred kinship with specific non-human relatives: herbs, 
bison, and eagles.  His song also expresses the moral agency and personhood of these 
relatives.  It is not just the human nation that walks in a sacred manner, but also the 
eagles and bison, and perhaps the herbs as well as these powers reveal each other as what 
they are.  Deloria elaborates on this view, 
Behind the apparent kinship between animals, reptiles, birds, and human beings in 
the Indian way stands a great conception shared by a great majority of 
tribes.  Other living things are not regarded as insensitive species.  Rather they are 
‘peoples’ in the same manner as the various tribes of men are peoples (1973, 103). 
 
The lives of these relatives are powerful, independent, and influential.  They participate 
actively in the moral nexus of concern for the Lakota people and shape its identity and its 
ideas of right and wrong. 
 If readers wish to call this an ethic, or more specifically an environmental ethic, 
the label would not be entirely wrong.  However, caution is needed to avoid creating false 
equivalencies to mainstream environmental practices that are often ardently secular or 
obsessed with science and technology.  Richard Dawkins’ book, The God Delusion is one 
example of the total condemnation of anything resembling religion to the Western 
scientific mind.  The book is replete with problematic examples of “aboriginal” or 
“native” cultures that, according to Dawkins, on the one hand have an intimate 
knowledge of their “biological environment” but on the other hand are possessed of 




environmental future does not include a religious aspect either.  He said in an interview 
pertaining to his new book, The Meaning of Human Existence, 
All the ideologies and religions have their own answers for the big questions, but 
these are usually bound as a dogma to some kind of tribe.  Religions in particular 
feature supernatural elements that other tribes – other faiths – cannot accept ... 
And every tribe, no matter how generous, benign, loving and charitable, 
nonetheless looks down on all other tribes.  What's dragging us down is religious 
faith (Sarchet 2015; Wilson 2015). 
 
Native scholars take a different approach, acknowledging the ways in which broader 
spiritual orientations at the core of ontological awareness shape the daily ethical life of 
humans.  It is important to recognize the role of tribal spirituality for Native 
environmentalisms.  Michelle Jacob of theYakama Nation writes, “Indigenous spirituality 
is tied to place; it is tied to Indigenous homeland, and we see this cultural value 
throughout Indian Country.  Thus an Indigenous environmentalism will be spiritual at its 
core” (Jacob 2016, 49). 
 Bunge explains a Lakota concept of spiritual moral direction in terms of a life-
changing “vision, induced or otherwise, or a revelation of some kind” (1984, 148).  Such 
visions are rare and significant in terms of how they shape life according to new 
realizations.  A frequent misconstruction of the experience of land having a personality 
assumes that there is a superstitious attribution of supernatural powers to natural forces 
that are otherwise explainable in terms of physical laws.  This is a Western projection 
based on what Irving Hallowell calls the “natural-supernatural dichotomy” that is “so 
persistently invoked… in describing the outlook of peoples in cultures other than our 
own” (Hallowell 1960, 28). 
 However, for Bunge the range of practical and spiritual experience with land is 




scientific manner of perceiving the world or a simple conflation of realms.  Rather it is a 
manner of perceiving the significance of events as rich and multi-faceted in their 
implications for human emotions and knowledge.  Standing Bear famously wrote, 
“Everything was possessed of personality, only differing with us in form.  Knowledge 
was inherent in all things.  The world was a library and its books were the stones, leaves, 
grass, brooks, and the birds and animals that shared, alike with us, the storms and 
blessings of earth” (2006, 194).9  This awareness of a continuity between personality and 
materiality, the spiritual and the practical, is what brings Cordova to state quite simply 
“the mundane is actually the sacred” (2007, 232).  Hence it is through a respect to the 
distinctness of personalities (rather than the blanket category of the “natural”) that a 
continuity of knowledge and spiritual practice regarding the “natural” environment is 
achieved. 
 Native spiritualities seek to establish experiential continuity in everyday 
perceptions.  Deloria writes, “In almost every instance in which other religions were 
considered as invalid, it was because the categories of explanation were those derived 
primarily from temporal considerations of how the world ought to be” (1973, 88).  
Deloria is talking about messianism and other universalizing temporal claims in 
mainstream religions that do not synchronize well with any practical forms of experience 
and do not apply to any place in particular.  In contrast, “Indian tribal religions could be 
said to consider creation as an ecosystem present in a definable place” (1973, 91).  
Hence, rather than telling a universal creation story, tribal spirituality tends to focus on 
                                               
9 Although many Native authors refer to traditions in the past tense, most recent scholarship does not see 
Native life as past.  Hence Bunge’s comment cited above that Native philosophy “continues to exert 




the creation of specific peoples in specific places and the sacred sorts of relationships that 
make those relationships what they are within the specified bounds.  This polycentric 
spiritual outlook is what allows Black Elk to say, for example, “the spirits took me there 
to the center of the world” (2007, 62).  He is referencing the Black Hills specifically, not 
a scientifically located “center” of the entire universe or the earth.  The Black Hills are 
the center of the world to Lakota traditions specifically. There is no claim to universality.  
The Black Hills are the place that makes the Lakota people what they are and give 
spiritual and ethical guidance to their world. 
 The geographical orientation of tribal religions creates an egalitarian spiritual 
environment in which there is room for a multiplicity of ethical and spiritual practices 
because the experiential basis for each worldview is based on a connection to a particular 
place.  The “tribalism” that “always looks down on other tribes” is part of the make-
believe world cooked up by characters like Wilson and Dawkins.  Deloria writes, 
No tribe, however, asserted its history as having primacy over the accounts of any 
other tribe...the recitation of stories by different peoples was regarded as a social 
event embodying civility.  Differing tribal accounts were believed, since it was 
not a matter of trying to establish power over others (1973, 114). 
 
Deloria notes that Christianity in particular lacks this quality because of its a-spatial 
character.  References in the Bible to specific places like the Garden of Eden or Mt. Sinai 
are most commonly interpreted as universal messages about all mankind rather than 
geographically bounded revelations.  He says, “Without the particularity of land on which 
it was intended that a particular people live, creation had to become an event of the 
beginnings of the world” (1973, 162).  The continuities and differences of spiritual and 
practical life established by an awareness of geographical origins are key components 






 Recognizing the agencies and personalities of land suggest a need to discuss not 
only the sovereignty of Native nations on those lands but also the sovereignty of the land 
itself.  The assertion of treaty rights has been an increasingly prominent way for Native 
nations to manifest their spiritual ownership of homelands and reclaim relationships to 
the regions that give them life (Bilke 2017).10  They have also been an important way to 
assert the right for the land to express agency of its own.  This contributes to Indigenous 
liberation because it opens the possibility for tribes to re-enter relationships not just with 
a physical homeland but with their land as the person or persons that constitute their 
creation as a people.  In the Pacific Northwest, for example, the fish-ins and multiple 
arrests of legendary Billy Frank Jr. prompted legislation that finally recognized the rights 
of the Nisqually to fish in their sacred river (Wilkinson 2000).  The Chippewa have had 
similar legal struggles with the state of Minnesota, where they have been embroiled in an 
on-going battle over the right to fish for their walleye since 1990 (Minnesota Legislative 
Reference Library 2015).11  However, it is important not to confuse the assertion of 
usufruct rights with a desire or intention to enforce a Western framework of property 
ownership or the right to exploitation.  For the most part, Native forms of identity, ethics, 
and spirituality find the concept of property ownership in land to be alien and unwanted, 
perhaps occasionally useful in rebutting colonial land grabs.  This can be seen in how 
treaty rights have been asserted for the benefit of land and its many eco-social 
                                               
10 Strategic assertion of treaty rights has become more common throughout the Native world despite 
ongoing concerns about whether sovereignty is an effective political concept for decolonization.  On this 
debate see Alfred 2004, Deloria 2007, and Turner 2007. 




communities, both human and non-human.  Fundamentally speaking (as in Locke), the 
right to ongoing property ownership is established based on the extent to which land is 
exploited for human use and capital gain; the right to spiritual ownership is established 
based on the extent to which land and people have reached a reciprocal continuity of 
understanding and emotion.  For that reason, the personhood, sovereignty, agency, and 
self-determination of Indigenous nations and their lands are inextricably linked.  Spiritual 
ownership of the land can be seen in the words of Billy Frank, who said the following, 
We talk about state sovereignty and tribal sovereignty, but those ant communities 
under the big fir trees are sovereign, too.  We’ve got to find a way to protect their 
sovereignty … I don’t believe in magic.  I believe in the sun and the stars, the 
water, the tides, the floods, the owls, the hawks flying, the river running, the wind 
talking.  They’re measurements.  They tell us how healthy things are.  How 
healthy we are.  Because we and they are the same.  That’s what I believe in 
(Wilkinson 2000, 101). 
 
 It is apparent that Native nations have developed robust and refined concepts of 
land in an effort to live peacefully and sustainably with neighboring nations both human 
and non-human.  This ongoing process long predates the threat of European colonialism.  
Kyle Whyte warns that “settler societies seek to inscribe their own homelands over 
indigenous homelands, thereby erasing the history, lived experiences, social reality and 
possibilities of a future of indigenous peoples” (2016, 159).  Resistance to this process 
can be found in anticolonial spiritual practices seeking peace and reciprocity that 
recognize the multitudinous sovereignties whose right to life are written in to the 
landscapes of a polycentric world.  The subtlety of Native environmental principles that 
“walk” according to a dynamic and specific “natural order” fight to maintain a 
connection to ecological moral terrains of the body in connection to land (LaDuke 1989, 




is thought of as an integral component of identity that sets the parameters of oppressive 
regimes (not just for Native identity but for all identities).  Native views of land as a 
person and a  Mother contradict the objectifying and heterosexualizing aspects of 
colonization that attempt to fix Native bodies and lands as the property of white men. 
 All these recognitions and more are needed to begin a thoroughgoing critique of 
the ways in which the concept of land has been ignored, misappropriated, manipulated, 
and otherwise made operational as part of oppressive theoretical formulations by Western 
philosophy.  What follows argues that many settler inscriptions on land can be found 
deep within avenues of Western philosophical literature that have specifically attempted 
to radicalize attitudes towards nature or the earth.  If these radical philosophies represent 
some of the best efforts so far on behalf of Western people to transform their worldview 
for the better, then it is imperative that they be thoroughly reformed according to 
anticolonial principles.  This includes an examination of how they still lack a critical 
distance from the settler worldview from which they are written.  Critical experiential and 
material aspects of this worldview are to be found in their expression in Western 
phenomenology and political economy, especially where they have concerned themselves 





III.  (DE)COLONIZING PHENOMENOLOGIES 
 As a philosophical method, phenomenology has been an influential form of 
resistance against discourses that are reductive with regards to human experience, the 
natural world, and the earth.  However, this chapter argues that thus far, even in its quest 
to develop ecological onto-ethical narratives through diverse and often opposing 
conceptual frameworks, Western phenomenology has normalized settler experience in 
ways that span much of its core.  In particular, Heidegger’s concept of earth has been 
prominent as an expression of the living connectedness of humans to the place of their 
dwelling and inhabitation (Maly 2009, 52).  This intimate relationality transmutes into a 
moral call to save (retten) the earth in its powers of self-concealing and regeneration.  
Heidegger’s “paganism” is often associated with the spiritual content of Native religions.  
However, anticolonial analysis reveals a disconcerting harmony between Heideggerian 
narratives, colonial ideology in general, and the fascist history of Germany in particular.  
Interpreters have often been hasty in their application of Heidegger to ecological 
problems without fully addressing these concerns.  For example, Bruce V. Foltz’s 
authoritative book, Inhabiting the Earth, spends only three pages discussing the threat of 
national socialism and suggests that Heidegger’s silence on the Holocaust was a mere 
“personal failing” (Foltz 1995, 110-113).  Such explanations regarding Heidegger’s 
involvement in Nazism as a “human weakness” are common (Gessmann 2017, 116).  But 
even if Heidegger’s thinking can be redeemed from Nazism, it cannot be so easily 
abstracted from the colonial history of the West.  When interpreted within this context, 




that can be found buried in essential aspects of Heidegger’s thinking and that of his 
interpreters. 
 A rival dialogue has been formulated by those attracted to Levinas’ description of 
the elements or the il y a as expressing the menacing alienness of nature rather than our 
connectedness or participation with it.  This approach resists the forfeiture of human 
identity in a fusion with the earth and, contrary to Levinas’ own beliefs, posits the radical 
alterity of nature in its nonhuman gaze as a “face” that places demands on us.  But 
attempts to extend Levinas’ notion of the face to nature are troubled by the fact that the 
moment of the il y a and the anonymity of nature are the essential prehistory to what 
Levinas calls the discovery of “man in the nudity of his face” (Toadvine 2012, 178; 
Levinas 1990, 234).  In resisting the fascist insinuations and racial particularism of 
Heidegger’s earth, soil, and enrootedness, Levinas narrates the flip side of colonial 
perception, seeing the earth as utterly lacking in agency, personality, organization, and 
meaning, while enthusiastically embracing the ability of technology to obliterate all local 
character and particularity.  The tension of these two views is however unified in their 
heterosexualization of nature (which is also linked to male supremacy and sex-right), 
only differing in the adoption of either an “Orphic” or a “Promethean” attitude to this 
essentially conquerable version of the feminine, whether it be the target of poetry or 
technology (Hadot 2006, 150-51). 
 It is not surprising that colonial meanings can be found in phenomenology given 
that most of what is traditionally considered to be amongst its corpus has been written 
under the umbrella of European culture.  But these prominent descriptions of lived 




or desire, although often resonant for Western readers, do not appear so universally 
binding when evaluated from vantages that are incongruent with the history of Europe 
and its settlements.  The normality of the settler ego or settler perceptivity can be 
confronted by considering land and as a pivotal structure of experience.  Land appears in 
most Western phenomenology at the fringes of analysis.  Its analogues such as earth, 
nature, place, soil, the elements, etc. receive far more attention, but are too far abstracted 
from the framing of Western perception by colonial expansion, which inflects each of 
these other concepts with settler meanings and intentions.  If Western phenomenology is 
to approach its own stated goals of analysis, it must confront the colonial aspect of its 
Europeanness.  This can be achieved in no other way than a dialogue about the categories 
of experience that bracket or enclose European perceptions about the human relation to 
land. 
 Therefore, this chapter also argues that Western phenomenology must adopt a 
decolonizing element among its first methodological principles if it is to challenge the 
colonial inheritance of its European origins.  The process of reconsidering concepts that 
are basic to the discipline from a decolonizing perspective is in accord with 
phenomenological method as a radical examination of experience.  Phenomenologists can 
and should ask how colonialism structures perception and phenomenological description.  
Merleau-Ponty wrote that “the presuppositions of every thought… pass by unnoticed” 
unless we “abstain from them for a moment in order to awaken them and to make them 
appear” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, xxvii).  Indeed, the “serviceability” of Husserl’s epoché of 
Ideas I only accrues when the phenomenologist brackets the natural attitude of everyday 




sense” including perceptions, memories, fancies, judgments, feelings, desires, etc. 
(Husserl 1952, 112-15).  For Husserl the relation of the perceiving to the perceived is not 
limited to neo-Kantian conceptions of transcendental consciousness as the “objective 
ground” of the laws which pervade “all appearances” but also includes the content of the 
“life-world” (Kant 2007, 160; Moran 2013, 124).  Husserl argues towards the end of 
Ideas 1, 
Such are types of objects bearing a value, all practical objects, all concrete 
cultural organizations which as hard realities determine our actual life, the State, 
for instance, the Church, custom, the law, and so forth… The shaping of these 
entities leads back quite naturally to that of psychical subjects and of things or 
their analogues in space:  they are grounded indeed in such realities.  Material 
reality as the lowest formation remains in the last resort the foundation of all other 
realities, and therefore undoubtedly the phenomenology of material nature holds a 
pre-eminent position (444). 
 
 Although Husserl’s interpretation of this project in Ideas II is concentrated on the 
regions of the “material inanimate object of the outer world,” I would propose that this 
statement also implies an analysis of power and colonization in the relation of material 
nature to the body of the perceiving subject (Schuetz 1953, 396).  Western 
phenomenology should be reformed according to what appears by bracketing, to use a 
phrase coined by Scott Pratt, the “colonial attitude” which reduces all meanings to “part 
of the history of European progress” (2002, 39, 51). 
 One way to bracket the colonial attitude is by listening to descriptions of 
experience outside the scope of colonial culture (whether they are intended specifically to 
be phenomenology or not).  The momentary “abstention” of listening functions by 
opening a window into another world.  This does not imply a reduction of anti or non-




through the transformation of phenomenology from a praxis of description into a praxis 
of listening.  The individual and cultural isolation of the “I” in phenomenological 
reflection is shattered when the “I” listens.  This is not without challenge and dissonance.  
Merleau-Ponty asks, “can we understand someone else without sacrificing him to our 
logic or it to him?” (1964, 115).  Merleau-Ponty suggests that this problem can be 
partially overcome by anthropology, writing, “What interests the philosopher in 
anthropology is just that it takes man as he is, in his actual situation of life and 
understanding” (123).  Another approach to intersubjective and intercultural dialogue is 
to listen directly to voices that challenge the core assumptions of Western 
phenomenology as phenomenology, that is, as descriptions of lived experience that are 
heard and attended to immediately as such. 
 One reason for this suggestion is to combat the narrative of a “founding moment” 
of Western phenomenology that proclaims culturally exclusive access to the kind of 
knowledge it creates.  On the one hand, Husserl also resisted the “racist particularism” of 
National Socialism with an appeal to a universal humanity (Levinas and Hand 1990, 64).  
He writes, 
Only [through the disclosure of this a priori] can there be an a priori science 
extending beyond all historical facticities, all historical surrounding worlds, 
peoples, times, civilizations…Do we not stand here before the great and profound 
problem-horizon of reason, the same reason that functions in every man, the 
animal rationale, no matter how primitive he is?” (1970, 377-78). 
 
However, if we look deeper into this apparent sense of universal humanity, it is clear that 
Husserl’s original conception of the natural attitude structurally presupposes the colonial 
attitude.  In fact, the “natural attitude” is epitomized in Husserl’s philosophy by what he 




lack of distance from their own lifeworld or an inability to see their world as one possible 
world-representation rather than the world itself.  Husserl writes that all societies have 
such a given world, 
…right back to those of the ‘primitive’ tribes…Every people, large or small, has 
its world in which, for that people, everything fits well together, whether in 
mythical-magical or in European-rational terms, and in which everything can be 
explained perfectly (1970, 373). 
 
He extends a rudimentary humanness to all people in so far as they have a culture, basic 
sorts of practical reason, sensibility, feeling, and need.  However, he posits a hierarchy of 
worlds where European supremacy is marked by its ascension to a truly universal 
scientific consciousness.  Accordingly, he writes that it was the Greeks who made “the 
first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its entelechy…the historical 
movement through which universal reason, ‘inborn’ in humanity as such, is revealed” 
(Husserl 1970, 15).  Technically this developmental stage of humanity is accessible to all, 
but so far only achieved by Europe.  Husserl’s own understanding of non-Western 
societies is mediated through the anthropology of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl to whom he sent a 
personal letter of admiration.  In that correspondence, Husserl writes that we must, 
“understand this [primitive] humankind as having, in and through its socially unified life, 
the world, which for it is not a ‘world representation’ but rather the world that actually 
exists for it” (Husserl 2008, 86).  These “empirical anthropological types” as Husserl 
calls them, have yet to start down the path of true human greatness that has already taken 
hold as the soul of Europe (Husserl 1970, 16). 
  Criticizing Husserl’s Eurocentrism is not new (Lau 2011; Tava and Meachum 
2016).  However, the critique has not been taken seriously enough or followed to its full 




become “commonplace to accuse Husserl of a certain ‘Eurocentrism,’” (2011, 465).  
However, he closes the same essay with apologetics (as foreshadowed by his scare-
quotes around Eurocentrism), writing “there is no evidence that Husserl thinks that Indian 
or Chinese civilizations are essentially incapable of making the breakthrough from myth 
to the theoretical attitude, originally performed by ‘a few Greek eccentrics’” (Moran 
2011, 494).  This comment puts Moran’s position on European culture more-or-less 
unchanged from Husserl’s own. 
 European supremacy presents a contradiction in Western phenomenology at its 
outset.  The presumption of supremacy commits the exact failure that the suspension of 
the natural attitude is supposed to avoid.  It confuses the world of “universal science” 
with “the world.”  This understanding of phenomenology is in lockstep with colonial 
epistemologies that assume European science has special or privileged access to 
knowledge and thereby a special right of access to land.  The settler ego is disclosed by 
bracketing the colonial attitude, pushing phenomenology to see the subject in terms of the 
desire for and perceptual structure of the normality of settler colonial power.  Land is the 
existential site where colonization manifests itself and forms a circuit with the moral 
terrains of the body as they are called forth in the horizon of perceptual entitlement.  
Land represents a culmination of judgment, of value, of right, of desire, of logic (as in 
“logics of elimination”) and so on.  Land “opens the space of perception by calling for a 
response of our bodies” but is not exhausted by those perceptions (Toadvine 2003, 149).  
The content of the perceiving “I” as it exists in relation to land can be modified in 




sense of the “I” as the settler on this land.  Hence, land is the structural link that connects 
meaning and matter in a way that discloses colonial perception. 
 Phenomenology is useful as a method of revealing this link in ways that 
naturalistic methods cannot.  Land conceived merely as an object of the natural sciences 
will necessarily be insufficient for analyzing a dynamic cultural phenomenon inflected by 
power and politics.  The importance of developing such linkages is stressed by 
anticolonial thinkers such as Leigh Patel who asks us “to contend directly with the 
material consequences of how identities are necessarily essentially ascribed by a settler 
state” (Patel and Tuck 2016).  Phenomenology can play an important role in this process 
because it invites the meanings of everyday life to be related to broader social-ontological 
structures, situating the meaning of bodily identities within an experiential background, 
place, or lifeworld rather than reducing them to mere statistical or physical objects.  A 
sense of this strength of phenomenology should also be tempered by an awareness of 
potential shortcomings.  David Wood writes, “Phenomenology was born out of resistance 
to the threat of naturalism” (Wood 2003, 211).  This original struggle with naturalism is 
most meaningfully traced back to Husserl, whose work circled the problem up until his 
death.  He warns of the “positivistic concept of science” that seeks “the universe of mere 
facts” but forgets “its meaning for life” (Husserl 1970, 5, 9).  Because Western 
phenomenology is fashioned specifically for the task of combatting the loss of meaning 
in modern sciences, certain theories are assumed to explain the degradation of the earth 
and its objectification in terms of property and resources.  In particular, the mainstream 
tends to see this as an extension of naturalism rather than colonialism.  Although Native 




anticolonial position and are therefore inclined to take Western naturalistic views of 
nature to be bound to colonialism in an essential manner.  The origins of Western 
phenomenology in their identification of naturalism as the fundamental spiritual and 
ideological danger of modernity can have a problematic tendency to smudge or sideline 
colonialism as a mere aftereffect.  Thinking intersectionally about land in terms of 
colonialism, naturalism, race, class, gender, sexuality, materiality, ideology, etc., avoids 
privileging one mode of critique over others. 
My personal experience with the social gatherings of professional 
phenomenologists have proven to mirror an approach that privileges European 
perspectives.  In 2013, The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy 
(SPEP) held its main conference in Eugene, Oregon, the town where I live.  The first 
night featured a plenary given by Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl Archives on “Decentered 
Thinking.”  This talk was followed by a panel on Husserl and nature the following day.  
There was a panel on the concept of resistance in Deleuze and Foucault.  In the book 
exhibit, I came across a book called Heidegger and the Thinking of Place.  The final 
plenary talk was given by Catherine Malabou of the Centre for Research in Modern 
European Philosophy at Kingston University in London.  At one point in her talk she 
resolutely tasked the audience with a moral calling, “We must create an ecological 
philosophy.”  What are the historical implications of this moral destiny?  Who are “we”?  
Who is being left out?  Whose history is at stake?  Do ecological philosophies already 
exist?  If so, has Malabou simply failed to read them or has she committed them to the 
unmodern and irrelevant prehistory of “Stone Age man” to which it is impossible to 




experience, it is problematic that the Society for Phenomenology and Existential 
Philosophy designates “a professional organization devoted to supporting philosophy 
inspired by continental European traditions” (SPEP, n.d.).  Such a totalizing approach to 
phenomenology is exclusionary and stifles the much-needed rigor found only in multi-
perspectival forums.  This should be a major concern given the conference prides itself 
on a pluralist approach and broad base of participation, positions which are also 
expressed in its ties to the Pluralist’s Guide for graduate programs.12 
Despite the themes of the conference that, on the face of them, are immediately 
relevant to the lives of Native people and explicitly thematize nature, the environment, 
and so on, no speaker at the conference acknowledged the Kalapuya people upon whose 
land we were gathered.  The conference did not invite any tribal members to speak on 
philosophical questions relevant to the region or its people.  Most of the principal 
speakers were invited from Europe.  The conference was a very cosmopolitan and 
international affair, but the only nations represented were European and settler nations. 
 The International Association for Environmental Philosophy met the day directly 
following SPEP.  A total of zero papers were delivered on Native philosophy of any kind.  
There were six or so papers concerning Euro-American philosophers (my paper on John 
Dewey, titled “Post-Humanist Pragmatism,” was one of these).  Other papers were 
delivered on William James and Aldo Leopold.  Exercising the privilege to participate in 
such a colonial occasion left me unsettled; not, however, in the Heideggerian sense of an 
underlying anxiety or uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) that is founded in the encroachment 
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upon the everyday of the indefiniteness of the nothing and nowhere (Heidegger 2010, 
182).  This feeling was very much of the more definite sort described by Tuck and Yang, 
the unsettling awareness of the moral need to recognize and repatriate land to those 
whose home I occupy, and the troubling sorts of tensions this unearths from an otherwise 
hidden colonial context (Tuck and Yang 2012, 7).  Unsettledness is a feeling related to 
the somewhere of your own existence, to your own settler reality.  It puts an immediate 
stop to romantic feelings of oneness, unity, wholeness, or fluidity that come from 
covering over the truth. 
 This phenomenological event pointed me to the realization that phenomenology is 
more than just a set of useful devices for critical analysis.  Western phenomenology is 
itself a cultural expression of settler experience.  Therefore, it is important to scrutinize 
how exactly the philosophical languages of this practice arrive heavily laden with the 
broader colonial context.  They do not always stand over and against this context as a 
mode of resistance so easily or so readily.  This chapter makes the argument that 
phenomenology has served to express the normalization of colonial experience.  The 
operational presence and conceptual absence of land in Western phenomenology can be 
read as both a result and a cause of settler ideology in contemporary phenomenological 
research.  Because European phenomenology has minimalized the concept of land as a 
subcategory of some presumably broader ontological category (place, earth, elements, 






 Heidegger’s concept of earth constitutes an influential pole of phenomenological 
thinking in general and environmental phenomenology in particular.  Jeff Malpas writes 
that the “spatialized character” of Heidegger’s later thinking expressed by the strife of 
earth and world, the there, the clearing, the open, etc., make him “one of the principal 
founders of such a mode of place-oriented thinking” (Malpas 2012, 1, 132-133).  Michel 
Haar identifies four senses of earth that have been variously appropriated:  the 
concealedness that comes forth in unconcealment (the lethe of aletheia), the dense force 
of withdrawal that comes in to strife with world, the material in the work of art, and the 
native soil that is understood and preserved (Haar 1993, 57-64).  Of these meanings it is 
arguable that the second is most primary.  Haar writes, 
might Physis be the illuminated part of the Earth, the disclosure of a totality of 
which the Earth would be the nocturnal aspect… does not Earth coincide, as we 
will see, with the dimension of withdrawal, obscurity… (48). 
 
Foltz describes a similar if slightly different role,  
The earth is precisely that from which phusis arises, into which it continually 
withdraws, and which withholds and preserves the possibility of both…. the earth 
is what bears and gives rise to what comes to light only by remaining intrinsically 
dark itself (1995, 14). 
 
Whether nature and the earth form a totality or are ontologically distinct does not matter 
for the current argument.  These descriptions bear the marking of a heterosexualized 
femininity, as is further expressed by Haar’s descriptions of earth as that which 
“possesses a secret ground that resists… the violence of ex-plication or ex-position” (57).  
This ground should be carefully preserved and “one must acquiesce to its unopenable 
dimension if one does not want to destroy it.  It must show itself as what holds itself in 
reserve” (57).  But for those who show realeasement (Gelassenheit) in their approach, 




calls forth an image of earth as a modest heterosexual woman who resists “giving up” her 
carefully protected virginity.  Heidegger expresses his appreciation for Hannah Arendt’s 
womanhood in similar terms.  He muses that, “Woman’s effect and being – are much 
closer to the origins for us – less transparent, hence providence – but all the more 
fundamental” (Arendt and Heidegger 2004, 25).  It is the “breadth” of the “original unity 
of womanly Being” that provides the basis of “unending womanly giving” (5).  The role 
of poetry becomes a tool for opening up that which is withheld by earth and womanhood, 
for revealing their giving aspects, the es gibt.  He writes, 
What poetry, as clearing projection, unfolds of unconcealment and projects into 
the rift within the figure is the open; poetry allows this open to happen in such a 
way, indeed, that now, for the first time, in the midst of beings, it brings them to 
shine and sound (Heidegger 2002, 45). 
 
We can add to these images “the possibility of saving the earth and dwelling upon it… ‘to 
save’ (retten) means not only to rescue or to set aside and store but also to preserve and to 
protect intact” (Foltz 1995, 15).  This heteronormative narrative describes a “damsel in 
distress” that must be rescued or protected, supplying what Kathy Miriam calls “the 
connection between heteronormativity and male supremacy” which creates meanings that 
preserve the presumption of male sexual access to women and girls (Miriam 2007, 211, 
225). 
 The association of access to women’s bodies and the earth is a significant part of 
colonial perceptivity.  Settler fictions about Pocahontas are cemented into the collective 
imagination of the United States, where a “love story” with John Smith legitimizes the 
takeover of her ancestral lands (Driskill et al. 2011, 35-36).  As a symbol Pocahontas 
explains the motivation for settler states to enforce heteronormativity that is linked not 




women connects white men to their “love” for the earth.  More specifically it extends the 
right of access to the Native female body to the right of access to the lands with which 
those bodies are associated.  Rethinking this “love” or “care” of the land as a more 
general “love” of the earth conceals the specific connections to the settler experience of 
entitlement.  The moment at which land enters Haar’s discourse makes this intention 
clear.  He writes, 
Heideggerian dwelling is not founded on a mysticism or a magic of the factually 
native place.  The native is neither patriotic nor political, nor purely geographic 
nor linked to the singular charm of a place:  it is the “home” which, though being 
completely spontaneously given, keeps asking to be chosen, adopted.  Every true 
father land is adopted (Haar 1993, 63). 
 
It is convenient for settlers to not be bound to the actual place or nation where they are 
born.  This would be far too limiting.  Haar warns that such a literal or “biological” 
interpretation of one’s native land leads to Nazism and the impulse to the ideology of 
“Blut und Boden” (62, 63).  According to Haar the true place of belonging is adopted, or 
rather, it adopts you and calls you to it.  Such fantasies of adoption or “settler nativism” 
have been thoroughly outlined by Tuck and Yang as structural settler strategies for 
shirking the guilt of colonial violence and legitimizing settler states.  This adoption 
“bequeaths a new inheritance of Native-ness and claims to land (which is a reaffirmation 
of what the settler project has been all along)” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 13-17). 
 Heidegger’s refusal of the Promethean attitude and his adoption of a more poetic 
or Orphic attitude towards the earth can be linked to the resistance to naturalism found in 
Husserl.  Heidegger’s famous “Memorial Address,” eloquently denounces the “atomic 
age” of calculative thinking and its obsession with advancement, research, and so on.  




from “conditions that are given” in a “flight from thinking” spurred on by the demand for 
economic advancement (Heidegger 1966, 45-46).  Technological domination of life 
prearranges the human relation to nature and to homelands as one of a subject to an 
object.  The proliferation of technology presses in on human life from all sides, 
establishing courses for human action that, just like the fixed course of electricity through 
lines, overpowers everyday possibilities for experience and meaning.  It appears that the 
spirit of technology dictates human history and the human relationship to the earth rather 
than the human spirit itself.  The technological en-framing of nature as standing reserve 
overtakes the self-revealing capacity of physis:  Nature is only disclosed as a resource or 
utility.  But this can be overcome by the creative spirit of Dasein, poiesis (Heidegger 
1977, 30). 
 For Heidegger, an uncanniness always remains at the core of technological 
calculative thinking.  This is the possibility of releasement towards technology.  Humans 
have the capacity to adopt meditative principles by establishing a connection to their 
homelands as rooted, autochthonous beings who dwell in a specific spatial-historical 
place that calls them to their destiny.  This relationship to one’s homeland or rather the 
tension between the original homeland and the chosen homeland destines our lives and 
calls us forth to resolute action based on non-technical principles.  But what does the 
ontological overcoming of the essence of technology and the rebuilding of poetic 
dwelling on the earth really mean for Heidegger?  What is the tension between the 
“biological” native ground that Haar calls “the maternal abode and its ‘source’” and the 
“necessity of leaving ‘for foreign lands?’” to prove oneself in the crucible of the foreign? 




 Towards the end of The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger’s rhetorical 
mode switches from contrasting technology and self-emergence to a focus on historical 
destining and the “destining of revealing” (1977, 32).  The self-revealing of physis does 
not simply happen on its own as some function of nature.  Rather it must be summoned 
forth out of the earth by poiesis as a historical development of the spiritual life a people, a 
Volk.  Heidegger’s closing example is indicative and harkens back to the heavily 
emotional content of his work in the 1930s, 
In Greece, at the outset of the destining of the West, the arts soared to the supreme 
height of the revealing granted them. They brought the presence of the gods, 
brought the dialogue of divine and human destinings, to radiance (1977, 34, my 
emphasis). 
 
Similar to Husserl, Heidegger often reflected on an original spirit of the West that was 
being forgotten or overrun.  If we recall the pro-colonial work of Frederick Jackson 
Turner, we see elements that can be tied to Heidegger’s descriptions of this spirit.  In a 
later essay published in 1918 titled “Middle Western Pioneer Democracy,” Turner wrote, 
As they wrested their clearing from the woods and from the savages who 
surrounded them, as they expanded that clearing and saw the beginnings of 
commonwealths, where only little communities had been, and as they saw these 
commonwealthers touch hands with each other along the great course of the 
Mississippi River, they became enthusiastically optimistic and confident of the 
continued expansion of this democracy. They had faith in themselves and their 
destiny (Turner 1994, 167, emphasis mine). 
 
Turner identified the basis of Western spirit as the expansion into a frontier of free land, 
developing a theory about the destiny of a people is both formed and fulfilled by clearing 
away a wilderness in order to build the common life of a people (Turner 1994, 61).  
Philosophically, the connection to settler phenomenology comes in the way of a 




order in which I arrange them here is somewhat arbitrary.  Each concept implies the other 
and they appear historically and experientially in an unfolding process of development.   
 The general meaning of poiesis for Heidegger expresses an existential category of 
Dasein.  Specifically, it is linked to cultural achievement of the arts.  The Latin cultus has 
a relation to the word cultivation; for Heidegger cultivation can be thought of as a sort of 
existential manifestation of “care” (Sorge).  Care in this sense as an ontological structure 
is what opens the relation of Dasein to the world.  Hence Heidegger, “being-in-the-world 
is essentially care” (2010, 186).  In relation to mortal (human) dwelling on the land the 
existential category of cultivation structures everyday concern (Fürsorge).  Cultivation as 
a sort of care has a precise meaning.  Robert Bunge gives us this, “the white man’s love – 
a love that wastes the land by ‘working’ it; plowing, tilling, digging, blasting, mining 
it…” (1979, 3).  Heideggerian objections to blasting and mining as the technological 
domination of nature do not do much in the way of changing the general trajectory of the 
argument because they do not address the underlying meaning of cultivation in general 
which Heidegger is quite clear about.  Heidegger writes, “The old word bauen however 
also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically 
to till the soil, to cultivate the vine” (Heidegger 1971, 147).  In relation to land, poiesis is 
precisely bringing forth the fertility of the soil in the techne of settled farming.  This is 
what is meant by rootedness.  Key recordings from the 1933-1944 lectures, Nature, 
History, State, delivered during Heidegger’s rectorship in the Third Reich corroborate 
this meaning, 
…people and space mutually belong to each other…From the specific knowledge 
of a people about the nature of its space, we first experience how nature is 




would definitely be revealed different from the way it is revealed to us; to Semitic 
nomads, it will perhaps never be revealed at all (Heidegger 2013a, 56). 
 
History teaches us that nomads have not only been made nomadic by the 
desolation of wastelands and steppes, but have also left wastelands behind them 
where they found fruitful and cultivated land – and that human beings who are 
rooted in the soil have known how to make a home for themselves even in the 
wilderness… (Heidegger 2013a, 55). 
 
 We have here in Heidegger’s phenomenology the first of the above terms, the idea 
of wilderness as it is contrasted with cultivated space.  This establishes a clear anti-
Semitic trope crafted around the idea of landless or nomadic Jews who will never achieve 
the rooted nature of those who have sunk down into the soil and come to know 
themselves as autochthonous beings.  Wilderness is opposed to that which is cultivated in 
poetic relation with the earth by Dasein.  It is the concealed earth, the dense forest, the 
ceaseless winds, all that which resists Dasein in primal conflict in the establishment of a 
world (Heidegger 2013b).  To be cultivated, this wilderness must first be cleared 
(gelichtet).  This clearing activity of Dasein is the ground of the world, of history, of 
destiny.  Heidegger writes in Being and Time, “Ecstatic temporality clears the there 
primordially.  It is the primary regulator of the possible unity of all the essential 
existential structure of Dasein” (Heidegger 2010, 334, italics in original).  Clearing the 
there makes room.  This room is the ground of Dasein’s poetic dwelling.  Thus 
Heidegger, 
Only things that are locations in this manner allow for spaces.  What the word for 
space, Raum, Rum, designates is said by its ancient meaning.  Raum means a 
place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging.  A space is something that has 
been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a 





 It does not seem so strange now to associate Heidegger with Turner’s description 
of pioneers who “wrested their clearing from the woods” to create a “commonwealth.”  
This cleared room, cleared land, is the area of settlement, the site where rootedness can 
take place.  Rootedness happens through the work (Arbeit) of cultivation.  Dasein sets the 
earth forth through poiesis and techne, “fighting of the battle in which the 
unconcealedness of beings as a whole, or truth, is won” (2013b, 55).  In a speech given in 
November 1933 titled “The German Student as Worker” Heidegger cautions the newly 
matriculated that the double-meaning of work as both an undertaking and a result is not 
sufficient for understanding the essence of the concept.  It was only two years later that 
he began writing The Origin of the Work of Art where the more essential meaning can be 
found.  The essence of work is only properly understood when Dasein posits itself 
as a worker in the struggle with beings as a whole.  In this struggle is the 
authorization, the enforcement, the providence (Fügung), the taming (Bändigung) 
of these earth-shaping powers [Nature, History, Art, Technology].  The essence of 
work thusly understood determines the existence of humans from the ground up 
(2000, 204). 
 
In its work Dasein settles and this process of settlement creates boundaries.  These 
boundaries mark not just an area of residence but the space of a people.  In clearing the 
wilderness and settling, Dasein creates a state: 
Thus, for example, nature becomes manifest as the space of a people, as 
countryside and homeland, as soil and ground…By being tied to nature, supported 
and overarched by her, at once fueled and limited by her, the history of the people 
is realized (Heidegger 2000, 200-201). 
 
 A Volk wills the state into existence by building it in their work.  This is not the 
same as the work of bees and termites in building a hive but is the resolute projection of 
Dasein in the mode of being-with-others in a shared destiny, for “in communication and 




settlement of a people at once roots and destines.  In binding together the state, nature and 
history, the truth and the destiny of a people is revealed.  The projection of a destiny 
implies a people undertaking something beyond themselves, the achievement of 
something greater.  Thus, rootedness in the home soil is not sufficient.  There is need for 
expansion.  Heidegger said to his students, 
…it is not right to see the sole ideal for a people in rootedness in the soil, in 
attachment, in settledness, which find their cultivation and realization in 
farming…So the state…is grasped in terms of the will to work out into the 
expanse, in terms of interaction, in terms of power.  This space we call land…we 
can speak of the state only when rootedness in the soil is combined with the will 
to expansion, or generally speaking, interaction…For this reason, peoples or their 
subgroups who do not step out beyond their connection to the homeland into their 
authentic way of Being – into the state – are in constant danger of losing their 
peoplehood and perishing” (Heidegger 2013a, 55). 
 
Here we have the final term of the colonial four-fold: Wilderness, clearing, settlement, 
expansion.  The implication of this expansion is that the imperial process will be repeated 
in an unending cycle (back into the wilderness to be cleared and settled).  Deployment of 
the term “interaction” functions as an ontology of imperialism. 
 For Heidegger, the greatness of the state in its expansion at once both achieves 
and justifies the superiority of its people.  This superiority is both physical and spiritual.  
Heidegger says, “Then spiritual superiority and freedom develop as a deep dedication of 
all forces to the people, the state, as the most rigorous breeding, as engagement, 
endurance, solitude, and love” (2013a, 49).  The superiority of a people establishes a rule 
against which other cultures are measured.  Those humans living in the wilderness are 
savages, beasts, primitive, and so on, and have no rightful claim to that land because they 
have wasted its potential as a ground for the building of a great civilization.  Thus, the 




the right to appropriate all other cultures, lands, and peoples into the work, the spirit, and 
the state of the dominant power.  Or if these will not be assimilated, they must be 
eliminated to make room, or cleared, that is, so that the land can be set free in the 
undertakings of the superior group.  Those who are assimilated are asked to appreciate 
the essence of their new life as members of the state, as participants in a common vision, 
no matter their station, status, or level of servitude.  Heidegger’s appraisals of fascist 
authoritarianism suggest an approval towards the use of force in such eliminations and 
assimilations.   
For if we ask, “What is rule?  What is it based on?” then if we give a true and 
essential answer, we experience no power, enslavement, oppression, or 
compulsion.  Instead what we experience is that rule and authority together with 
service and subordination are grounded in a common task (2013a, 49). 
 
The place of Jewish people relative to this rule, especially in light of the Black 
Notebooks, is subordination to the common task by violent coercion.  Heidegger’s 
critiques of calculative thinking are suspect in light of his antisemitism.  One scholar 
writes, “wherever Heidegger philosophized in a minor key about the modern age and the 
‘abandonment of being’ he was also thinking of the Jews as a symptom of this 
misfortune” (Gordon 2017, 138).  Hence, his resolution to return to an autochthonous 
human existence can only be read as containing similar problematics. 
 Persecuted by the very antisemitism Heidegger sustained, Levinas is a natural 
critic of this “pagan” attachment to rootedness and soil, promising instead a universal 
humanism.  This forms a clear lineage to Husserl, whose normative position Moran 
characterizes as “a cry from the heart for the recognition of the universal rational 
humanity of all peoples” (Moran 2011, 477).  In a confrontation with racial hierarchies 




Judaism.  He offers a three-part account of  ethical structure:  the il y a, the separation of 
the ego, and the arrival of the face.  At the outset, the directionality of human existence 
for Levinas is opposite to Heidegger.  Identity is not forged through an association with 
the earth but rather in the distinction of human life from the anonymous forces of nature, 
the il y a.  Whereas Dasein is a thrown projection in to the openness of being, for Levinas 
humanity is defined by the interiority of the subject and its separation from the 
homogeneity of the elements.  As Jean-Michel Salanskis writes, “In contrast with 
Heidegger, Levinas reads the human subject as a position, as the arousal of some here out 
of the unframed there is” (2010, 53).  This original separation is the endogenous desire 
for enjoyment.  Because enjoyment is constantly under threat of being swallowed up by 
the menace of the il y a, the here of the human subject is stabilized by making a home.  
Levinas writes,  
…the separated being breaks with natural existence…The primordial function of 
the home does not consist in orienting being by the architecture of the building 
and in discovering a site, but in breaking the plenum of the element (2000, 156). 
 
Dwelling is not a communion with the earth.  Rather it is “conceived as an extension of 
my ‘I’” (Mensch 2015, 98).  The earth is a source of unspecified material from which the 
home is constructed.  The subject works to stockpile goods to ensure its enjoyment.  
“Labor conforms with the elements from which it draws the things.  It grasps matter as 
raw material” (Levinas 2000, 159).  Spatiality is not grounded in an ecstatic involvement 
with the world, but in experiencing the here of enjoyment in contrast to il y a.  It is in this 
core desire of enjoyment, in “bathing” in the elements, that the subject first appears or 
crystalizes (144).  The comfort of enjoyment is further destabilized by arrival of the face.  




is not rooted in the same soil.  The face does not appear from any particular nation or 
region.  The spatiality of the face is not horizontal or geographical.  It comes from a 
height and placing demands on us to share our home, to be hospitable.  
 Despite these contrasts, Levinas’ explicit confrontation with Nazism through an 
appeal to a universal humanity does not establish an unqualified phenomenological break 
from Heidegger.  If we again bracket the content of his descriptions with an eye to the 
way they normalize settler experience, they appear as another side or aspect of colonial 
projection.  One hint is Levinas’ treatment of heteronormative femininity as a structural 
component of masculine subject formation and its link to nature.  His account situates the 
role of the feminine and the role of nature as components parts to masculine enjoyment.  
Simone de Beauvoir’s famous evaluation of Time and the Other labels it “the most 
explicit” expression of absolute masculine subjectivity to which woman is the appended 
and derived in body, sex, and consciousness (2011, 6).  The content of the feminine is 
described throughout Levinas’ corpus with extraordinary force.  In Totality and Infinity, 
the “gentleness of the feminine face” belongs to the “interiority of the Home” (2000, 150, 
155).  As “one of the cardinal points of the horizon in which the inner life takes place,” 
the feminine softens the masculine focus on the labor of “acquisition,” preparing him for 
the arrival of the other (157, 159).  The feminine is a point on the horizon of “inner life," 
raising the question as to whether it has an inner life of its own.  Indeed, if the task of the 
feminine is to prepare men for the arrival of the face, then how is it that the feminine face 
could appear at all?  This “effacement of woman,” as Sonia Sikka calls it, is also hinted at 
in “Judaism and the Feminine” (Sikka 2001, 102).  There Levinas praises the comforting 




adds a telling contrast between the feminine and the human (1990, 33).  He writes, “the 
femininity of woman can neither deform nor absorb her human essence” (34).  A woman 
can be human, but not in and through her femininity.  She is only human in so far as she 
is not her sex. 
 One common reply to Beauvoir’s evaluation has been to argue that there is 
nothing essentially female about Levinas’ feminine.  James Mensch writes that a “mother 
and a father” can provide the nourishing environment of the home (2015, 96).  The 
problem with this basic approach is that it fails to address the structural lack of autonomy 
and effacement of the nurturing role itself in Levinas.  Diane Perpich suggests a subtler 
rapprochement between Levinas’ philosophy and the feminine.  On the one hand she 
acknowledges that Levinas’ feminine 
… is problematic not just because it is gendered according to a set of stereotypes 
widely questioned by feminists at least since Beauvoir’s Second Sex, but because 
it is a narrative device, a figure employed to do work required by the argument 
but likewise prohibited within its own terms…the feminine face is a mechanism 
meant to serve as an interface between incommensurable orders” (2008, 104). 
 
However, she attempts to salvage Levinas basic ethical structure of radical alterity by 
looking past its sexism, arguing that “the problem is not with the feminine per se, but 
with the task for which it is so neatly suited but which neither it nor any figure could 
rightfully or legitimately accomplish” (108).  Perpich is perhaps both right and wrong 
here.  She is correct that the role of the feminine in Levinas entails an ontological 
contradiction.  The feminine must be both a subject and not a subject, human yet 
inhuman, possess a face yet be effaced.  However, she is mistaken to think that the 
impossibility of a task negates either the possibility of assigning it or attempting it.  




per se in Levinas:  Its heterosexualization, effacement, association with nature as an 
object of masculine enjoyment, etc., are all structural parts of this task securing the male 
right to access.  Levinas’ treatment of the feminine approximates the ambiguity at the 
heart of the sexual contract identified by Carole Pateman, where she recognizes the 
patriarchal strategy to secure male sex-right as twofold:  
Women are property, but also persons; women are held both to possess and to 
lack the capacities required for contract – and contract demands that their 
womanhood be both denied and affirmed (1988, 60). 
 
This contradiction is, yes, a potential problem for patriarchy but is also a structural form 
of oppression where women are treated as property that has paradoxically elected its own 
status as such.  Stauncher critics of Levinas like Sikka do not see much flexibility in 
Levinas’ gendered ontology, writing “for Levinas the ethical relation, for which the 
feminine is a preparation, is a fundamentally masculine one” (2001, 103). 
 Because the feminine is contained within the domicile as the horizon of masculine 
interiority, it falls within the same realm as property.  At the same time the sex-right is 
linked by masculine enjoyment to the right to nature and the earth.  For Levinas the 
building of the domicile is a described in violent terms; material is “wrenched from 
nature” (1990, 32).  Mensch writes, “The point that Levinas is making is subtly different 
from that of John Locke, who sees the origin of property in our action of withdrawing 
goods from the common store of nature” (2015, 97).  Levinas assures his reader that such 
labor does not constitute any actual violence because the elements are faceless (2000, 
160).  He enthusiastically embraces the expedient nature of technology to convert the 
elements into usable resources.  Technology has a lightening effect on humanity, 




these cumbersome and obtuse things that burden human particularisms” (1990, 231).  
Like Husserl, Levinas associates this “heaviness” of culture with an inability to break 
with the natural attitude and to see one’s own world as just one possible world-
representation amongst a universal humanity.  Technical progress forces a  
break with spontaneous life, to the ending of instinctive life buried in the 
immediacy of nature as given. They mark the beginning of what one can 
accurately call the life of spirit (1990, 32). 
 
This is a version of European supremacy very similar to Husserl’s.  Levinas’ now 
infamous comment below, which he is recorded expressing on several different 
occasions, is explicit: 
I often say, although it is a dangerous thing to say publicly, that humanity consists 
of the Bible and the Greeks.  All the rest can be translated:  all the rest – all the 
exotic – is dance (Mortley 1991, 18). 
 
Technology is a path for cultures around the world to find this humanity, to be 
“translated” into a universal language.  Levinas writes, 
One’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to Place, without which 
the universe would become insignificant and would scarcely exist, is the very 
splitting of humanity into natives and strangers.  And in this light technology is 
less dangerous than the spirits of the Place.  Technology does away with the 
privileges of this enrootedness and related sense of exile.  It goes beyond this 
alternative…Technology wrenches us out of the Heideggerian world and the 
superstitions surrounding Place.  From this point on, an opportunity appears to us: 
to perceive men outside the situation in which they are placed, and let the human 
face shine in all its nudity (1990, 232-33). 
 
The radical alterity of the face presupposes the total erasure of indigeneity.  National 
identities integrally bound to land are automatically barbaric and pre-ethical.  It is not 
surprising that Sikka sees in Levinas “the same old patriarchal monotheism, the same old 
imperialism, the same old absence of hospitality towards the foreigner…” (2011, 114).  




agency, or personhood of their own.  They are only understandable “on the plane of the 
human world of property” (Levinas 1998, 29).  It is precisely their ontological position as 
a mere pre-objectified source of matter that prepares the way for the arrival of the face.  
Attempts to extend Levinas’ ethics of the face to the natural world often sidestep this 
deeper issue.  Toadvine writes, 
Levinas’s failure to consider ethical obligations toward nature on its own terns, 
consequently, is not merely an ungrounded prejudice but is foundational to his 
thought.  If it is true that the relations with infinity by which Levinas understands 
this source of all genuine ethical obligation presupposes this relationship with 
nature, then efforts to appropriate Levinas’s work by extending moral standing to 
nature, seeking in it a genuine source of alterity, will already assume what they set 
out to contest (Toadvine 2012, 178). 
 
 Despite their differences, many influential phenomenological treatments of spatial 
relations normalize settler experience.  The heterosexualization of land and its link to 
male access and supremacy is a key common factor.  The Levinasian break from Nazism 
still posits the supremacy of European civilization and glorifies its ability to nullify 
cultural difference “under the fiery breath of the spirit of technology” (Bunge 1979, 13).  
The depth of the colonial nature of Western phenomenology has yet to be fully 
appreciated by many.  In an essay titled “Postcolonial Though and Levinas’ Double 
Vision,” for example, Robert Eaglestone cites Levinas saying in an interview “…it is 
Europe which, alongside its numerous atrocities, invented the idea of ‘de-
Europeanization.’  This represents a victory of European generosity” (Robbins 2001, 
164).  An anticolonial perspective puts these comments solidly within the history of 
European supremacy:  Even resistance to Europe is an act of European creation.  But 
somehow Eaglestone manages to find the merit in these remarks, writing, “This 




Such repetitions of the same old colonial attitude, or “circling the same old rock,” as Vine 
Deloria might put it, calls for a radical decolonizing element within phenomenology 
applied at every juncture (Deloria 1989, 113).  It calls for an effort to listen to the other 
without an intention to make them an addendum to European history.  Most importantly 
it calls for the end of colonial behavior, the end of the colonial attitude, and the reunion 
of lands with their spiritual relatives. 
 
Going Places 
 Given the insinuation of racial and national superiority in the terms earth and 
interaction, an insinuation that also runs through each term of the colonial four-fold, it is 
prudent to give a quick look at more recent variations on these themes.  The concept of 
place is frequently utilized with insufficient awareness of how its elucidation might relate 
to colonialism.  If we turn to Edward Casey’s popular work of the 90s, Getting Back into 
Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World, there is a clear reiteration 
of a Heideggerian framework.  He speaks of wilderness as “insouciant” (1993, 185).  To 
be cultured means to be settled, to cultivate, to plough (1993, 230).  “Indeed the land or 
the sea in its wildness actively resists our efforts to colonize it with cultural means” 
(1993, 237).  The title of the book implies that something about modern existence has left 
people dis-placed.  To be re-implaced, Casey claims, requires a journey across the land 
that results in a homecoming especially in the sense of homesteading (1993, 291).  This 
new “settled co-existence between humans and the land” should also be paired with a 
new awareness of the importance of wild spaces and the opportunity to preserve the 




He lauds “Thoreau’s idea of ‘national preserves’” which “combines the cultural entity of 
the ‘nation’ with the natural region of the ‘preserve’” (1993, 241).  He expresses no 
awareness of what these “preserves” have meant for Native Peoples.  All this reiterates 
the core aspects of settler perceptivity in the opposition of wilderness and cultivation, the 
resolution of this in settlement and the work of the homestead, the binding together of 
nature and history in the state, and the need to go beyond the boundaries of your home to 
reach the culmination of some sort of destiny (journey). 
 Casey draws copiously on the lives of various Native groups to show support for 
his own view.  Despite this, he never addresses the problem of colonialism at any length.  
Brundige and Rabb offer an interesting critique of David Abram’s use of Native cultures, 
which is arguably similar to Casey’s.  Although they recognize the effort to create a more 
respectful relationship with the earth, the authors notice that he “loses sight of Native 
Americans once he shows how closely they are connected to the land” (Brundige and 
Rabb 1997, 84).  Because Abram uses Native cultures primarily for his own purposes 
without recognizing the concerns of those Native Peoples themselves, this sort of 
authorship is a form of appropriation.  It is not uncommon for Western phenomenologists 
to cite Native people seamlessly alongside their own narrative without pausing to 
consider the differences in history and perspective (for example, see Maly 2009).  To 
avoid appropriation, Brundige and Rabb suggest that eco-phenomenological thinking 
must recognize the “essential link between land and person” in a manner that is 
decolonizing (1997, 85).  This goes beyond general descriptions of the human relation to 
place or nature and recognizing tribal sovereignty on ancestral lands.  Phenomenology as 




showing support for or making comparisons to its own argumentation.  Rather it should 
show how Native ethical principles and ways of viewing the world, when properly 
understood and respected by Westerners, achieve justice for Native Peoples at the same 
time as they confront the interests or beliefs of settlers.  It is not as though there is a lack 
of space in the literature for anti-colonial moments.  In fact, there are opportunities at 
every turn.  Casey writes, 
Not only a person but land also has rights…. even our responsibility to humans is 
ultimately to people in places, not to unplaced persons existing in a void. When it 
comes to being ethical, there is no escaping the imperative of place (1993, 265). 
 
This would have been a perfect opportunity to address colonialism.  But instead, the next 
move of the text is to join in on the Leopoldian hymn, “Aldo Leopold was perhaps the 
first person to argue explicitly for a land-based ethics” (ibid.).  Once again, Native 
Peoples are relegated to what Casey himself describes as an “era of prehistory when 
human beings were hunters and gatherers” (188). 
 To avoid such reiterations of colonial experience, phenomenology cannot and 
should not remain “neutral” about colonialism (is this even possible?) and must engage in 
rigorous anticolonial self-criticism if it is to “bracket” or “confront” the structures of 
colonial perception as such.  Whether or not one thinks phenomenology is an ethical 
project need not decide the approach here.  Re-inscribing and normalizing settler 
experiences does the work of colonialism on the one hand and obstructs good 
phenomenology on the other.  There is no phenomenological need to remain satisfied by 
vague concepts like “interaction.”  Looking at the history of phenomenology from an 
anticolonial perspective reveals the trace or mark of coloniality throughout many of its 




is clear: it takes much more than writing environmental phenomenology and 
“demonstrating” how one’s philosophy is superficially similar to that of Native Peoples.  
Wilderness, clearing, settlement, and expansion capture specific colonial experiences of 
land and this cycle of experience tends to play out in present-day treatments of related 
themes of description. 
 
From phenomenology to political economy 
 Of those who have begun to recognize land’s significance for phenomenology, 
recent scholarship by Todd Mei agrees in some ways with the current argument for a 
need to develop a meaningful ontology of land in the West.  In his book, Land and the 
Given Economy, Mei argues that this gap in thinking blinds phenomenology to the 
“economic correlate” of its ontological categories, arguing that Heidegger develops a way 
“to think being in terms of an intimate participation with our surroundings” (2017 Mei, 
178, 106).  Regarding this generalized relation to space, Heidegger gives a fantastic 
summary statement in his Nazi lectures Nature, History, State, 
The position of a body in space is fundamentally non-arbitrary; it stands in a 
completely definite reciprocal relation to its surroundings…the relation between 
living being and space the “environment.”  This [biological] word is meant to 
indicate that the limit between space and living being is not the surface of the 
living body, that the living being does not simply take up a section of indifferent 
space… (Heidegger 2013a, 54). 
 
For Heidegger, experience comes only in terms of a hupokeimenon or something which 
makes it possible.  This always-already meaningful background or “ground” grounds the 
revealing and concealing of both being and beings.  In contrast with Casey, Mei’s 
interpretation of Heidegger brings the analysis to an ontology of land.  Casey classifies 




their place:  Land mediates our relationship to a place.  Mei is correct to doubt Casey’s 
ontology here.  He writes, “But land is not reducible to place; it allows place to manifest” 
(112).  In a way, Mei reverses the ontological priority of the concepts.  The meaning of a 
place is always already grounded by the material relation to land in the way that it 
fundamentally provides for the existence of life.  It is the surrounding land that serves as 
the basic ground of experience. 
 Mei interprets this grounding to be precisely the fact that “the land makes itself 
available for something like building and cultivation” (2017, 113).  Land, then, is seen 
precisely as a sort of fundamental ontological backdrop or stage for human development.  
He continues, “Earth is therefore ever-present as the subject of human activity” (2017, 
121).  Though a subject is an original source, that which is predicated, Mei’s use of the 
word also suggests it to be a primordial room for the world-building capacities of human 
beings.  It is “the subject of revealing – that is…the basis upon which we relate to other 
entities and allows us to construct a world” (2017, 125).  This is not a “subject” in the 
sense of a person having its own life and agency (subjectivity as the cogito).  This is a 
subject in the sense of what is “thrown under” or “underlying,” treated as a “subject” to 
be studied, examined, or all in all, subjected.  In this sense land becomes “the subject 
(hupokeimenon) of economic activity” (2017, 157). 
 Mei credits land and the earth as a “ground” and ur-source of human life but 
much in the same way as Locke and others who obsess with its role in capitalist 
production.  There is perhaps some difference in how much “credit” these philosophers 
think is due to land.  Locke recognizes land as the “chief matter of property,” and the 




useful things are a product of human labor (only 1/100 of these are a provision of nature, 
to be exact).  In contrast, Mei cites Heidegger, 
Only a minute fraction of what lies before us in this way has been laid down by 
man, and even then only with the aid of what is lying there before. The stones 
from which the house is built come from natural rock (Mei, 121; Heidegger 1976, 
200). 
 
But this acknowledgment by Heidegger and Mei is overshadowed by an uncomfortable 
result.  It follows that the earth and the land in its giving forth, in its generosity, in its 
depth and self-concealment, in its position as a primordial source, secretes a sort of 
“excess” (Mei 133-54).  The sense of this “excess” is both ontological and economic, and 
it is with this dual concept that Mei makes the textual transition from phenomenology to 
political economy.  The word has a history in both traditions. 
 In phenomenology the idea of excess conveys something about the nature of 
things, that they have a certain depth that lies beyond our experience of them.  Things 
always hold something in reserve.  Nothing is ever fully manifest.  Because of their 
situatedness in a complex shifting environment, there is always “excess” over what is 
present.  Mei argues that this “excess” originates in the land as the material background 
of complex relations.  Land gives things a quality that cannot be captured in any one 
encounter, any one season, or any one year.  For Mei, “land’s excess resides in providing 
for opportunities to actualize potentialities-for-being…the donation of the possibility-to-
be…the excess of possibility” (2013, 144-45).  This ontology of land suggests land’s 
primary role as offering a “free gift” of possibilities for human growth and development.  
The economic correlate of the term “excess” is found in capitalist thinkers.  As 
previously discussed, it is correlated with the God-given right of capitalists and 




form, the argument goes that the interaction between farmer and the soil produces a sort 
of natural “excess” or “surplus” beyond what is needed for the laborers’ immediate needs 
of survival.  This becomes the basis of profit, the ability to draw rent, taxes, and so on.  
This “excess” is precisely the value slated to become the profits of capital. 
 Hence it turns out that the ability of the land to produce “excess” is the very 
grounds of its exploitation and the exploitation of the worker.  Mei’s attachment to 
Ricardo as an economic expression of his ontology makes it difficult for him to grasp the 
problematic implications of “excess” as an economic category.  Because Mei dismisses 
Marx as a reductionist when it comes to thinking about land, he overlooks Marx’s 
critique of surplus-value (“excess”) entirely.  For Marx, this “excess” is an ideological 
invention of capitalists, an economic myth formulated to justify interference in the direct 
metabolic relationship of the laborer and the soil.  Although Mei develops proxy concepts 
that allow him to move fluidly between ontological and economic categories, a 
potentially exciting (or devastating?) achievement, his fully Western family of 
phenomenologists and capitalists do little to challenge colonial presuppositions.  In fact, 
he writes an entire book on land without once mentioning colonialism. 
 
Conclusions 
 As has been demonstrated in this chapter, analysis of spatial ontologies can 
become an anticolonial practice if land is emphasized as a key component of 
intersectional criticism.  Neglect of this dimension has normalized what can only be 
called the colonial attitude within Western phenomenology.  This blindness should be 




criticism and participation.  As Mei demonstrates, phenomenology is fully capable of 
forming ontologies of land, but this is a fruitless exercise without anticolonial critique.  
The connection between phenomenology and political economy is based on the simple 
fact that experience and matter are correlated.  The economic correlates of experience are 
equally critical for formulating an anticolonial approach to land.  Although the colonial 
dimensions of capitalist political economy have been thoroughly explored in literature of 
all kinds, not enough attention has been granted to improving the anticolonial of 
capacities of Marxist theory by a thoroughgoing reappraisal of its central concepts and 
interpretive tools.  Hence a similar treatment of the material correlates to colonial 
ontology must be carried out in the radical literature. 




IV.  THE SETTLER PROLETARIAT AND IMPERIALISM 
 The ways in which humans experience land have rich implications for how it is 
treated economically and materially.  However, such an exploration is not the goal of this 
chapter.  Land plays a much more prominent role in modern political economy than in 
most other forms of Western philosophy.  Yet the nature of land has not been sufficiently 
reconsidered within Western political economy itself.  This chapter argues that Marxist 
theory can and should be meaningfully re-radicalized in light of anticolonial criticism.  It 
will do this by way of three sub-goals:  First, it articulates a Marxist theory of land in 
contrast to the (im)possibility of capitalist reformism.  Marx’s theory of the degradation 
of soils uncovers the contradictions contained in the Ricardian philosophy adopted by 
Mei.  The theory of exploitation, which is often only considered in relation to labor, can 
be extended to land and the supposed “excess” or “surplus value” it creates.  Second, this 
chapter argues that although Marx and Marxists have been outspoken critics of European 
expansionism and colonialism, there are deep theoretical aspects of Marxist theory that 
need to be reevaluated from an anticolonial lens.  One of these is the overstated insistence 
on ultimate contradictory forces represented by the capitalist class and the white settler 
proletariat, whose interests tend to be unified in the project of colonialism.   Third, this 
chapter argues that visions of the future in terms of direct control by the associated 
producers tends to overshadow the importance of the associated nations or peoples, 
making this relation less visible within Marxist theory. 
The path to a re-radicalization of Marxist thinking can be pursued in multiple 
ways.  In the introduction to their landmark book, Monopoly Capital, Baran and Sweezy 




“familiar formulations, as though nothing really new had happened since the days of 
Marx” (1966, 3).  If Marxian sociology was indeed stagnated, it may have been due to a 
lack of attention to new developments as the authors claim.  However, it is equally likely 
that stagnation came from a failure to re-evaluate the fundamental attitudes and ideas that 
have formed the basis of Marxist analysis since the beginning.  The current chapter is 
aimed more closely at the latter approach for revision and self-critique.  Many kernels of 
insight needed for such an analysis are contained in Marxism and Native Americans, a 
collection of essays and speeches by Native leaders who outline ways in which Marxists 
have failed or committed outright violence against Native Peoples by aligning themselves 
with ideals and modes of action that are more generally Western than either capitalism or 
communism.  In addition to much-needed critique, this volume also indicates potential 
bridges for alliance.  As LaDuke asks in the preface, 
Within such a [political] movement Marxism, or aspects of Marxism, may well 
have a role and function.  What and how remains to be seen.  What better 
direction to turn for clarification than to those who have no particular question as 
to their relationship to the land [Native Peoples] … Let Marxism explain its utility 
to its hosts” (Churchill 1989, iix). 
 
There is something to Marxism that is potentially better than the prevailing norms 
perpetuated by capitalism.  But a mere potential for limited allyship is not yet an alliance 
in reality.  So, the first question that should be asked here is the following:  How can 
Marxism still be useful for radicalizing settlers around issues of land and achieving 
justice for Native Peoples?  This can only be answered as a response to LaDuke’s most 
pressing question for Marxists: “What is Marxism’s understanding of the land?” 




In formulating an answer to this question, the goal should not be the self-serving 
end of convincing Native Peoples that Marxists are right about everything, but rather to 
offer some insights about how the theory and praxis of Marxism might be useful for 
making positive change.  As an initial step, the first part of this chapter will make a 
Marxist case against those like Mei who believe that capitalism can reconcile its 
relationship with land. 
 
Marx vs Ricardo 
Ricardians like Henry George and Mei propose a philosophical and material shift 
harkening back to a “classical” era of capitalist philosophy that maintains a strict 
distinction between capital and land.  At stake centrally for Ricardian capitalists is 
whether the nationalization of rents would accomplish the material outcome correlating 
with the conceptual distinctness of land and capital.  As the theory goes, nationalizing 
land would redirect the rents accumulated by landlords towards those who are active in 
production: labor and capital.  Ricardians like Mei argue that because land is not 
produced by humans, the landlord does not in fact produce anything.  Rent is only 
possible because of a monopoly on land held by landlords.  Hence, on this theory, 
landlords unjustly take the “surplus” that rightfully belongs to laborers and capitalists.  
This recognition, according to Mei, would correlate with the proper manner of thinking 
of land as a hupokeimenon, or original source of value for human existence. 
But this so-called “trinitarian” view that insists upon land, labor, and capital as 
distinct elements of production is an entirely ideological conception.  On the one hand it 




insistence upon their distinctness misses the fact that capital is a relation and not an 
entity.  Therefore, it cannot simply be grouped alongside land and labor as if these things 
are three peas in a pod.  Marx writes, “Capital, land, labour! But capital is not a thing, it 
is a definite social relation of production pertaining to a particular historical social 
formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this thing a specific social 
character” (1991, 953).  Hence, their conceptual uniqueness does nothing to guarantee 
their material separation, so to speak.  In accord with capitalist methodology which tends 
to de-historicizing social relations, Mei writes, “Capital is thus like a capacity; it lies in 
wait in order to be used in production” (2017, 85).  But capital is not an imaginary stock 
waiting about in a warehouse, as Mei would have it.  Marx shows that the material 
relation of capital to land and labor is acquisitive in nature.  The cycle of capital is a 
specific process for extracting material value from land and labor in an unending quest 
for accumulation.  Hence, regardless of whether land and labor are in theory “different” 
than capital (in the sense that one cannot be totally reduced to the other), both are 
appropriated within the valorization process.  As Marx explains, “Land, so long as it is 
not exploited as a means of production, is not capital.  Land as capital can be increased 
just as much as all the other instruments of production” (1976, 205).  Land is not 
originally capital, it becomes capital. 
Marx certainly does not disagree that the extraction of value from the labor-land 
relationship by a landlord is unjust, but there is a fundamental problem with the wishful 
economic theory that believes taking rents away from landlords would benefit either land 
or laborers.  That’s just not how capitalism works.  Ricardo himself believed that wages 




disappear for the working classes, wages would simply drop to the newly lowered level 
of subsistence.  The value represented by rents would be captured by non-landed capital 
investments rather than by landlords.  Marx writes that “land is personified in the 
landowner, he is the land similarly standing up on its hind legs and demanding its share… 
of the products produced with its aid; so that it is not the land that receives the portion of 
the product needed to replace and increase its productivity, but instead the landowner 
who receives a share of this product to be sold off and frittered away” (1991, 963).  The 
nationalization of rent means massive amounts of investment capital redirected from 
landowners into new paths to valorization, resulting in the exploitation of land and 
workers in other ways.  Nationalization coupled with the continuation of capital does not 
do away with the social conditions in which material is stripped from people and soil.  As 
a capture of a portion of the “surplus” value demanded by capital, rents do not represent 
any fundamental form of exploitation. 
This is one way in which Marxist theory can be useful for analyzing capital in its 
root material functions because it details the concrete movement of values away from 
land and people to capitalists.  Landlordism is only one way in which land is forced into 
yielding profits.  If it were eliminated, what would be left of land for capital to exploit?  
The answer is everything.  Land is turned into capital every-which-way.  Land can also 
be farmed, mined, logged, developed, etc.  As Marx writes, “They conquered the field for 
capitalistic agriculture, incorporated the soil into capital…” (1990, 895).  The end of rents 
does not mean the end of land as capital; it only means the end of landlordism.  Human 
beings, soils, plants, animals, minerals, and the land in general are all appropriated as 




into capital.  As co-operators, as members of a working organism, they merely form a 
particular mode of existence of capital” (1992, 451).  These insights are lost on Mei who 
complains that it is not fair to accuse all capitalists of conceiving land as merely a form of 
capital.  While he is nominally correct in that assertion, he is incorrect in his assessment 
of the arguments laid out against Ricardo by Marx regarding the pervasive and elastic 
nature of capital and its ability to invade all aspects of existence. 
It is here that a Marxist theory of the relation between human needs and land can 
play a critical role in understanding how capitalism functions.  In order to understand this 
relation, it is fruitful to look at how Marx’s theory of land is often misread by his critics.  
Ricardian economists accept that it is morally justifiable for capitalists to exploit laborers 
as well as land.  The nationalization of rents is intended to free up more material value for 
capital investment.  Hence, it is ironic that Mei and many others accuse Marx of 
neglecting the value of land in favor of a theory of values that prioritizes labor.  The 
assumption is that Marx’s thorough analysis of the exploitation of labor in Capital 1 
means he reduces all value to generic units of socially necessary labor time, i.e. the labor 
theory of value.  Mei writes, “His system of economics becomes a way of marginalizing 
the more classical distinctions in the production of value in favor of the laborer who is the 
sole producer of value,” calling those who think otherwise “apologists,” referencing 
especially the work of John Bellamy Foster (2017, 16, 48).  This is a common reading of 
Marx even by those who appreciate his work.  Coulthard writes that “Indigenous peoples, 
deep ecologists, defenders of animal rights, and other advocates of environmental 
sustainability” all accuse Marx of “anti-ecological” tendencies (2014, 13).  This is an 




Sagoff 1984), but the net critique of Marx is one that is worth addressing at length to see 
where it has validity and where it does not. 
There are different arguments at work here and two ways in which this critique 
has been formulated: First, that Marx was anthropocentric because of his focus on 
human labor, and second, that Marx was an industrial developmentalist obsessed with 
productivism and technical social progress. 
These two ideas are related but not the same.  The idea that Marx held the so-
called “labor theory of value” is so common that refuting this allegation became one 
focus in David Harvey’s 2017 book, Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic 
Reason.  Readers of Marx often assume that Marx’s placement of labor at the center of 
value makes sense as an antithesis to the idea that capital produces value.  But as a good 
dialectician, Marx knew that the answer was not in the antithesis but the conception of a 
new synthesis.  The labor theory of value is in fact capitalist in origin, first developed by 
Petty, Smith, Ricardo, and others to explain market prices.  It was capitalists who have 
argued that market price is in fact a good overall reflection of value writ large.  John 
Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett write, “Socialism has as its specific goal overcoming the 
narrow value form so as to allow for the development of a rich world of needs, while 
rationally regulating the metabolism between humanity and nature” (2018, 2).  The value 
produced by labor, as a social relation, is never spoken of by Marx as if it originates from 
a single source or is opposed to other forms of value.  Rather, values for Marx originate 
only in and through eco-social relationships and are polymorphic. 
 Mei accuses Marx of “reducing” land to a mere use-value in contrast to some 




conceives of land as having an original sort of use-value as the basis of life activity (Marx 
1976, 276).  But what does this “reduction” mean coming from a standpoint of capitalist 
theory?  Mei argues that on the capitalist trinitarian view, land is conceived as an 
originary source of wealth, or original subject of economic activity.  But all this means is 
that as the subject of economic activity, there is a moral obligation to maximally 
capitalize land.  For Marx, land is “reduced” to a use-value in the sense that he argues 
against its commodification, privatization, and subjection to capital.  Marx writes, “The 
view of nature attained under the domination of private property and money is a real 
contempt for and practical debasement of nature…” (1976, 172).  Marx distinguishes 
land as a use-value from more common use-values in that it is not produced by human 
effort, though the distinction is not absolute.  Its existence is mostly independent of 
human efforts.  So, in the first instance, Marx’s apparent “reduction” of land to use-value 
can be more properly said to be the condemnation of land’s relation to capital as an 
exchange value to be bought and sold on the market.  What is left after the elimination of 
land as capital is a theory of values as emergent in the direct relationship between 
humans and land. 
Marx writes, “Value is represented in use-value; and use-value is a prerequisite 
for the creation of value; but it is folly to create an antithesis by placing a use-value, like 
land, on one side and on the other side value” (1991, 956).  This fluidity of value can be 
interpreted quite literally.  As ecological Marxists like John Bellamy Foster have now 
made famous, Marx writes that capitalist production “disturbs the metabolic interaction 
[Stoffwechsel] between man and the earth; i.e. prevents the return to the soil of its 




kernel of Marxist theory is the degree to which human life is conceived as a part of nature 
and as such “bound to the soil” in a metabolic interchange (Marx 1990, 875).  It is the 
direct relationship between land and humans that is important because there is in fact no 
“surplus” created in this exchange that can be sustainably expropriated as capitalists 
would have it.  The nature of use-values is that they satisfy material social needs, i.e. the 
material necessary for life, and the creation of use-values in this interchange does not 
entail the creation of surpluses above and beyond the ecological requirements of either 
humans or lands.  Capital does not take directly from the worker or from the soil, but 
rather from the values generated in their interchange.  A key passage from Marx 
identifies the essence of this relationship and its basis in the soil science of his time, 
… it produces conditions that provoke an irreparable rift in the interdependent 
process of social metabolism, a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life 
itself.  The result of this is a squandering of the vitality of soil, which is carried by 
trade far beyond the bounds of a single country (Liebig, Die Chemie in ihrer 
Anwendung auf Agricultur und Physiologie)” (1991, 949). 
 
Hence for Marxists, the only solution to re-establishing sustainable social relationships is 
a reconciliation between humans and lands.  This can never be achieved under the social 
conditions of capital because capital ex vi termini expropriates the values produced in that 
relationship. 
The abolition of private property does not appear to be a necessary step to ending 
the degradation of land for Ricardian theorists.  Mei writes, “One might be tempted to 
think that prohibiting private ownership of land and its finite features is the only option. 
This is not necessarily the case.  Because excess commutes into value form, one need 
only prohibit the private consumption of this value” (2017, 182).  The capitalist belief 




expropriating values from the direct human-land relation into exchangeable forms for the 
general coffers of “society” (i.e. capital).  This continuation of private property alongside 
the supposed “usufruct” conditions of nationalized land under capitalism still rests on the 
ability to pay within a hierarchical economic system.  Mei continues, “Does the 
professional trading in derivatives market not wish to buy property, perhaps in exclusive 
areas?  Seek an increase to his or her standard of living?  In short, seek new possibilities 
for dwelling in land?” (2017, 191).  Mei’s deployment of the Heideggerian turn of phrase 
grants a sort of philosophical luster to capitalism, giving a new life to the supposed 
“dignified role of the commodity…” in shaping social experience (Mei 2017, 166).  
Whether the aspirations of day traders to acquire private property and commodities 
deserves such high praise is a question for posterity. 
 
Land: Exploitation or Expropriation? 
One of Coulthard’s main concerns is that Marx focuses disproportionately on the 
value produced by human beings.  If human-created value holds primary significance in 
material social relations, then the source of this value, namely labor, is what can 
rightfully be said to suffer under the thumb of capital.  This would be problematic from a 
Native environmental point of view concerned with land as more than a resource for 
human appropriation.  Coulthard writes, “From the vantage point of the capital 
relationship — which, I have argued, tends to concern itself most with the adverse 
structural and ideological effects stemming from expropriated labor, land is not 





First, it has been argued that the Marxist theory of exploitation need not apply to 
land or nature because nature is expropriated by capital, not exploited.  Foster and Clark 
develop this view specifically to address ecological degradation, 
…it is no longer realistic to treat—even by way of abstraction—the crucial 
political-economic struggles of our day as if they were confined primarily to the 
exploitation of labor within production.  Instead, social conflicts are increasingly 
being fought over capitalism’s expropriation and spoliation of its wider social and 
natural environment…The inner dynamic of the system is governed by the 
process of exploitation of labor power, under the guise of equal exchange, while 
its primary relation to its external environment is one of expropriation 
(“appropriation...without exchange” or “without equivalent”) (2018, 1). 
 
…given the specific form in which this expropriation occurs within the value 
circuit in capitalist production, under the guise of equal exchange, Marx 
distinguishes the exploitation of labor power in developed capitalist industry as a 
specific type, sui generis, not to be confused with expropriation in its more 
general historical sense as robbery or theft outside the process of production and 
valorization (2018, 5). 
 
On this theory, exploitation is a subset or a mode of expropriation.  The laborer is 
compensated with a wage, that is, an “equivalent” of the value produced for the capitalist.  
It is the illusion of the fair exchange of labor for wages that gives exploitation its specific 
character.  There is a clear difference between the exploitation of labor and the condition 
of slavery, which is a bare form of expropriation.  Nancy Fraser writes, “‘Race’ emerges, 
accordingly, as the mark that distinguishes free subjects of exploitation from dependent 
subjects of expropriation” (2016, 172).  So is it with the oil field, mine, or dammed river: 
in the relation of expropriation, humans and nature are treated as mere stock by capital 
with no act of exchange.  Foster and Clark write, 
In his overall analysis, Marx designated numerous forms of appropriation without 
exchange (or without reciprocity), some general, others more specific, 
encompassing widely differing levels of analysis and spheres of operation. These 




swindling, usurpation, parasitism, spoliation, dissolution, confiscation, 
enslavement, colonialism, patriarchal domination, squandering, blood-letting, and 
“vampire-like” relations—along with more specific concepts such as rent, usury, 
monopoly profits, “free gifts of Nature to capital,” impoverishment (in the formal 
sense of undermining “conditions of reproduction”), profit upon 
alienation/expropriation, profit by deduction, “secondary exploitation,” “odious 
exploitation,” the metabolic rift, and the alienation of land/labor (6). 
 
 A second possible response to Coulthard identifies locations in the circulation of 
capital where land is put to task in ways analogous to the exploitation of wage labor.  In 
such circumstances, capital must exchange with land a portion of the value produced in 
order to maintain land’s productive capacities in a process entirely internal to the 
valorization of capital.  Agriculture is the paradigmatic example.  The amount of this 
value is analogous to the wage equaling the socially necessary cost of the reproduction of 
the labor force.  While there is no doubt that the bulk of Capital 1 is focused on the 
exploitation of the worker, there is evidence that Marx developed a theory of the 
exploitation of land, most notably in The Poverty of Philosophy and Capital 3. 
Even in Capital 1, which focuses on labor, the expropriation of land is at work as 
a foundational background theory.  Especially in the second half, it is always the removal 
of people from the soil that is pivotal for capital because this makes both humans and soil 
vulnerable to exploitation.  Marx’s vague yet rhetorically powerful laments of capital 
robbing the soil at the end of Chapter 15 are expanded into an explicit theory of the 
exploitation of land elsewhere in his corpus.  A common capitalist theory during his time 
was that the pressure of rent provided motivation for the small farmer to improve the 
fertility of land and hence also its productivity.  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s iteration of the 
idea went so far as to claim that the farmers in fact owed rent to the rest of society for the 




more abundance than was needed to restore its fertility (analogous to the worker’s ability 
to produce more value than is necessary for the reproduction of life).  Marx 
systematically dismantled Proudhon’s view, replying: 
Rent, instead of binding man to nature, has merely bound the exploitation of the 
land to competition… Rent, has so completely divorced the landed proprietor 
from the soil, from nature, that he has no need even to know his estates, as is to be 
seen in England.  As for the farmer, the industrial capitalist and the agricultural 
worker, they are no more bound to the land they exploit than are the employer and 
the worker in the factories… they feel an attachment only for the price of their 
production, the monetary product (1976, 201-202). 
 
Social relations based on exploitation give birth to rents, not some imagined 
indestructible power of the soil to produce “excess.”  Marx writes, these are the “... social 
relations in which the exploitation of the land takes place… Rent is a product of society 
not of the soil” (1976, 205).  The separation of people from the soil not only opens the 
human-land relationship to exploitation, it also atrophies human spiritual life in 
connection to land, as outlined by Marx in the Manuscripts of 1844, reducing it to a mere 
statistical and monetary nature (1976, 276).  This twofold death, being both material and 
spiritual, induces a moral detachment from environmental responsibilities to future 
generations.  Marx writes, 
… instead of a conscious and rational treatment of the land as permanent 
communal property, as the inalienable condition for the existence and 
reproduction of the chain of human generations, we have the exploitation and the 
squandering of the powers of the earth (1991, 949). 
 
It does seem that Marx offers well-developed theories of the expropriation and even the 
exploitation of land and nature by capital.  In addition, it does not seem accurate to 
ascribe a theory of values to Marx that privileges humans over nature in any radical sense 
(based on a supposed “labor theory of value”).  However, Coulthard’s worries cannot be 






 Still hanging in the balance is the treatment of colonialism.  As is typical of 
Western worldviews, Marx’s theories of exploitation stuffer from a sort of universalism.  
The grand view of oppression at work focuses on the concept of class as the primary tool 
for explaining economic and historic conditions rather than a more robust intersectional 
analysis.  Deloria writes, “Reduction of the human being to an interchangeable unit 
within a larger political, social or economic theory or theology simply restricts analysis to 
that concept” (Churchill 1989, 126).  An overemphasis on class struggle projects a Euro-
universalist conception of history that exalts the progress-based industrial trajectory of 
Europe to the history of all human beings and all nations, twisting the violence of 
colonialism into a form of world-historical progress.  The ability to see exploitation as 
multi-layered requires a much subtler approach.  Hence, Coulthard’s assertion that to 
make Marxism useful we must begin by stripping it of this “historical metanarrative” and 
“contextually shifting our investigation from an emphasis on the capital relation to the 
colonial relation” (2014, 10). 
 It is a basic tenet of Marxism that class defines historical struggle in the age of 
capitalism.  This needs to be revisited from an anticolonial lens that sees struggle as 
diversely distributed by identity and geography.  Colonial oppression is not merely or 
even primarily based on class, although it produces classes.  Different from a class 
relation, colonialism is an unfinished nation-to-nation relationship.  Imperialist nations do 
not invade a class of people.  They invade a nation of people that is already full of the 




colonialism, the national concept is probably more relevant for understanding how the 
exploitation of land works than is the class concept.  The focus of Marxist theory on 
imperialism as a necessary aspect of capitalism often fails to understand its own 
implication that national identities (often misunderstood as wholly racial) are a central 
component of anti-imperialist and therefore anti-capitalist struggle.  This neglect is a 
fundamental contradiction in socialist theory.  Imperialism expands and conquers new 
territory, nations, etc.  It does not conquer classes of people.  Although capitalism has 
various techniques for infecting cultures with its preferred set of social distinctions, 
attempting to distort the existing social relations into versions more useful to capital 
accumulation, it can make do with a variety of outcomes.  The result of capitalist 
imperialism is not always the conversion of the conquered population into workers.  As 
has been argued by Wolfe, Coulthard, and others, it often means either extermination 
and/or marginalization within economic systems. 
When viewed as part of the intercourse between nations, colonialism yields more 
than class differentiation as the violent founding moment of a landless proletariat.  Rather 
than being purely divisive, imperialism also unifies the patriotic bonds of a nation, 
including the unification of the ruling class with the underclass.  The unification of these 
classes in the identity of the ruling nation has been massively understated in Marxist 
literature that assumes an absolute and universal opposition between capitalists and a 
globalized proletariat.  Usually Marxists chalk up any apparent complicity of the working 
class with ruling class to propaganda.  Rarely is it acknowledged that the working class of 
a capitalist nation experiences real material gain from national conquest.  The most 




described by Frederick Turner.  In the United States this reality is expressed by the law 
and spirit of the Marshall Trilogy, which, couched in resolute white-supremacy, grants 
the federal government right to acquisition of Native lands and denies the self-
determining capacity of Native nations.  Judge Marshall writes, 
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable and heretofore 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished 
by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether 
those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United 
States can with strict accuracy be denominated foreign nations.  They may more 
correctly perhaps be denominated domestic dependent nations” (Cherokee Nation 
vs Georgia, 1831). 
 
The spirit of these decisions was further enhanced by the Homestead Acts that 
empowered settlers to occupy millions of acres.  It should not be ignored that by these 
policies the white settler proletariat gained extraordinary material wealth in the form of 
free land.  The history of Marxist thought is replete with failures to grasp this clearly.  In 
his classic chapter on imperialism published in Finance Capital, Rudolf Hilferding 
dwells at length on the expansive tendencies of capitalism: 
Capital becomes the conqueror of the world, and with every new country that it 
conquers there are new frontiers to be crossed.  These efforts become an 
economic necessity, because every failure to advance reduces the profit and the 
competitiveness of finance capital, and may finally turn the smaller economic 
territory into a mere tributary of the larger one.  They have an economic basis, but 
are then justified ideologically by an extraordinary perversion of the national idea, 
which no longer recognizes the right of every nation to political self-
determination and independence, and ceases to express, with regards to nations, 
the democratic creed of the equality of all members of the human race” (1981, 
335). 
 
There are some worthy recognitions here, specifically that the advance of capital violates 
the right to self-determination of subjugated nations.  However, placing total blame on 
capital and failing to see the participation of the settler proletariat makes imperialism 




and attitudes who actually carry out its undertakings.  A mechanistic view of an organic, 
historical, and social relation accomplishes little analytically.  Capitalism reifies, 
objectifies, and mechanizes people, and it does no good to use an equivalent metric to 
derive what constitutes its basis of power.  Capitalism is the creed of living people, of 
nations, and is their identity down to the marrow; as a human identity is not a mere 
ideology but also a material, bodily occupation. 
A central problem that results from underestimating the material force of national 
identity and colonialism is the inability for Marxist theory to meaningfully distinguish 
between expropriated populations.  The central theory here has been that expropriation is 
always carried out in order to create a mass of wage-laborers.  Hilferding calls this 
method the “essence of colonial policy” (1981, 319).  But settler colonialism has as its 
primary operative methods human extermination and the theft of land with the forced 
labor of Natives as a real but more often secondary result.  In short, as Coulthard writes, 
it is characterized predominantly by “the history and experience of dispossession, not 
proletarianization” (2014, 13).  In his article, “White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of 
Investment Imperialism,” Arghiri Emmanuel identifies the “deficiencies of revolutionary 
Marxism” and “the inadequacy of the old concepts” in terms of “their failure to recognize 
a third factor that intervenes between imperialist capitalism and the peoples of the 
exploited countries, i.e. the colonialists themselves” (1972, 36).13  This historical and, I 
                                               
13 Emmanuel’s essay predates the work of Patrick Wolfe, Eve Tuck, and other modern theorists of settler 
colonialism.  However, the development of this specific concept outside the realm of Marxist analysis has 
had more of a resonance with many Native scholars because of the problematic assumptions underlying 
Marxist theory that are outlined in this chapter and in the volume Marxism and Native Americans.  Of 
course, Native people have spoken (and later written) critically about white settler colonialism since its 
inception, so there is nothing new in Emmanuel’s analysis.  However, it was and still is a necessary 





would argue, ongoing failure to properly theorize the function of expropriation in 
capitalist expansion falsely imagines a generalized capitalist class in fundamental 
opposition to a generalized proletariat.  But history has shown that the methods of settler 
colonial expropriation often create a bonded interest between capitalists and the white 
proletariat, shattering this opposition.  Hilferding writes, “The policy of expansion unites 
all strata of the propertied class…” (1981, 365).  This statement fails to see that the policy 
of expansion also unites wealthy capitalists with the poor precisely because it is private 
property that the white settler proletariat stand to gain by participating in expansionist 
policy.  Emmauel writes, 
For these people, the colonial adventure was neither a ‘hindrance’, a 
‘contradiction’ nor a ‘distortion’, but the mainspring of their existence and their 
supreme justification.  They benefited from colonialism and therefore promoted it, 
without reserve or contradiction – and for this very reason they were basically 
anti-imperialistic, however paradoxical this may seem (1972, 39). 
 
 The formation of “White States” in the colonies as a response to the imperialism 
of parent countries unified white settlers of all classes (43).  At the same time it unified 
settlers against Native populations.  From a Marxist perspective, the proposed 
counteragent to the imperial aspect of capitalism has been the international solidarity of 
the proletariat.  Hilferding writes that the proletariat is the “most decisive enemy of 
imperialism” (1981, 368).  But this makes little sense as a singular strategy given that 
imperialism is aimed at nations rather than classes.  There are many examples that 
contradict his claim.  The anti-imperialist resistance of Water Protectors at Standing Rock 
was most clearly spearheaded by the Sioux Nation standing its ground against Energy 
Transfer Partners; this was not resistance by the proletariat.  If anything, the settler 




Historically speaking the white settler proletariat has functioned simultaneously as an 
anti-imperialist and an imperialist force.  And yet many Marxists, Baran and Sweezy for 
example, claim that the primary function of the U.S. military within its national boundary 
is to “control the domestic labor force” (1966, 179).  They write that these “domestic 
disturbances” are of “negligible importance and can be abstracted from… We can 
concentrate on the international uses of armed force” (ibid.).  But the use of armed forces 
“domestically” in this case must in fact be seen as an international struggle and an 
international use of armed forces.  Otherwise there is no recognition that the United 
States violates the self-determination of thousands of nations within its claimed territory.  
Any radical form of anti-imperialism must acknowledge this fact as fundamental to 
shaping resistance.  It is questionable when Marxists persist, as Deloria puts it, in an 
“aggressively missionary-minded” manner, to propose communism as a universal form of 
resistance to imperialist capitalism (Churchill 1989, 132).  How does an a-national 
strategy make more sense than a pluralistic approach that includes a struggle for the self-
determination of Native nations?  Coulthard writes, 
the colonial relation should not be understood as a primary locus or ‘base’ from 
which these other forms of oppression flow, but rather as the inherited 
background field within which market, racist, patriarchal, and state relations 
converge to facilitate a certain power effect – in our case the reproduction of 
hierarchical social relations that facilitate the dispossession of our lands and self-
determining capacities (2014, 14). 
 
The long-standing narrative of Marxism has been that the proletariat is a landless, 
propertyless, etc., mass of workers.  But from the point of view of the colonized, it is 
obvious that property in land is precisely what the white proletariat gains as settlers.  The 
military, the nation, and the capitalist economy are sources of white privilege in land.  




“property-owning minority” (1966, 157-158).  This description has little bearing in real 
social conditions.  The settler land rushes enabled by an imperialist military and written 
into American law are mirrored by modern day home ownership.  It is important not to 
confuse capital and property in this instance.  While it may be true that the settler 
proletariat is defined by lacking control over any significant capital, it is not the case that 
they are propertyless.  In 1966, the publication year of Monopoly Capital, it was by no 
means a minority of Americans who owned land.  In fact, home ownership was at around 
63%.  This number is approximately the same today, with white people at about 73% 
homeownership and more than ⅓ of these owning their property outright (American 
Community Survey 2016; U.S. Census Bureau 2018).  In addition, approximately 66% of 
all farmland is owned by small to medium-sized operators, the legacy of what Veblen 
called the needlessly expansive “colonial pedigree” of American pioneer-farmers (USDA 
2013; Veblen 1997, 138-40).  Data clearly indicates that the settler proletariat is not 
landless. 
 This inability to see the proletariat as colonists or as the expropriating rather than 
the expropriated population has caused Marxist philosophy to misinterpret the state of 
colonialism worldwide.  Expropriation does not only produce classes; in the case of 
settler colonialism it also produces landless nations — nations that have been separated 
from their homeland.  Pointing out this shortfall, Sandy Grande writes, “The failure to 
problematize the issue of (colonized) land is perhaps the major deficiency of Marxist and 
other Western-centric politics — traditional or revolutionary” (2004, 49).  Playing the 
exact tune identified by Grande, Baran and Sweezy write in a footnote, “Largely because 




States expansionism has rarely taken the form of colonialism” (1966, 183).  This 
blindness to the current colonial status of the United States (and presumably other 
nations) cannot be good for the future of Marxism.  Morally speaking, the white settler 
proletariat cannot simply excuse itself by pointing a finger at capitalism.  This matter is 
complicated further by the fact that the white settler proletariat is often motivated to 
establish its hold on land by conditions of misery and desperation induced by enclosures 
in their home country.  For example, the first British to colonize Ireland were yeoman 
farmers driven from their farms by the British military.  Marx writes, 
If of any property it ever was true that it was robbery, it is literally true of the 
property of the British aristocracy. Robbery of Church property, robbery of 
commons, fraudulent transformation, accompanied by murder, of feudal and 
patriarchal property into private property — these are the titles of British 
aristocrats to their possessions (1853). 
 
However, as Tuck and Yang emphasize, this movement does not necessitate colonization.  
There is a difference between settlers and immigrants.  “Immigrants are beholden to the 
Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 
6).  What characterizes the white settler proletariat is that its expropriation is generative 
of an imperialist conquest resulting in settler colonization of Native lands. 
 Hence, it is critical for any theory of anti-capitalism to understand the colonial 
basis of exploitation in the present day.  The expropriation Native nations should not be 
characterized as the removal of the worker from the land, but the removal of a people, a 
nation, from its homeland.  Thus far, most Marxist theories of the international relations 
of exploitation have centered on the idea of uneven development.  For example, Baran 
and Sweezy theorize that exploitation works as the layered effect of a complex hierarchy 




powerful.  They call those at the top of the hierarchy “metropolises” and those at the 
bottom “colonies” (1966, 179).  The problem with this vision of exploitation is that, in 
the case of the United States and many other nations, the metropolis is the colony.  To 
rethink exploitation, it should not only be seen as the external relation of a metropolis 
gathering wealth from its colonies, but as an internal relation of the metropolis to the 
stolen land it occupies continuously as a colonial force.  Emmanuel identifies this need 
for a shift in emphasis, 
International antagonisms cannot always be automatically reduced to the terms of 
class struggle.  We must pass from factory antagonisms to national antagonisms.  
On this level, there is no common measure between on the one hand the 
contradictions of great international capital and the under-developed peoples, and 
on the other hand the total enslavement and even physical extermination with 
which some of these peoples are threatened by true colonialism, which is that of 
the white settlers and their States, where these exist (1972, 57). 
 
 Incomplete theories of class conflict and colonialism lead to poorly formulated 
visions of future justice.  A Marxist understanding of land sees humans as part of nature, 
inextricably bound to the earth for their social, material and spiritual needs.  Self-
determined human existence means a rationally governed, undisturbed, and direct 
metabolic relationship between humans and land, between the soil and the associated 
producers.  But this vision of a rational and equal society misses the point that land 
divided proportionally amongst a settler proletariat still constitutes violent and unjust 
colonialism.  Tuck and Yang have criticized the Occupy movement for suggesting that 
land, like other forms of wealth, should be “distributed democratically” (2012, 24).  
Echoing their concerns, Coulthard writes 
what must be recognized by those inclined to advocate a blanket “return of the 
commons” as a redistributive counterstrategy to the neoliberal state’s new round 




only belong to somebody – the First Peoples of this land – they also deeply 
inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior that harbor 
profound insights into the maintenance of relationships within and between 
human beings and the natural world built on principles of reciprocity, 
nonexploitation and respectful coexistence (2014, 12). 
 
Coulthard’s insights here can carry the conversation to its final phase: How can a better 
understanding of colonialism re-radicalize Marxist thinking?  How should it alter theories 
of production, exploitation, value, and other affiliated concepts? 
 
Marxist futures? 
 A better understanding of colonialism should fundamentally alter visions of 
production, that is, what it means for humans to interact with land in a way that provides 
for their material needs.  Harkening back to that common critique of Marx, that he was an 
industrialist, there is clear enough evidence that at the very least Marx held a view of 
history that was progressivist in nature.  Specifically, this means a belief that human 
history is characterized by progress throughout distinct developmental stages 
characterized by evolving technical modes of production.  Exactly what sort of future 
relationship to technology Marx imagined is unclear, but what is clear was the view of 
Native livelihoods.  For example, Engels wrote in The Origin of the Family, 
However impressive the people of this epoch appear to us, they are completely 
undifferentiated from one another; as Marx says, they are still attached to the 
navel string of the primitive community. The power of this primitive community 
had to be broken, and it was broken. But it was broken by influences which from 
the very start appear as a degradation, a fall from the simple moral greatness of 
the old gentile society (Engels 2010, 130). 
 
This confirms the concerns of those like Russell Means who said that Marxists regard 
Native Americans as “primitive” and “economically retarded” (Churchill 1989, 26).  The 




social-dialectical transformations in order to emerge from the supposed womb-like state 
of the tribe into various forms of exploitation to finally emerge at a state of human 
liberation.  But this projects the dialectical upheavals specific to European history into a 
universal plane where they have no legitimacy.  As Sandy Grande writes, “Indeed Marx 
and Engels perceived the fate of the tribes as ‘doomed,’ destined to be absorbed by the 
more powerful organization of class-based societies” (Grande 2004, 49).  It is a violent 
proposition to suppose that self-determined nations who have provide for their own needs 
on terms they have elaborated over thousands of years must first be conquered and 
modernized to become free. 
 The concept of production and the basic life-sustaining activities of humans are 
wrapped up in a violent universal idea about progress and the eventual messianic 
culmination in the state of communism.  This overly simplistic theory of the resolution of 
human alienation from nature in the return to a direct relationship between the land and 
the associated producers is complicated by an anticolonial point of view.  As Deloria 
writes, Native People have not generally experienced an alienation from nature, but rather 
removal from a homeland (Churchill 1989, 131).  Hence, there is need for a very different 
resolution in their history.  Communism as a vision of human liberation is only 
appropriate to those who have experienced the specific historical conditions of alienation 
it takes as a starting premise; these are by no means universal. 
 Most fundamentally, Marxists should adopt the following principle when 
formulating visions of future justice:  The life activities that produce the mutually 
interdependent needs of humans and lands are not characterized by a general relation, but 




they merely an uncharacterized group of workers who just-so-happen to make their living 
in such-and-such a place?  Or rather are they more properly a specific group of humans 
who have developed personal understandings with a homeland?  The latter definition 
demands us to think of the production and reproduction of life in terms of personal rather 
than generic terms.  Accordingly, a settler liberated from capitalism living uninvited on 
Native lands is by no means an associated producer.   Rather they still fall under the 
definition of an exploiter of those lands because their existence is disruptive of the 
relationship of those who have fine-tuned their life activity since time immemorial to 
align with the material and spiritual requirements of that land.  It is equally important to 
think of exploitation not in its simple form of removing material and chemical values 
from soils, but rather as the overall intervention into living relationships for the benefit of 
colonial power. 
 An emphasis on the colonial relationship broadens the scope of analysis beyond 
capitalism, recognizing forms of exploitation that are not due to the monotonous hum of 
capital as value-in-motion.  It recognizes the relationships between peoples and lands as 
produced in mutual interaction over time rather than taking this relationship for granted, 
as if all peoples and all lands were more or less compatible and interchangeable.  The 
idea of the associated producers, a concept so significant for communist visions of the 
future, must be put in conversation with a concept of the associated peoples.  The 
associated producers have participated actively in the extirpation of the associated 
peoples from their lands.  The importance of envisioning Native futures as the associated 
peoples also has ecological implications.  Any generic “producer” can work a given 




land, who can direct human activity according to the needs of the whole community of 
life. 
 The concept of nationhood is often maligned by a liberal politics obsessed with 
privileged, empty, narcissistic fantasies of world-citizenship and cosmopolitanism.  
Nationhood on this view is irredeemably myopic and blindly patriotic.  As the iconic line 
goes, “Imagine there’s no countries.”  In addition to the rampant cultural appropriation of 
its era, there is a familiar racial undertone to this sentiment that was recently expressed in 
the title of Amy Chua’s popular book, Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of 
Nations.  The pejorative conception of “tribalism” based on racist anthropology belies an 
eerie accord between “color-blind racism” and a refusal to recognize legitimate national 
differences and therefore the right to national boundaries and self-determination.  
Granted, the tendency of Western nations to exist mostly as engines of imperialism might 
elicit a desire to do away with all nations.  As can be found in Veblen, “In the last 
analysis the nation remains a predatory organism, in practical effect an association of 
persons moved by a community interest in getting something for nothing by force and 
fraud” (1997, 442).  But it is unjust for members of imperialist nations to project the 
demons they have conjured as a universal reality.  Indigenous national identities also 
form real bastions of resistance to imperialism, colonialism, and expropriation.  Without 
nations as a possibility for alternative organizational principles, what is left to guide the 
fate of the world but the demands of capital? 
 The possibility of redefining nationhood as both an anticolonial strategy and 
revitalization of culture is already being pursued in Native theory and practice.  The 




theoretical distinctions necessary for clarity in such projects, emphasizing the root 
“peoplehood” of tribal nationalism in contrast to the assimilative liberal models built on 
judicial processes (Poliandri 2016, 2; Alfred 2009, 12).  This peoplehood is based on 
social identities in relation to a homeland that is both the ancestral birthplace and rightful 
future of the nation. 
 To become radicals again, it is imperative for Marxists to learn lessons of 
humility and historical fact to temper their worldview, ceasing to proselytize communism 
as universal truth.  As Peter Mclaren and Ramin Farahmandpur have written, it is far 
more productive to understand Marxism as a “weapon of interpretation...for analyzing 
and challenging capitalist production” (2001, 148).  Emmanuel writes that the failure to 
recognize the power of the “uncomfortable ‘third element’ of the white settler “makes for 
grave misunderstandings and prevents any true dialogue between revolutionary Marxism 
and decolonized peoples” (1972, 40).    Taking the anticolonial aspects of Marxism one a 
step further requires asking how the concept of production itself is challenged by 
reconceiving land as an agent.  What happens if the human relation to land is no longer 
thought of in terms of production but rather in terms of kinship?  Production as a 
fundamental ontology of land is insufficient for recognizing the unique character of 
Indigenous national identities.  An ontology of land as an agent makes these identities 
visible.  There is a need to supplant Marx’s conception of land as a use-value in a relation 
of dialectical productivity with human-created values.  The ethical reciprocity implied by 
kinship cannot play a secondary role in an anticolonial worldview.  Kinship can indeed 
be productive.  However, anticolonial Marxism frames the productivity and use of the 




universal categories.  They are specific to the history of the West.  Anticolonial Marxism 
relinquishes the absolute right of the proletariat to seize the means of production in any 
and all cases where this conflicts with the sovereignty of Native nations and where the 




V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 As a site of social revolution, land must also be a site of philosophical revolution.  
The major philosophical traditions of the West have not yet taken seriously the 
implications of land as a person.  Native philosophies of liberation are mocked, stolen, 
belittled, eliminated, ignored, patronized, objectified (“studied”), etc., and the reason for 
this could not be more clear:  The cognition of land as a person plants the seeds that 
unravel colonization.  The end of oppression requires a land where people can be free:  
Liberty needs a space of liberation.  But the land itself must also be free and these two 
forces of liberation are integrally linked.  If it is seen that land is a person, then it cannot 
be private property, communal property, or capital.  If it is seen that land is a person, then 
it cannot be the grounds of possibility for human poetic and cultural achievement.  If it is 
seen that land is a person, then it cannot be an anonymous plenum of elements from 
which humans wrench their needs.  If it is seen that land is a person, then our first relation 
to it cannot be one of generalized production or as a worker. 
 The goal of anticolonial critique is to achieve the justice of reuniting Native 
peoples with their lands.  Given the pervasive nature of colonialism, no single project, 
political movement, or philosophical idea can be sufficient for this task.  Hence, the 
temporality of anticolonial philosophy is an ongoing and cyclical process.  Old colonial 
ideas go dormant or fade from focus only to resurface again.  They must be challenged 
again and again.  No critical process can ever be “completed” in the sense that Marx 
describes the critique of religion.  So often, land is partially decolonized only to be 
recolonized (for example, the participation of Native tribes in the creation of Bear Ears 




progression directed at a fixed state of affairs in the future.  Decolonization is a praxis 
that requires repetition, response, and attention to reoccurring oppression.  In Native 
ritual practices of the Pacific Northwest, processes of healing and reflection match the 
temporal rhythms of land itself.  Seasonality, the cycling of energy and matter, and the 
migrations of living beings all offer opportunities for renewed thinking and action at the 
appropriate times and in the appropriate places.  When spring melts the snow in the 
mountains to call the first salmon home, this is the time to receive instruction from these 
ancestors and pay respect.  When camas blooms to adorn the fields with purple crowns, 
this is the time to ask what these sacred flowers express about the invisible richness 
beneath.  When the first huckleberries ripen in July, this is the time to ask how their 
bodily nourishment can be reciprocated.  When the acorns drop in the fall, this is the time 
to ask of the white oak what must be done to honor its gift.  Settlers must ask themselves 
additional questions at these times.  What do the First Foods ask of those who have 
forcibly disrupted the kinship of the land and its people?  Given proper time and 
attention, anticolonial philosophies in the West that are formed in and through 
decolonizing methodologies can begin to answer this question.  And answers to this 
question will focus around land. 
 No healing is possible from a colonizing attitude that sees no personality in land 
and reduces everything to its role in the history of European development.  Western 
anticolonial critique must stop to listen at the appropriate times and respond with care, 
respect, and gratitude for what has been learned.  It must propose real actions and 
changes in the culture and praxis of philosophy itself and society at large.  One place to 




example, editorial practices of journals, protocols and topics at conferences, invitations 
for contributions, hiring processes, and the relation of universities in general to the 
nations whose lands they occupy can all be reevaluated through anticolonial critique.  All 
these situations offer theoretical and practical space for decolonizing interventions on a 
quarterly, annual, or reoccurring basis.  Journal editors need to recognize the 
epistemological sovereignty of Native worldviews.  Conferences need to verbally 
acknowledge the Native people upon whose land they meet and whenever possible center 
Native voices and topics of concern.  Hiring committees need to stop using the excuse 
that “no Native person applied” and take it upon themselves to advertise and design jobs 
that attract Native scholars.  University administrators, faculty, employees, and students 
need to develop and deepen relationships with local tribes and regularly ask what specific 
steps can be taken to move towards decolonization not only in terms of research and 
teaching but in terms of the physical presence of the university campus on Native lands.  
Finally, anticolonial critique should ask questions about the university system in general 
as a colonial institution and whether its continued existence is compatible with 
decolonization. 
 Western philosophy will flounder and struggle to find meaningful emancipatory 
discourses through internal critique.  If there is one methodological lesson proposed by 
this dissertation, it is that inter-cultural dialogue centered on Native voices is the only 
path towards anticolonial philosophies in the West.  Although reconceiving land as a 
person is a foundational aspect of anticolonial philosophy, an emotional and practical 




theoretical development, or conceptual focus.  In the long run decolonization is a moral 
problem, not merely conceptual one. 
 As I sit and write these concluding sentences, I acknowledge that I am still 
occupying lands from which the Kalapuya people were forcibly removed and from which 
they remain separated.  This fact engenders a feeling of unsettledness in the sense that 
Tuck and Yang use it:  A feeling related to my own life as a settler.  It is not an 
uncomfortable feeling from which I or any Western scholar should shy away.  This 
dissertation has been an attempt to unsettle Western philosophical discourses that contain 
on the one hand great possibility for dialogue and material change, but on the other hand 
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